Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

[Gary Fuhrman]

Section 3.6 of NP takes up the predicate part of the proposition and "The
Iconical Side of Dicisigns". As Frederik remarks, "the important and
controversial idea here is that general, schematic images play a central
role in logic and cognition" (p. 61). The part of Peirce's Syllabus
(EP2:282) quoted on p. 62-3 is crucial, of course, but I'd like to focus on
the two excerpts from MS 599, "Reason's Rules" (1902?), which Frederik
includes in this section. The first is this:

"All icons, from mirror-images to algebraic formulae, are much alike,
committing themselves to nothing at all, yet the source of all our
information. They play in knowledge a part iconized by that played in
evolution according to the Darwinian theory, by fortuitous variations in
reproduction."



The relation between semiosis and evolution will be taken up in later
chapters. Here we might say that life commits itself (always temporarily!)
to selected forms through the evolutionary process of elimination (of forms
which don't pass the viability test). In the analagous process of cognition,
"knowledge" is a commitment to those forms which are not eliminated by the
pragmatic test of experiment/experience, but instead continue to guide our
interactions with the real world. Icons, representing Firstness, commit
themselves to nothing, but their connection (Thirdness) with experiential
external Secondnesses constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of
sign which actually makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!)
commitment to that connection is what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is
represented by assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in
biology is the adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its
form (sometimes by modifying it).



This analogy is of particular interest to us, I think, living as we do in a
biological age of mass extinction coupled with a cultural age of
"information overload".



But getting back to the proposition, here's the other excerpt from "Reason's
Rules" in NP 3.6:



A proposition never prescribes any particular mode of iconization, although
the form of expression may suggest some mode. [...] ... it is true (and a
significant truth) that every proposition is capable of expression either by
means of a photograph, or composite photograph, with or without stereoscopic
or cinetoscopic elaborations, together with some sign which shall show the
connection of these images with the object of some index or sign or
experience forcing the attention, or bringing some information, or
indicating some possible source of information; or else by means of some
analogous icon appealing to other senses than that of sight, together with
analogous forceful indications, and a sign connecting the icons with those
indices. ("Reason's Rules", 1902, Ms 599, 5-7)



This brings us to the syntax of the sign which Peirce later named
"Dicisign." That syntax (which should not be confused with the syntax of a
sentence) is the subject of the next section of NP, 3.7.



gary f.

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F wrote:

1) "Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is represented by assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying it)."

I think that Icons commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity- even though in themselves they convey no information; what is vital is their role of connectivity. And this connectivity is to Thirdness which functions as the general communal long term mode of identity. Therefore, this is not merely to promote adaptation of the species, which I suggest is informed more by deviations from the norm; it functions to promote continuity and robust stability of the species. Deviations emerge within connections with other Sign systems that provide their information to the 'home system'.

2) I don't think we live in a 'biological age of mass extinction'. Species always die and new ones or adaptations of the old, emerge. I'd say we are living in a biological age, as always, which operates as a complex adaptive system - and this complexity is increasing, which promotes both increasing decay and diversity. [I'd certainly agree with the 'information overload' comment!]

Edwina

----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List'
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 10:14 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6


Section 3.6 of NP takes up the predicate part of the proposition and "The Iconical Side of Dicisigns". As Frederik remarks, "the important and controversial idea here is that general, schematic images play a central role in logic and cognition" (p. 61). The part of Peirce's Syllabus (EP2:282) quoted on p. 62-3 is crucial, of course, but I'd like to focus on the two excerpts from MS 599, "Reason's Rules" (1902?), which Frederik includes in this section. The first is this:

"All icons, from mirror-images to algebraic formulae, are much alike, committing themselves to nothing at all, yet the source of all our information. They play in knowledge a part iconized by that played in evolution according to the Darwinian theory, by fortuitous variations in reproduction."



The relation between semiosis and evolution will be taken up in later chapters. Here we might say that life commits itself (always temporarily!) to selected forms through the evolutionary process of elimination (of forms which don't pass the viability test). In the analagous process of cognition, "knowledge" is a commitment to those forms which are not eliminated by the pragmatic test of experiment/experience, but instead continue to guide our interactions with the real world. Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is represented by assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying it).



This analogy is of particular interest to us, I think, living as we do in a biological age of mass extinction coupled with a cultural age of "information overload".



But getting back to the proposition, here's the other excerpt from "Reason's Rules" in NP 3.6:



A proposition never prescribes any particular mode of iconization, although the form of expression may suggest some mode. [...] ... it is true (and a significant truth) that every proposition is capable of expression either by means of a photograph, or composite photograph, with or without stereoscopic or cinetoscopic elaborations, together with some sign which shall show the connection of these images with the object of some index or sign or experience forcing the attention, or bringing some information, or indicating some possible source of information; or else by means of some analogous icon appealing to other senses than that of sight, together with analogous forceful indications, and a sign connecting the icons with those indices. ("Reason's Rules", 1902, Ms 599, 5-7)



This brings us to the syntax of the sign which Peirce later named "Dicisign." That syntax (which should not be confused with the syntax of a sentence) is the subject of the next section of NP, 3.7.



gary f.

[Gary Fuhrman]

Edwina, I guess you don't agree with Peirce that icons "commit themselves to
nothing at all" (MS 599, as quoted). You also seem to disagree with his
suggestion that "fortuitous variations in reproduction" (or what you call
"deviations from the norm") play a role in evolution analogous to the role
of icons in cognition (and the role of chance as Firstness in Peirce's
cosmology). This may well indicate a major difference between you and Peirce
concerning Firstness as a mode of being.



I'm more surprised, though, at your denial that this is an age of mass
extinction in biology - the seventh in the history of the planet, by the
usual count of evolutionary biologists, and the first to be caused mainly by
a single species (guess who). What I hear from biologists is that
biodiversity is in steep decline. I'd like to see your evidence that the
complexity of the biosphere is increasing . but not at the cost of
distracting the list from the main argument of NP. So I'll just leave it at
that.



gary f.



From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:***@primus.ca]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 10:38 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter
3.6



Gary F wrote:



1) "Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their
connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes
information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a
connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is
what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is represented by assertion as a
speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the
species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying
it)."



I think that Icons commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity-
even though in themselves they convey no information; what is vital is their
role of connectivity. And this connectivity is to Thirdness which functions
as the general communal long term mode of identity. Therefore, this is not
merely to promote adaptation of the species, which I suggest is informed
more by deviations from the norm; it functions to promote continuity and
robust stability of the species. Deviations emerge within connections with
other Sign systems that provide their information to the 'home system'.



2) I don't think we live in a 'biological age of mass extinction'. Species
always die and new ones or adaptations of the old, emerge. I'd say we are
living in a biological age, as always, which operates as a complex adaptive
system - and this complexity is increasing, which promotes both increasing
decay and diversity. [I'd certainly agree with the 'information overload'
comment!]


Edwina



----- Original Message -----

From: Gary Fuhrman <mailto:***@gnusystems.ca>

To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List'
<mailto:PEIRCE-***@list.iupui.edu>

Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 10:14 AM

Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6



Section 3.6 of NP takes up the predicate part of the proposition and "The
Iconical Side of Dicisigns". As Frederik remarks, "the important and
controversial idea here is that general, schematic images play a central
role in logic and cognition" (p. 61). The part of Peirce's Syllabus
(EP2:282) quoted on p. 62-3 is crucial, of course, but I'd like to focus on
the two excerpts from MS 599, "Reason's Rules" (1902?), which Frederik
includes in this section. The first is this:

"All icons, from mirror-images to algebraic formulae, are much alike,
committing themselves to nothing at all, yet the source of all our
information. They play in knowledge a part iconized by that played in
evolution according to the Darwinian theory, by fortuitous variations in
reproduction."



The relation between semiosis and evolution will be taken up in later
chapters. Here we might say that life commits itself (always temporarily!)
to selected forms through the evolutionary process of elimination (of forms
which don't pass the viability test). In the analagous process of cognition,
"knowledge" is a commitment to those forms which are not eliminated by the
pragmatic test of experiment/experience, but instead continue to guide our
interactions with the real world. Icons, representing Firstness, commit
themselves to nothing, but their connection (Thirdness) with experiential
external Secondnesses constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of
sign which actually makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!)
commitment to that connection is what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is
represented by assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in
biology is the adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its
form (sometimes by modifying it).



This analogy is of particular interest to us, I think, living as we do in a
biological age of mass extinction coupled with a cultural age of
"information overload".



But getting back to the proposition, here's the other excerpt from "Reason's
Rules" in NP 3.6:



A proposition never prescribes any particular mode of iconization, although
the form of expression may suggest some mode. [...] ... it is true (and a
significant truth) that every proposition is capable of expression either by
means of a photograph, or composite photograph, with or without stereoscopic
or cinetoscopic elaborations, together with some sign which shall show the
connection of these images with the object of some index or sign or
experience forcing the attention, or bringing some information, or
indicating some possible source of information; or else by means of some
analogous icon appealing to other senses than that of sight, together with
analogous forceful indications, and a sign connecting the icons with those
indices. ("Reason's Rules", 1902, Ms 599, 5-7)



This brings us to the syntax of the sign which Peirce later named
"Dicisign." That syntax (which should not be confused with the syntax of a
sentence) is the subject of the next section of NP, 3.7.



gary f.

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F - nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion? Nor do I disagree with the 'fortuitous variations in reproduction' play a role in adaptation. I've constantly focused on the vital role of chance/Firstness. My comment was on the nature of the connections, where I pointed out that the function of Thirdness was not merely mediation but also continuity of type. It isn't easy for novelty to get Thirdness to change! Therefore, chance - if we consider it only as randomness (and I don't think it is)...is necessary restrained within the general constraints of Thirdness.

Constructive deviations do not, in my view, emerge within random chance mutations -- and Peirce also rejected that evoluation/adaptation was guided only by mechanical randomness and held that an agapastic 'connected and informed' force was the key agent in adaptation/evolution). Chance or Firstness is a much stronger force than mere mechanical randomness. Its connectedness enables it to offer informed potentiality rather than mechanical uninformed randomness.

As for my disagreement with your 'Man-as-Sinner' - we'll have to leave it at that. I disgree and point to the various research on complex adaptive systems which disagree with the one-way linearity of your view. I strongly promote CAS (complex adapative systems) functioning in all realms - biological as well as societal, economic, etc..and view semiosis as the basic process in the CAS....lots of articles on biology as a CAS and the saltational dynamics that take place.
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List'
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 11:50 AM
Subject: RE: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6


Edwina, I guess you don't agree with Peirce that icons "commit themselves to nothing at all" (MS 599, as quoted). You also seem to disagree with his suggestion that "fortuitous variations in reproduction" (or what you call "deviations from the norm") play a role in evolution analogous to the role of icons in cognition (and the role of chance as Firstness in Peirce's cosmology). This may well indicate a major difference between you and Peirce concerning Firstness as a mode of being.



I'm more surprised, though, at your denial that this is an age of mass extinction in biology - the seventh in the history of the planet, by the usual count of evolutionary biologists, and the first to be caused mainly by a single species (guess who). What I hear from biologists is that biodiversity is in steep decline. I'd like to see your evidence that the complexity of the biosphere is increasing . but not at the cost of distracting the list from the main argument of NP. So I'll just leave it at that.



gary f.



From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:***@primus.ca]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 10:38 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6



Gary F wrote:



1) "Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is represented by assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying it)."



I think that Icons commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity- even though in themselves they convey no information; what is vital is their role of connectivity. And this connectivity is to Thirdness which functions as the general communal long term mode of identity. Therefore, this is not merely to promote adaptation of the species, which I suggest is informed more by deviations from the norm; it functions to promote continuity and robust stability of the species. Deviations emerge within connections with other Sign systems that provide their information to the 'home system'.



2) I don't think we live in a 'biological age of mass extinction'. Species always die and new ones or adaptations of the old, emerge. I'd say we are living in a biological age, as always, which operates as a complex adaptive system - and this complexity is increasing, which promotes both increasing decay and diversity. [I'd certainly agree with the 'information overload' comment!]


Edwina



----- Original Message -----

From: Gary Fuhrman

To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List'

Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 10:14 AM

Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6



Section 3.6 of NP takes up the predicate part of the proposition and "The Iconical Side of Dicisigns". As Frederik remarks, "the important and controversial idea here is that general, schematic images play a central role in logic and cognition" (p. 61). The part of Peirce's Syllabus (EP2:282) quoted on p. 62-3 is crucial, of course, but I'd like to focus on the two excerpts from MS 599, "Reason's Rules" (1902?), which Frederik includes in this section. The first is this:

"All icons, from mirror-images to algebraic formulae, are much alike, committing themselves to nothing at all, yet the source of all our information. They play in knowledge a part iconized by that played in evolution according to the Darwinian theory, by fortuitous variations in reproduction."



The relation between semiosis and evolution will be taken up in later chapters. Here we might say that life commits itself (always temporarily!) to selected forms through the evolutionary process of elimination (of forms which don't pass the viability test). In the analagous process of cognition, "knowledge" is a commitment to those forms which are not eliminated by the pragmatic test of experiment/experience, but instead continue to guide our interactions with the real world. Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is what we call "knowledge" or "belief" and is represented by assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying it).



This analogy is of particular interest to us, I think, living as we do in a biological age of mass extinction coupled with a cultural age of "information overload".



But getting back to the proposition, here's the other excerpt from "Reason's Rules" in NP 3.6:



A proposition never prescribes any particular mode of iconization, although the form of expression may suggest some mode. [...] ... it is true (and a significant truth) that every proposition is capable of expression either by means of a photograph, or composite photograph, with or without stereoscopic or cinetoscopic elaborations, together with some sign which shall show the connection of these images with the object of some index or sign or experience forcing the attention, or bringing some information, or indicating some possible source of information; or else by means of some analogous icon appealing to other senses than that of sight, together with analogous forceful indications, and a sign connecting the icons with those indices. ("Reason's Rules", 1902, Ms 599, 5-7)



This brings us to the syntax of the sign which Peirce later named "Dicisign." That syntax (which should not be confused with the syntax of a sentence) is the subject of the next section of NP, 3.7.



gary f.

[Gary Fuhrman]

Clark, your quotes from CP 3.433-5 jogged my memory and sent me back to
their source, Peirce’s 1896 Monist article “The Regenerated Logic”; and I
found there a good example of a Dicisign, given by Peirce several years
before he invented the term, yet fairly clear about the role of iconicity in
the dicisign. CP 3.433:



When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or other
signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some
hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a
stranger upon a different planet, an æon later; or it may be that very same
man as he will be a second after. In any case, the deliverer makes signals
to the receiver. Some of these signs (or at least one of them) are supposed
to excite in the mind of the receiver familiar images, pictures, or, we
might almost say, dreams — that is, reminiscences of sights, sounds,
feelings, tastes, smells, or other sensations, now quite detached from the
original circumstances of their first occurrence, so that they are free to
be attached to new occasions. The deliverer is able to call up these images
at will (with more or less effort) in his own mind; and he supposes the
receiver can do the same. For instance, tramps have the habit of carrying
bits of chalk and making marks on the fences to indicate the habits of the
people that live there for the benefit of other tramps who may come on
later. If in this way a tramp leaves an assertion that the people are
stingy, he supposes the reader of the signal will have met stingy people
before, and will be able to call up an image of such a person attachable to
a person whose acquaintance he has not yet made. Not only is the outward
significant word or mark a sign, but the image which it is expected to
excite in the mind of the receiver will likewise be a sign — a sign by
resemblance, or, as we say, an icon — of the similar image in the mind of
the deliverer, and through that also a sign of the real quality of the
thing. This icon is called the predicate of the assertion. But instead of a
single icon, or sign by resemblance of a familiar image or “dream,” evocable
at will, there may be a complexus of such icons, forming a composite image
of which the whole is not familiar. But though the whole is not familiar,
yet not only are the parts familiar images, but there will also be a
familiar image of its mode of composition.



Now, the tramp’s chalk mark is NOT an icon of its object, rather it’s a
conventional symbol; but its replication on a particular fence is a
proposition and a dicisign, and functions as such because its placement
there is an index involving an icon, which is the predicate of the
proposition (and thus of the assertion).



I thought this worth quoting because it might be a more perspicuous example
of a nonverbal proposition than the “Gun Country” example. Besides, the last
two sentences anticipate Peirce’s later doctrine (covered in NP 3.7) of the
syntax of the proposition, which is itself iconic in a special way. (So I
changed the subject line here from Chapter 3.5 to 3.6.)



gary f.



From: Clark Goble [mailto:***@lextek.com]
Sent: 3-Oct-14 3:11 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5





On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <***@nau.edu>
wrote:



Perhaps we should distinguish between different ways that the word
'intention' is used in Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning that is
expressed when I say, for instance, that my intention in writing the
sentences above is to engage in a discussion with colleagues in the hopes of
improving our shared understanding of these questions. There is also the
more technical meaning of the term that is involved in the distinction
between first and second intentions in the theory of logic.



I think this is right. The word “intention” has so many connotations that
can lead us astray if we aren’t careful.



Although when Gary says intention need not be conscious I think he’s moving
us to the world of virtuality within Peirce and so it’s not intentionality
of the sort we usually encounter in philosophy of mind.



Frederick definitely does not see intentional acts necessarily accompanying
the dicisign. (See his post of Sept 1)



As for an example, I can’t think of an unintentional dicisign off the top of
my head. (Give me time - I’m sure someone will) However this statement by
Peirce on icons might be of interest in determining his use of intents.



The sort of idea which an icon embodies, if it be such that it can convey
any positive information, being applicable to some things but not to others,
is called a first intention. The idea embodied by an icon which cannot of
itself convey any information, being applicable to everything or to nothing,
but which may, nevertheless, be useful in modifying other icons, is called a
second intention. (CP 3.433)



and a few pages later



Neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor both together, can make an
assertion. The assertion represents a compulsion which experience, meaning
the course of life, brings upon the deliverer to attach the predicate to the
subjects as a sign of them taken in a particular way. This compulsion
strikes him at a certain instant; and he remains under it forever after. It
is, therefore, different from the temporary force which the hecceities exert
upon his attention. This new compulsion may pass out of mind for the time
being; but it continues just the same, and will act whenever the occasion
arises, that is, whenever those particular hecceities and that first
intention are called to mind together. It is, therefore, a permanent
conditional force, or law. The deliverer thus requires a kind of sign which
shall signify a law that to objects of indices an icon appertains as sign of
them in a given way. Such a sign has been called a symbol. It is the copula
of the assertion. (CP 3.435)



This is interesting since it does break with traditional speech act theory
where intentionality plays such a significant role. Personally I see
Peirce’s semiotics reversing the usual way signs or interpretation are
thought of in philosophy. Thus it’s objects that determine the interpretant
rather than an interpreter interpreting an object to create an
interpretation. Rather than a traditional interpretation with conscious
creation we have compulsions.



And of course, since I’ve brought up Derrida & Heidegger a few times that
last sentence is relevant to what I’ve spoken of before.

[Howard Pattee]

At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:

>Peirce: "When an assertion is made, there really
>is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who
>delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will
>be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter
>who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a
>different planet, an æon later; or it may be
>that very same man as he will be a second after.
>In any case, the deliverer makes signals to the receiver."

HP: Here is another view of how this works. In
our case, from the moment we type an assertion,
draw a diagram, or attach a photo, all the
communicated information is immediately coded
into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not logic)
and transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or
light (the same thing at shorter wavelengths). In
principle, all the coding can be done by Peirce
Arrows (NAND gates) and all the electrons and
waves obey Maxwell's equations. At the receiver
sequences are decoded, and the sender and
receiver do not care about the math, physics, or
the bit sequences, which is precisely why the bit
sequences are pure symbols and not icons,
indices, or any tokens with intrinsic physical similarities or meanings.

In the language of physics, the conditions for a
pure symbol vehicle with the function of
efficiently communicating information of any type
is that neither the physical structure nor the
sequential order of the symbols are determined or
influenced by physical laws. That means the
sequences do not differ significantly in energy
or forces between them. All efficient information
structures like sequences and memories are called energy degenerate.

That does not mean communication is independent
of laws. The 2nd law of thermodynamics says that
every bit of information added, erased, coded,
decoded or used will dissipate a little energy
(On the Internet this adds up to enormous energy
dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol
manipulating chemistry in brains or hardware
gates is limited by quantum mechanics.

In the language of Communication Theory, for
efficient communication of any type of
information, all the meaning should be hidden by
codes that translate the information into meaningless symbols.

Howard






>Some of these signs (or at least one of them)
>are supposed to excite in the mind of the
>receiver familiar images, pictures, or, we might
>almost say, dreams ­ that is, reminiscences of
>sights, sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, or
>other sensations, now quite detached from the
>original circumstances of their first
>occurrence, so that they are free to be attached
>to new occasions. The deliverer is able to call
>up these images at will (with more or less
>effort) in his own mind; and he supposes the
>receiver can do the same. For instance, tramps
>have the habit of carrying bits of chalk and
>making marks on the fences to indicate the
>habits of the people that live there for the
>benefit of other tramps who may come on later.
>If in this way a tramp leaves an assertion that
>the people are stingy, he supposes the reader of
>the signal will have met stingy people before,
>and will be able to call up an image of such a
>person attachable to a person whose acquaintance
>he has not yet made. Not only is the outward
>significant word or mark a sign, but the image
>which it is expected to excite in the mind of
>the receiver will likewise be a sign ­ a sign by
>resemblance, or, as we say, an icon ­ of the
>similar image in the mind of the deliverer, and
>through that also a sign of the real quality of
>the thing. This icon is called the predicate of
>the assertion. But instead of a single icon, or
>sign by resemblance of a familiar image or
>“dream,” evocable at will, there may be a
>complexus of such icons, forming a composite
>image of which the whole is not familiar. But
>though the whole is not familiar, yet not only
>are the parts familiar images, but there will
>also be a familiar image of its mode of composition.
>
>Now, the tramp’s chalk mark is NOT an icon of
>its object, rather it’s a conventional symbol;
>but its replication on a particular fence is a
>proposition and a dicisign, and functions as
>such because its placement there is an index
>involving an icon, which is the predicate of the
>proposition (and thus of the assertion).
>
>I thought this worth quoting because it might be
>a more perspicuous example of a nonverbal
>proposition than the “Gun Country” example.
>Besides, the last two sentences anticipate
>Peirce’s later doctrine (covered in NP 3.7) of
>the syntax of the proposition, which is itself
>iconic in a special way. (So I changed the
>subject line here from Chapter 3.5 to 3.6.)
>
>gary f.
>
>From: Clark Goble [mailto:***@lextek.com]
>Sent: 3-Oct-14 3:11 PM
>To: Peirce List
>Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5
>
>
>On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian
>Downard <<mailto:***@nau.edu>***@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>Perhaps we should distinguish between different
>ways that the word 'intention' is used in
>Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning
>that is expressed when I say, for instance, that
>my intention in writing the sentences above is
>to engage in a discussion with colleagues in the
>hopes of improving our shared understanding of
>these questions. There is also the more
>technical meaning of the term that is involved
>in the distinction between first and second intentions in the theory of logic.
>
>
>I think this is right. The word “intention” has
>so many connotations that can lead us astray if we aren’t careful.
>
>Although when Gary says intention need not be
>conscious I think he’s moving us to the world of
>virtuality within Peirce and so it’s not
>intentionality of the sort we usually encounter in philosophy of mind.
>
>Frederick definitely does not see intentional
>acts necessarily accompanying the dicisign. (See his post of Sept 1)
>
>As for an example, I can’t think of an
>unintentional dicisign off the top of my head.
>(Give me time - I’m sure someone will) However
>this statement by Peirce on icons might be of
>interest in determining his use of intents.
>
>The sort of idea which an icon embodies, if it
>be such that it can convey any positive
>information, being applicable to some things but
>not to others, is called a first intention. The
>idea embodied by an icon which cannot of itself
>convey any information, being applicable to
>everything or to nothing, but which may,
>nevertheless, be useful in modifying other
>icons, is called a second intention. (CP 3.433)
>
>
>and a few pages later
>
>Neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor
>both together, can make an assertion. The
>assertion represents a compulsion which
>experience, meaning the course of life, brings
>upon the deliverer to attach the predicate to
>the subjects as a sign of them taken in a
>particular way. This compulsion strikes him at a
>certain instant; and he remains under it forever
>after. It is, therefore, different from the
>temporary force which the hecceities exert upon
>his attention. This new compulsion may pass out
>of mind for the time being; but it continues
>just the same, and will act whenever the
>occasion arises, that is, whenever those
>particular hecceities and that first intention
>are called to mind together. It is, therefore, a
>permanent conditional force, or law. The
>deliverer thus requires a kind of sign which
>shall signify a law that to objects of indices
>an icon appertains as sign of them in a given
>way. Such a sign has been called a symbol. It is
>the copula of the assertion. (CP 3.435)
>
>This is interesting since it does break with
>traditional speech act theory where
>intentionality plays such a significant role.
>Personally I see Peirce’s semiotics reversing
>the usual way signs or interpretation are
>thought of in philosophy. Thus it’s objects that
>determine the interpretant rather than an
>interpreter interpreting an object to create an
>interpretation. Rather than a traditional
>interpretation with conscious creation we have compulsions.
>
>And of course, since I’ve brought up Derrida &
>Heidegger a few times that last sentence is
>relevant to what I’ve spoken of before.

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word “symbol” is used
in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics
is of limited use in semiotics.



In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirce’s definition of
“symbol” as “a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be
so interpreted” (http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3e).

This post, for example, is a symbol because the semiotic systems (languages
and technologies) at my end are sufficiently similar to those at your end
that I can assume that it will be interpreted as a sign of what I mean to
say. The rules governing semiotic systems can be called “codes” if you like,
and thus as Bateson put it, All messages are coded. Peirce on the other hand
calls them “legisigns.” (The laws of nature are also legisigns.)



gary f.



From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 9:54 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Cc: ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6



At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:




Peirce: "When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or
other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some
hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a
stranger upon a different planet, an æon later; or it may be that very same
man as he will be a second after. In any case, the deliverer makes signals
to the receiver."


HP: Here is another view of how this works. In our case, from the moment we
type an assertion, draw a diagram, or attach a photo, all the communicated
information is immediately coded into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not
logic) and transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or light (the same thing
at shorter wavelengths). In principle, all the coding can be done by Peirce
Arrows (NAND gates) and all the electrons and waves obey Maxwell's
equations. At the receiver sequences are decoded, and the sender and
receiver do not care about the math, physics, or the bit sequences, which is
precisely why the bit sequences are pure symbols and not icons, indices, or
any tokens with intrinsic physical similarities or meanings.

In the language of physics, the conditions for a pure symbol vehicle with
the function of efficiently communicating information of any type is that
neither the physical structure nor the sequential order of the symbols are
determined or influenced by physical laws. That means the sequences do not
differ significantly in energy or forces between them. All efficient
information structures like sequences and memories are called energy
degenerate.

That does not mean communication is independent of laws. The 2nd law of
thermodynamics says that every bit of information added, erased, coded,
decoded or used will dissipate a little energy (On the Internet this adds up
to enormous energy dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol
manipulating chemistry in brains or hardware gates is limited by quantum
mechanics.

In the language of Communication Theory, for efficient communication of any
type of information, all the meaning should be hidden by codes that
translate the information into meaningless symbols.

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol"
>is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the
>language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.

HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most
efficient and unambiguous communication is by simple coded sequences
with bits that are not icons or indices or tokens with semantic content.

>GF: In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirce's
>definition of "symbol" as "a sign which is fit to serve as such
>simply because it will be so interpreted"

HP: Yes, like bit strings. These physical and information theory
conditions do not depend on Peirce's theory of signs or naming bits
"symbols" or "legisigns". You are free to ignore these laws, but no
semiotic practice can avoid them. In any case, we cannot continue
this efficient communication without bit sequences.

Howard

"In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice
they are not." Einstein

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard,



Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or "legisigns". Bits
(as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic
sense of the word "symbol"; they are not symbols in the Peircean sense
because a bit by itself, out of any context, will not and cannot be
interpreted as a sign. Moreover, you can't make bits into symbols just by
stringing them together. Bit strings can be used to replicate a symbol, such
as a sentence or an email message or a book, but then it is the symbol that
will determine the interpretant, not the bits or bit strings.



It's true that communication can only take place by physical means - as
Peirce puts it, signs can only exist in replica - but the material medium in
itself can only be a sinsign, not a legisign, and not a symbol in the
Peircean sense. And it won't even be a sinsign, won't be a sign at all, if
it doesn't contribute its bit to the activation a semiotic system.



gary f.

From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 5-Oct-14 12:11 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6



At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:



Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol" is used
in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics
is of limited use in semiotics.


HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most efficient
and unambiguous communication is by simple coded sequences with bits that
are not icons or indices or tokens with semantic content.




GF: In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirce's definition
of "symbol" as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will
be so interpreted"


HP: Yes, like bit strings. These physical and information theory conditions
do not depend on Peirce's theory of signs or naming bits "symbols" or
"legisigns". You are free to ignore these laws, but no semiotic practice can
avoid them. In any case, we cannot continue this efficient communication
without bit sequences.

Howard

"In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice they
are not." Einstein

[Howard Pattee]

At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

>Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or
>"legisigns". Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of
>symbols in the semiotic sense of the word "symbol"; they are not
>symbols in the Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out of any
>context, will not and cannot be interpreted as a sign.

HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit
some kind of sign?

Howard

"There are 10 kinds of people in the world. Those who know binary,
and those who don't." Don Knuth

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard,

HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some
kind of sign?

GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0).
But without the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as the
answer to the question*, - part of which context is the legisign
establishing that 1 is in binary opposition to 0 - that bit conveys zero
information and is not a sign of anything.
Can you give me a one-bit question?

gary f.

-----Original Message-----
From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 5-Oct-14 3:53 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6

At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

>Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or "legisigns".
>Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of symbols in the
>semiotic sense of the word "symbol"; they are not symbols in the
>Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out of any context, will not
>and cannot be interpreted as a sign.

HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some
kind of sign?

Howard

"There are 10 kinds of people in the world. Those who know binary, and those
who don't." Don Knuth

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 5, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman <***@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
> HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
> Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some
> kind of sign?
>
> GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0).
> But without the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as the
> answer to the question*, - part of which context is the legisign
> establishing that 1 is in binary opposition to 0 - that bit conveys zero
> information and is not a sign of anything.
> Can you give me a one-bit question?

The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here.

[Howard Pattee]

At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote:

>The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here
>[Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement].

HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type
of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1.

Howard

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard, I'm glad you now see the ambiguity of "bit" (thanks to Clark for
pointing that out). But if there is any remaining disagreement between us,
it resides in the ambiguity of "information". Bits are countable quantities
of useful as a measure of Shannon "information". "Information" in Peircean
logic is defined as the logical product of the breadth and depth of a sign;
these are logical quantities and cannot be measured in bits. Shannon
information is useful for the effective engineering of communication
channels; Peircean information is useful for purposes of semiotic analysis.
We can't understand Dicisigns as "informational signs" or
"quasi-propositions" (EP2:275) without using the semiotic concept of
"information".



gary f.



From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 5-Oct-14 7:36 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6



At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote:




The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here [Pattee-Fuhrman
disagreement].


HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type of
information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1.

Howard

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, Howard,

It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information. Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes Shannon's.

A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is to read what he rewrites about it in his 1865 & 1866 lectures on the Logic of Science.

See also my notes:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Extension

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> On Oct 6, 2014, at 7:45 AM, "Gary Fuhrman" <***@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
> Howard, I’m glad you now see the ambiguity of “bit” (thanks to Clark for pointing that out). But if there is any remaining disagreement between us, it resides in the ambiguity of “information”. Bits are countable quantities of useful as a measure of Shannon “information”. “Information” in Peircean logic is defined as the logical product of the breadth and depth of a sign; these are logical quantities and cannot be measured in bits. Shannon information is useful for the effective engineering of communication channels; Peircean information is useful for purposes of semiotic analysis. We can’t understand Dicisigns as “informational signs” or “quasi-propositions” (EP2:275) without using the semiotic concept of “information”.
>
> gary f.
>
> From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
> Sent: 5-Oct-14 7:36 PM
> To: Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
>
> At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote:
>
>
> The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here [Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement].
>
> HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1.
>
> Howard
>

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Gary Fuhrman
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544

Gary, Howard, & All,

Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and the
Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the information in
my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another channel:

It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes Shannon's.

A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is to
read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of Science.

See also my notes:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Extension

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

[Gary Fuhrman]

re Peircean information, there's also my 2010 paper on it, but it's rather
long ...
http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm

gary f.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:***@att.net]
Sent: 6-Oct-14 8:54 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

Re: Gary Fuhrman
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544

Gary, Howard, & All,

Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and the
Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the information
in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another
channel:

It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes
Shannon's.

A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is
to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of
Science.

See also my notes:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Ex
tension

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon wrote in the cited link below provides unambiguous definitions of
"icon", "index", and "symbol" as signs:

"By focussing on specific relations within the basic triad of
Sign-Object-Interpretant, Peirce classified signs in various trichotomies.
The most basic and important of these (for our purposes) designates types
of signs by their relation to their objects:

the icon, or sign of Firstness, is connected to its object only by
resemblance to it in some respect.

the index, or sign of Secondness, is actually connected to its object –
usually either by ‘efficient’ causality, as when the impact of light makes
its mark on a photograph, or by forcefully directing attention to the
object, as a pointing ‘index’ finger may do if the object is a visible
thing.

the symbol, which ‘is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that
it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or
conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed
its selection’ (BD, ‘Symbol’)."

I hope that these statements will permanently silence the odd view often
expressed on these lists that "An icon is not a sign."

With all the best.

Sung
_____________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net






> re Peircean information, there's also my 2010 paper on it, but it's rather
> long ...
> http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm
>
> gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:***@att.net]
> Sent: 6-Oct-14 8:54 AM
> To: 'Peirce List'
> Cc: ***@lists.ut.ee
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
>
> Re: Gary Fuhrman
> At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544
>
> Gary, Howard, & All,
>
> Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and
> the
> Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the
> information
> in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another
> channel:
>
> It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
> Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes
> Shannon's.
>
> A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is
> to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of
> Science.
>
> See also my notes:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Ex
> tension
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>

[Sungchul Ji]

Gary F wrote in the following link:

"As De Tienne (2006) explains:
Peirce's elaborate discussion of dicisigns or propositions (100614-1)
in the Syllabus of 1903 (EP2: 275–85, 294–99) and in ‘New
Elements’ (EP2: 308–24) demonstrates clearly how such
propositions always involve iconic and indexical elements—
. . . "


I am puzzled.

How can a dicisign (or propositions) have an icon as its object ?
According to the 10 classes of signs, there are only 3 dicisigns that
implicate icons -- dicent indexical sinsign, decent indexical legisign,
and decent symbolic legisign. There is no decent iconic qulaisign, nor
decent iconic sinsign, nor decent iconic legisign, because these violate
the so-called 'Peircean selection rule', according to the quark model of
the Peircean sign.

With all the best.

Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net



> re Peircean information, there's also my 2010 paper on it, but it's rather
> long ...
> http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm
>
> gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:***@att.net]
> Sent: 6-Oct-14 8:54 AM
> To: 'Peirce List'
> Cc: ***@lists.ut.ee
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
>
> Re: Gary Fuhrman
> At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544
>
> Gary, Howard, & All,
>
> Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and
> the
> Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the
> information
> in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another
> channel:
>
> It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
> Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes
> Shannon's.
>
> A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is
> to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of
> Science.
>
> See also my notes:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Ex
> tension
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>

[Gary Fuhrman]

Sung, you need to read the EP passages cited (and/or Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3) on dicisigns and propositions. They do not have icons as objects;
rather their *relation to* their object is iconic as well as indexical (and
sometimes symbolic). There is no other way for an indexical sign to convey
information.

gary f.

-----Original Message-----
From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:***@rci.rutgers.edu]
Sent: 6-Oct-14 4:10 PM

Gary F wrote in the following link:

"As De Tienne (2006) explains:
Peirce's elaborate discussion of dicisigns or propositions (100614-1)
in the Syllabus of 1903 (EP2: 275-85, 294-99) and in 'New Elements' (EP2:
308-24) demonstrates clearly how such propositions always involve iconic and
indexical elements- . . . "


I am puzzled.

How can a dicisign (or propositions) have an icon as its object ?
According to the 10 classes of signs, there are only 3 dicisigns that
implicate icons -- dicent indexical sinsign, decent indexical legisign, and
decent symbolic legisign. There is no decent iconic qulaisign, nor decent
iconic sinsign, nor decent iconic legisign, because these violate the
so-called 'Peircean selection rule', according to the quark model of the
Peircean sign.

With all the best.

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon wrote:

"It is necessary to distinguish information (100614-1)
from measures of information."

Is this because information has three aspects/properties -- i) quantity,
ii) meaning, and iii) value, and yest Shannon's information theory and
other similar quantitative approaches to information can only capture the
first and not the rest ?


With all the best.

Sung
_________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net




> Re: Gary Fuhrman
> At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544
>
> Gary, Howard, & All,
>
> Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and
> the
> Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the
> information in
> my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another
> channel:
>
> It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
> Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes
> Shannon's.
>
> A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is
> to
> read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of
> Science.
>
> See also my notes:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Extension
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

[Jon Awbrey]

JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14548
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14554

Sung, List,

It is not the purpose of a measure to replace the thing measured.
Whether a measure serves any given purpose depends on many factors:
its à priori logical consistency, its empirical construct validity,
and even the efficiency of computing it in critical applications.

Regards,

Jon

Sungchul Ji wrote:
> Jon wrote:
>
> "It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information."
>
> Is this because information has three aspects/properties -- i) quantity, ii)
> meaning, and iii) value, and yet Shannon's information theory and other
> similar quantitative approaches to information can only capture the first and
> not the rest ?
>
>
> With all the best.
>
> Sung _________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology
> and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway,
> N.J. 08855 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
>
>> Re: Gary Fuhrman
>> At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544
>>
>> Gary, Howard, & All,
>>
>> Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and
>> the Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the
>> information in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is
>> by another channel:
>>
>> It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information.
>> Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes
>> Shannon's.
>>
>> A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is
>> to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of
>> Science.
>>
>> See also my notes:
>>
>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Extension
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

[Howard Pattee]

At 07:45 AM 10/6/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>"Information" in Peircean logic is defined as the logical product of
>the breadth and depth of a sign; these are logical quantities and
>cannot be measured in bits.

HP: I do not understand a "quantity" that has no measure of some
kind. If not information, what do you call it?

Howard

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard, see Baldwin's Dictionary on "quantity", especially (3) and (5):

http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Quantity



Also see NP p.50 on the Frege/Peirce discovery of quantification in logic.



gary f.



} In all ages we look down the well of history and see our own reflection.
[Anthony Freeman] {

www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics





From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 6-Oct-14 9:23 AM
To: 'Peirce List'; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:7111] Re: Natural Propositions,



At 07:45 AM 10/6/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:



"Information" in Peircean logic is defined as the logical product of the
breadth and depth of a sign; these are logical quantities and cannot be
measured in bits.


HP: I do not understand a "quantity" that has no measure of some kind. If
not information, what do you call it?

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Gary F,

I was responding to your statement: "Bits (as the name implies!) can
only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word
"symbol"; they are not symbols."

Of course, a bit is not a symbol or a piece of symbol. It is a
measure of information. I was trying to indicate that there are
one-bit answers. By definition of sign, any sign used to answer must
be interpretable. An "I agree" or I disagree" or a "Yes" or "No"
require just as clear interpretation as a 0 or 1.

Howard

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary F., Howard, lists,

I meant to take this up before but I got busy. I don't think that Howard
was so far off the mark in this. A symbol represents in virtue of a
habit or disposition for its interpretation. Those 1's and 0's are
symbols, or parts of symbols, in virtue of a code that is the habit or
disposition whereby to translate them into the conventional language
signs that the 1's and 0's symbolize. Indeed all the ordinary-language
indices, icons, and symbols are there in the strings of 1s and 0s for
those who can read them. Howard's main point was the efficiency that
symbols permit. This is because the requisite sign-system information is
'front-loaded' into the code and into the mind or quasi-mind that can
read, decode, the encoding. The coding gains efficiency by 'hiding' the
unwieldy qualities and reactions to which it refers, lets them be
translated into signs in another domain. The question of whether the 1's
and 0's should be called _/symbols/_, or parts of symbols, seems
equivalent to the question of whether a vegetable-organismic,
value-laden ('teleonomic') but non-learning inference process should be
called _/semiosis/_. However, even if one denies such semiosis, the
codings have what is needed in order to function as symbols in the same
sense as reactions and factually connected things have what is needed to
function as indices, and things similar to things have what is needed to
function as icons.

[Quote Peirce]
[...] thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be
interpreted as denoting the object [that's a great efficiency -
B.U.], in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a
natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. I next examine
into the different efficiencies and inefficiencies of these three
kinds of signs in aiding the ascertainment of truth. A Symbol
incorporates a habit and is indispensable to the application of any
intellectual habit at least. Moreover Symbols afford the means of
thinking about thoughts in ways in which we could not otherwise
think of them. They enable us, for example, to create Abstractions,
without which we should lack a great engine of discovery. These
enable us to count; they teach us that collections are individuals
(individual = individual object), and in many respects they are the
very warp of reason. But since symbols rest exclusively on habits
already definitely formed but not furnishing any observation even of
themselves, and since knowledge is habit, they do not enable us to
add to our knowledge even so much as a necessary consequent, unless
by means of a definite preformed habit. [....]
["Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism", 1906, CP 4.531
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/prolegomena.htm#Paragraph531
]

Since I've mentioned the vegetable-organismic level, I'd just point out
that life deals not only with messages within the organism, or among
organisms of the same species, etc., with the same special codes, based
on the interests of the given species, but also with mixed and scrambled
messages from material nature and other species, from which a living
thing seeks to extract information. So, allowing at least for
exposition's sake the idea of vegetable-level semiosis, the overall
efficient economy of vegetable-level 'interpretation of signs'
(including indices and semblances in its environment) may not afford, in
an organism, a level or system that deals purely in symbolic
communication with the kind of Shannon-style code, binary, ternary, or
otherwise, that can be used in computer programs, i.e., context, shifts
of context, etc., matter too much for such a thing. At the same time,
the particular efficiency of symbols would seem to place an evolutionary
premium on them.

Best, Ben

On 10/5/2014 4:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

> Howard,
>
> HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is
> it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some
> kind of sign?
>
> GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). But without
> the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as the answer
> to the question*, - part of which context is the legisign establishing
> that 1 is in binary opposition to 0 - that bit conveys zero
> information and is not a sign of anything.
> Can you give me a one-bit question?
>
> gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
> Sent: 5-Oct-14 3:53 PM
> To: ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions,
> Chapter 3.6
>
>> At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>
>>> Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or
>>> "legisigns". Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of
>>> symbols in the semiotic sense of the word "symbol"; they are not
>>> symbols in the Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out of any
>>> context, will not and cannot be interpreted as a sign.
>>>
>>>> HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
>>>> Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that
>>>> bit some kind of sign?
>>>>
>>>> Howard
>>>>
>>>> "There are 10 kinds of people in the world. Those who know binary,
>>>> and those
>>>> who don't." Don Knuth
>>>>
>>>> At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Howard,
>>>>>
>>>>> Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or
>>>>> "legisigns". Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces
>>>>> of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word “symbol”; they are
>>>>> not symbols in the Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out of
>>>>> any context, will not and cannot be interpreted as a sign.
>>>>> Moreover, you can’t make bits into symbols just by stringing them
>>>>> together. Bit strings can be used to replicate a symbol, such as a
>>>>> sentence or an email message or a book, but then it is the symbol
>>>>> that will determine the interpretant, not the bits or bit strings.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s true that communication can only take place by physical means
>>>>> — as Peirce puts it, signs can only exist in replica — but the
>>>>> material medium in itself can only be a sinsign, not a legisign,
>>>>> and not a symbol in the Peircean sense. And it won’t even be a
>>>>> sinsign, won’t be a sign at all, if it doesn’t contribute its bit
>>>>> to the activation a semiotic system.
>>>>>
>>>>> gary f.
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
>>>>> Sent: 5-Oct-14 12:11 PM
>>>>> To: ***@lists.ut.ee; ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
>>>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural
>>>>> Propositions, Chapter 3.6
>>>>>
>>>>>> Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word
>>>>>> “symbol” is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains
>>>>>> why the language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most
>>>>>> efficient and unambiguous communication is by simple coded
>>>>>> sequences with bits that are not icons or indices or tokens with
>>>>>> semantic content.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> GF: In discussing _Natural Propositions_, we are deploying
>>>>>> Peirce’s definition of “symbol” as “a sign which is fit to serve
>>>>>> as such simply because it will be so interpreted”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> HP: Yes, like bit strings. These physical and information theory
>>>>>> conditions do not depend on Peirce's theory of signs or naming
>>>>>> bits "symbols" or "legisigns". You are free to ignore these laws,
>>>>>> but no semiotic practice can avoid them. In any case, we cannot
>>>>>> continue this efficient communication without bit sequences.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Howard
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "In theory, theory and practice are the same. In
>>>>>> practice they are not." Einstein
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10/5/2014 8:50 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word
>>>>>>> “symbol” is used in the language of physics. As such, it
>>>>>>> explains why the language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In discussing _Natural Propositions_, we are deploying Peirce’s
>>>>>>> definition of “symbol” as “a sign which is fit to serve as such
>>>>>>> simply because it will be so interpreted”
>>>>>>> (http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3e ).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This post, for example, is a symbol because the semiotic systems
>>>>>>> (languages and technologies) at my end are sufficiently similar
>>>>>>> to those at your end that I can assume that it will be
>>>>>>> interpreted as a sign of what I mean to say. The rules governing
>>>>>>> semiotic systems can be called “codes” if you like, and thus as
>>>>>>> Bateson put it, All messages are coded. Peirce on the other hand
>>>>>>> calls them “legisigns.” (The laws of nature are also legisigns.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> gary f.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: Howard Pattee
>>>>>>> Sent: 4-Oct-14 9:54 PM
>>>>>>> To: ***@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
>>>>>>> Cc: ***@lists.ut.ee
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
>>>>>>> Propositions, Chapter 3.6
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Peirce: "When an assertion is made, there really is some
>>>>>>>> speaker, writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he
>>>>>>>> supposes there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or other
>>>>>>>> interpreter who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a
>>>>>>>> different planet, an Êon later; or it may be that very same man
>>>>>>>> as he will be a second after. In any case, the deliverer makes
>>>>>>>> signals to the receiver."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> HP: Here is another view of how this works. In our case, from
>>>>>>>> the moment we type an assertion, draw a diagram, or attach a
>>>>>>>> photo, all the communicated information is immediately
>>>>>>>> _/coded/_ into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not logic) and
>>>>>>>> transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or light (the same
>>>>>>>> thing at shorter wavelengths). In principle, _/all the coding/_
>>>>>>>> can be done by Peirce Arrows (NAND gates) and all the electrons
>>>>>>>> and waves obey Maxwell's equations. At the receiver sequences
>>>>>>>> are decoded, and the sender and receiver do not care about the
>>>>>>>> math, physics, or the bit sequences, which is _/precisely/_ why
>>>>>>>> the bit sequences are pure symbols and not icons, indices, or
>>>>>>>> any tokens with intrinsic physical similarities or meanings.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _I/n the language of physics/_, the conditions for a _/pure
>>>>>>>> symbol vehicle/_ with the function of efficiently communicating
>>>>>>>> information of any type is that neither the physical structure
>>>>>>>> nor the sequential order of the _/symbols/_ are determined or
>>>>>>>> influenced by physical laws. That means the sequences do not
>>>>>>>> differ significantly in energy or forces between them. All
>>>>>>>> efficient information structures like sequences and memories
>>>>>>>> are called _/energy degenerate/_.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That does not mean communication is independent of laws. The
>>>>>>>> 2nd law of thermodynamics says that every bit of information
>>>>>>>> added, erased, coded, decoded or used will dissipate a little
>>>>>>>> energy (On the Internet this adds up to enormous energy
>>>>>>>> dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol manipulating
>>>>>>>> chemistry in brains or hardware gates is limited by quantum
>>>>>>>> mechanics.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _/In the language of Communication Theory/_, for efficient
>>>>>>>> communication of any type of information, all the meaning
>>>>>>>> should be _/hidden by codes/_ that translate the information
>>>>>>>> into meaningless symbols.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Howard
>>>>>>>>

[Howard Pattee]

At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

>Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol"
>is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the
>language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.

HP: I agree. Physical laws and communication laws are of limited use
in semiotics; but limited use does not imply unnecessary. They are
universal limits to semiotic communication. No signs, symbols, or
propositions, whether true or false, whether in the brain or on the
Internet, can evade these laws. At the same time, no communication
would be efficient or even possible without these laws.

Unless you are a substance dualist, you can't have meaning without matter.

Howard

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Howard, lists,
Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in another sense than Peirce's sense of symbol.
Maybe we can compare it to the old vocabulary of structural linguistics - words are made up of units which may be signs (in-flat-ion), but each of these are made up of units which are not themselves signs because not having any meaning i-n, f-l-a-t, etc.). The bits of information theory are constituents of signs, meaningless when taken one by one, but constituting signs in their combinations.
Best
F

Den 05/10/2014 kl. 03.53 skrev Howard Pattee <***@roadrunner.com<mailto:***@roadrunner.com>>
:

At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:

Peirce: "When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a different planet, an æon later; or it may be that very same man as he will be a second after. In any case, the deliverer makes signals to the receiver."

HP: Here is another view of how this works. In our case, from the moment we type an assertion, draw a diagram, or attach a photo, all the communicated information is immediatelycoded into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not logic) and transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or light (the same thing at shorter wavelengths). In principle, all the coding can be done by Peirce Arrows (NAND gates) and all the electrons and waves obey Maxwell's equations. At the receiver sequences are decoded, and the sender and receiver do not care about the math, physics, or the bit sequences, which is precisely why the bit sequences are pure symbols and not icons, indices, or any tokens with intrinsic physical similarities or meanings.

In the language of physics, the conditions for a pure symbol vehicle with the function of efficiently communicating information of any type is that neither the physical structure nor the sequential order of the symbols are determined or influenced by physical laws. That means the sequences do not differ significantly in energy or forces between them. All efficient information structures like sequences and memories are called energy degenerate.

That does not mean communication is independent of laws. The 2nd law of thermodynamics says that every bit of information added, erased, coded, decoded or used will dissipate a little energy (On the Internet this adds up to enormous energy dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol manipulating chemistry in brains or hardware gates is limited by quantum mechanics.

In the language of Communication Theory, for efficient communication of any type of information, all the meaning should be hidden by codes that translate the information into meaningless symbols.

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

At 03:26 PM 10/11/2014, Frederik wrote:
>Dear Howard, lists,
>Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in
>another sense than Peirce's sense of symbol.

HP: Gary F and Frederik, I did not say that bits are symbols. I said
that all communicated information can be coded into bit sequences
which are pure symbols. As you may know there is a large controversy
in AI about when sub-symbolic sequences begin to have meaning. Is a
single bit entirely functionless or meaningless? How many synapses
must fire to be meaningfull?

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

At 07:04 AM 10/12/2014, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>lol. And who says what the meaning is?

HP: Meaning is created by the interpreting agent. Most
biosemioticians believe that interpreting agents and life are
coextensive. Certainty the first self-replicating cell must interpret
its coded symbolic instructions.

Howard

[Sungchul Ji]

(For undistorted table, see the attached.)


Howard, Gary F, Frederik, Helmut, lists,

I have been thinking about writing a post on the above title for over a
week now,but have not done so until now because I was not entirely sure
whether there is enough empirical and theoretical evidence to support such
an admittedly unconventional and outlandish idea. But I decided to stick
my neck out and spell out what seems to me to be suggestive of such a
possibility. Also it may in part answer the question Howard just raised
in [biosemiotics:7214]:

"How many synapses must fire to be meaningful ?" (101214-1)

Question (7214-1) clearly implicates chemical reactions (firing), neurons
(synapses), and consciousness (meaning) and hence is related to the
questions,

"What is consciousness ?" (101214-2)

"What is life ?" (101214-3)

In Table 1, I list the material components of the human brain and associated
properties that emerge as the results of their organization in space and
time at 5 distinct levels – (i) atomic, (ii) molecular, (iii) cellular,
(iv) brain, and (v) societal levels. This division is based on the
existence of a common/universal mathematical evidence to support each
level as indicated in the last column. The rest of the table should be
self-explanatory. If not, please let me know.

_________________________________________________________________________

Table 1. Empirical and theoretical evidence that human consciousness may
be quantized. For the figures referred to in the parentheses below, see
the attached.
1st quantization = atoms
2nd quantization = light
3rd quantization = life (?)
_________________________________________________________________________

Components Constructs Emergence Mathematics
_________________________________________________________________________

Fundamental Atoms Blackbody radiation Planck radiation
Particles equation (1900) [1]
________________________________________________________________________

Atoms Molecules Protein folding PDL(Planck
Catalysis distribution
law) [2]
________________________________________________________________________

Molecules Cells Metabolic field cytosociology [3]
Transcriptome PDL [4]
(Fig. 9b, c)
Cell force[5]
________________________________________________________________________

Cells Human brains Decision-making PDL [6]
(Fig. 9e)
Electrocorticogram PDL [6]
ECoG)(see attached)

________________________________________________________________________

Human brains Human society Speech (Fig. 9j) PDL [6]
Texts (Figs. 9 k, l, m) PDL [6]
CONSCIOUSNESS PDL [6]
(Fig. 9 e, j)
________________________________________________________________________

Finally, it should be pointed out that

(101214-4)
(i) PDL, y = a/(Ax + B)^5/(Exp(b/(Ax + B) – 1), reduces to the Planck
radiation equation when a = 2pihc, b = hc^2/kT, A = 1, and B = 0, and

(101214-5)
(ii) PDL is functionally equivalent to the Menzerath-Altmann law (MAL), y
= A(x^b) exp(-cx), in fitting glottometric data discovered by quantitative
linguists about 6 decades ago [7], as evident in Figures 9 a, b, f, g, j
(label missing), k, l and m.

Observation (ii) may be interpreted as meaning the unification of physics
and linguistics, the combined study of which may be termed "New Semiotics"
or "New Physics", in contrast to the "Peircean semiotics" on the one hand
and the "20th century physics" on the other:

New Semiotics/New Physics = Peircean Semiotics + 20^th Century Physics

(101214-6)

.

With all the best.

Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net


References:
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black-body_radiation.
[2] Ji, S. (2012). Isomorphism between Blackbody Radiation and Enzymic
Catalysis. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular
Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. PDF at
conformon.net under Publications > Book Chapters.
[3] Smith, H. A. and Welch, G. R. (1991). Cytosociology: A
Field-Theoretic View of Cell Metabolism, in Molecular Theories of Cell
Life and Death (S. Ji, ed.), Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick,
pp. 282-323.
[4] Ji, S. (2012). Isomorphism between Blackbody Radiation and
Whole-Cell Metabolism: Universal law of Thermal Excitations (ULTE).
In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular
Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. PDF at
conformon.net under Publications > Book Chapters.
[5] Ji, S. (1991). The Cell Force – The Link between Genotype and
Phenotype. In: Biocybernetics: A Machine Theory of Biology, in
Molecular Theories of Cell Life and Death, S. Ji (ed.), Rutgers
University Press, New Brunswick, pp. 101-119.
[6] Ji, S. (2014). Planckian Distributions in Molecular Machines and
Living cells: Evidence for Energy Quantization in Biology.
Computational and Structural Biotechnology J. (to appear).
[7] Eroglue, S. (2014). Menzerath–Altmann Law: Statistical Mechanical
Interpretation as Applied to a Linguistic Organization. J. Stat. Phys.
157:392–405 DOI 10.1007/s10955-014-1078-8.


> At 03:26 PM 10/11/2014, Frederik wrote:
>>Dear Howard, lists,
>>Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in
>>another sense than Peirce's sense of symbol.
>
> HP: Gary F and Frederik, I did not say that bits are symbols. I said
> that all communicated information can be coded into bit sequences
> which are pure symbols. As you may know there is a large controversy
> in AI about when sub-symbolic sequences begin to have meaning. Is a
> single bit entirely functionless or meaningless? How many synapses
> must fire to be meaningfull?
>
> Howard
>

[Gary Fuhrman]

Jeff, yes, that formulation will work too, but I don't see how it's simpler
than saying that "commitment" in this sense depends on indexicality, since
"saturation" of a rheme or predicate can only be done by an index. That's
what it takes to denote an object. You can't attribute qualities to an
object without using some kind of indexical sign.

By the way, according to Peirce, a dicisign or proposition does not suffice
for an assertion. It merely specifies what *can be* asserted (or denied),
i.e. what can be true or false. The act of assertion is like a quantum jump
to a new (and more binding) level of commitment.

gary f.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:***@nau.edu]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 4:27 PM

Lists,

The last paragraph in the earlier message contained errors--some of which
were caused by the autocorrect function on my email software. It is driving
me crazy, because it refuses to let terms like rheme and dicisign stay as
I've typed them.

It should read: Couldn't we simplify matters by saying that no rheme
(taking it as an unsaturated sign in isolation from its other possible
connections) commits itself to anything? Only a rheme that is part of a
larger dicisign involves such a commitment. If that is right, then the
reason icons commit themselves to nothing at all is that such signs, taken
by themselves, are never more than a rheme.

--Jeff

________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [***@nau.edu]
...

Icons themselves involve "connectivity and thus continuity" because a
qualisign may be connected to a token figure and a rule for interpreting
those connections--and not yet have the kind of object and interpretant
needed to make a positive assertion of fact. As such, I read the claim that
"icons commit themselves to nothing at all" to be based on an understanding
of what is needed for a sign to involve such a commitment. The kinds of
commitment that he is talking about is similar in kind to what a person does
when making an affidavit.

When those three things are connected to one another as parts of our
percepts, we are then in a position to make a perceptual judgment about some
object. In making such a judgment, those three connected things can
function as qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign--where we
attribute qualities with an intensity to some object at a place and a time.
At this point, we have enough for a dicisign--and an assertion is thereby
made.

Couldn't we simplify matters by saying that no theme taking as an
unsaturated sign alone commits itself to anything? One a rheme that is part
of a larger design involves such a commitment. If that is right, then the
reason icons commit themselves to nothing at all is that such signs, taken
by themselves, are never more than a rheme.

--Jeff