Gary Fuhrman
2014-10-19 13:27:48 UTC
The final section of NP Chapter 3, rather than summarizing what has gone
before, looks ahead to the chapters which will explore the "actual
implications of Peirce's doctrine of propositions". For me, the most
interesting of these implications is the possibility of a deeper insight
into the connections between human cognition and that of other sentient
beings.
I must say that before I was drawn into Peirce's work, and then into
Stjernfelt's, I never expected to find any such insights in the history of
logic. I was more inclined to look for them in the work of thoughtful
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio. Just to give one example from the
first chapter of his recent (2010) work, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing
the Conscious Brain, p. 27:
In brief, the conscious mind emerges within the history of life regulation.
Life regulation, a dynamic process known as homeostasis for short, begins in
unicellular living creatures, such as a bacterial cell or a simple amoeba,
which do not have a brain but are capable of adaptive behavior. It
progresses in individuals whose behavior is managed by simple brains, as is
the case with worms, and it continues its march in individuals whose brains
generate both behavior and mind (insects and fish being examples). I am
ready to believe that whenever brains begin to generate primordial
feelings-and that could be quite early in evolutionary history-organisms
acquire an early form of sentience. From there on, an organized self process
could develop and be added to the mind, thereby providing the beginning of
elaborate conscious minds. Reptiles are contenders for this distinction, for
example; birds make even stronger contenders; and mammals get the award and
then some.
Most species whose brains generate a self do so at core level. Humans have
both core self and autobiographical self. A number of mammals are likely to
have both as well, namely wolves, our ape cousins, marine mammals and
elephants, cats, and, of course, that off-the-scale species called the
domestic dog.
Peirce's doctrine of the dicisign as the core semiotic structure of the
proposition provides another angle from which to investigate the relations
between self-control and sentience, consciousness and language, cybernetics
and psychology. That's my perspective on it, anyway. I'd be interested in
hearing from others - especially those with little previous interest in
logic - what they hope or expect to find as we venture further into Natural
Propositions. Tomorrow, Tyler Bennett will lead us into Chapter 4.
gary f.
} How do we reimagine and remake the human presence on earth in ways that
work over the long haul? [David Orr] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
before, looks ahead to the chapters which will explore the "actual
implications of Peirce's doctrine of propositions". For me, the most
interesting of these implications is the possibility of a deeper insight
into the connections between human cognition and that of other sentient
beings.
I must say that before I was drawn into Peirce's work, and then into
Stjernfelt's, I never expected to find any such insights in the history of
logic. I was more inclined to look for them in the work of thoughtful
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio. Just to give one example from the
first chapter of his recent (2010) work, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing
the Conscious Brain, p. 27:
In brief, the conscious mind emerges within the history of life regulation.
Life regulation, a dynamic process known as homeostasis for short, begins in
unicellular living creatures, such as a bacterial cell or a simple amoeba,
which do not have a brain but are capable of adaptive behavior. It
progresses in individuals whose behavior is managed by simple brains, as is
the case with worms, and it continues its march in individuals whose brains
generate both behavior and mind (insects and fish being examples). I am
ready to believe that whenever brains begin to generate primordial
feelings-and that could be quite early in evolutionary history-organisms
acquire an early form of sentience. From there on, an organized self process
could develop and be added to the mind, thereby providing the beginning of
elaborate conscious minds. Reptiles are contenders for this distinction, for
example; birds make even stronger contenders; and mammals get the award and
then some.
Most species whose brains generate a self do so at core level. Humans have
both core self and autobiographical self. A number of mammals are likely to
have both as well, namely wolves, our ape cousins, marine mammals and
elephants, cats, and, of course, that off-the-scale species called the
domestic dog.
Peirce's doctrine of the dicisign as the core semiotic structure of the
proposition provides another angle from which to investigate the relations
between self-control and sentience, consciousness and language, cybernetics
and psychology. That's my perspective on it, anyway. I'd be interested in
hearing from others - especially those with little previous interest in
logic - what they hope or expect to find as we venture further into Natural
Propositions. Tomorrow, Tyler Bennett will lead us into Chapter 4.
gary f.
} How do we reimagine and remake the human presence on earth in ways that
work over the long haul? [David Orr] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics