[biosemiotics:7245] Peirce and physics

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard,



HP: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain
where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.



GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can explain
that, I'm changing the subject line of this thread.



HP: First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's
philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude
freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the demands of
empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that have shown that
physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or
epistemologies.



GF: Where does Peirce (or anyone!) argue that physical laws can be
encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies?

HP: I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects
the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes
in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that
brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the
Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and
linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists
do not doubt the reality of their results.



GF: Where does Peirce claim that physicists do not doubt the reality of
their results?



gary f.



From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 16-Oct-14 7:55 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; peirce-***@list.iupui.edu;
***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:7245] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter



At 01:02 PM 10/15/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:




Then in some cases you [Howard] say that you didn't say those things and I
show where you said them. If those are not inconsistencies but instead
reflect your changes of mind or your corrections of your misphrasings, then
please say so.


HP: I stand by what I said; no corrections or mind changes, but I will try
to make my beliefs clearer. Your rephrasings altered my meanings. I think
the reason I appear to you as inconsistent is because you do not recognize
the empirical necessity of complementarity and hierarchic levels of models.
Also, we have a different view of scientific models. Your response also
illustrates my original point that such disputes over undecidable
epistemological ideologies can not only be a waste of time, but are often
misleading; or worse, they can become name-calling contests over the -isms,
distracting otherwise productive discussions over substantive scientific
theories.

That does not mean that epistemologies are unimportant. In physics,
epistemologies of many forms are entertained (not believed) as important
explorations of conceptual and formal theories. That is, they are a form of
thought experiment, not unlike the non-existent Maxwell demon. For example,
Wigner entertained solipsism as a logically consistent interpretation of
quantum theory, but he does not believe in solipsism. QM has also engendered
novel epistemologies, like Many Worlds, that are often entertained but
seldom believed. That is what I was getting at when I said: "I often think
realistically. I see no harm in it as long as I don't see it as the one true
belief."

As evidence, ask yourself: For how many years have the greatest minds been
arguing over realism vs. nominalism? Is there any obvious trend toward a
consensus? If not, why not? Do you know of any mathematical theorem,
physical, biological, or brain theory that would be altered if either the
truth or falsity of either view were revealed?

To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain
where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views. First, I want to
emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's philosophy of science as an
attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude freed from any predisposition.
I see a difference in the demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to
Peirce of course, that have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or
blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies.

I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects the
conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in
it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings
about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the
Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and
linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists
do not doubt the reality of their results.

This is long enough for one post. I will give examples of the necessity of
complementarity and hierchic levels later. In logic and mathematics,
Peirce's (and Aristotle's, Descartes', Cantor's, Dedekind's, et al's)
problem with defining discreteness and continuity is one example. Reversible
and irreversible models, and deterministic and probabilistic models are
others.

Howard

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, Howard, List,

The critical question here is whether our conceptual framework (methods, models, practices, theories, etc.) is adequate to a given domain of phenomena and problems.

Naturalism being one of the few isms that I fess up to, I assume that everything that happens is natural. The question of reductionism is not whether intellectual, mental, semiotic, or whatever phenomena reduce to natural (physical, chemical, biological, etc.) laws but whether they reduce to so-&-so's favorite natural laws.

Physics is rife with triadic relations because mathematics is rife with triadic relations and so it is possible that some of these relations may already be winners with regard to affording models of processes that are adequate to the rei of the semiotic domain, but I do not get the sense that those potentially adequate resources are currently being exploited to their full potential by people whose pet models fall into the dyadic mold.

Regards,

Jon


Sent from my iPad

Post by Gary Fuhrman
Howard,
HP: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can explain that, I’m changing the subject line of this thread.
HP: First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies.
GF: Where does Peirce (or anyone!) argue that physical laws can be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies?
HP: I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the reality of their results.
GF: Where does Peirce claim that physicists do not doubt the reality of their results?
gary f.
Sent: 16-Oct-14 7:55 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7245] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter
Then in some cases you [Howard] say that you didn't say those things and I show where you said them. If those are not inconsistencies but instead reflect your changes of mind or your corrections of your misphrasings, then please say so.
HP: I stand by what I said; no corrections or mind changes, but I will try to make my beliefs clearer. Your rephrasings altered my meanings. I think the reason I appear to you as inconsistent is because you do not recognize the empirical necessity of complementarity and hierarchic levels of models. Also, we have a different view of scientific models. Your response also illustrates my original point that such disputes over undecidable epistemological ideologies can not only be a waste of time, but are often misleading; or worse, they can become name-calling contests over the -isms, distracting otherwise productive discussions over substantive scientific theories.
That does not mean that epistemologies are unimportant. In physics, epistemologies of many forms are entertained (not believed) as important explorations of conceptual and formal theories. That is, they are a form of thought experiment, not unlike the non-existent Maxwell demon. For example, Wigner entertained solipsism as a logically consistent interpretation of quantum theory, but he does not believe in solipsism. QM has also engendered novel epistemologies, like Many Worlds, that are often entertained but seldom believed. That is what I was getting at when I said: "I often think realistically. I see no harm in it as long as I don't see it as the one true belief."
As evidence, ask yourself: For how many years have the greatest minds been arguing over realism vs. nominalism? Is there any obvious trend toward a consensus? If not, why not? Do you know of any mathematical theorem, physical, biological, or brain theory that would be altered if either the truth or falsity of either view were revealed?
To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views. First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies.
I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the reality of their results.
This is long enough for one post. I will give examples of the necessity of complementarity and hierchic levels later. In logic and mathematics, Peirce's (and Aristotle's, Descartes', Cantor's, Dedekind's, et al's) problem with defining discreteness and continuity is one example. Reversible and irreversible models, and deterministic and probabilistic models are others.
Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Howard said: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's
book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can
explain that, I'm changing the subject line of this thread.

HP: Frederik begins NP with some 30 pages on the historical
antipsychologism movement. In Chapter 4, in order to Naturalize
propositions he associates nominalism with psychologism (p. 106) with
more arguments against both. Somewhere, Frederik is afraid that
cognitive sciences will introduce nominalism and psychologism by the
back door.

I think fighting or worrying about nominalism or psychologism is not
only unnecessary, but likely to miss out on discoveries about how
brains recognize and associate patterns. I am arguing that these
should not be either-or epistemic or metaphysical choices. As many
physicists have suggested, these are complementary interpretations
that are very useful, but not empirically decidable. Trying to
eliminate one or the other is counterproductive. That is why I
suggested thinking about these questions:

"For how many years have the greatest minds been arguing over realism
vs. nominalism? Is there any obvious trend toward a consensus? If
not, why not? Do you know of any mathematical theorem, physical,
biological, or brain theory that would be altered if either the truth
or falsity of either view were revealed?"

HP: First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's
philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an
attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the
demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that
have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by
either analytic logics or epistemologies.
GF: Where does Peirce (or anyone!) argue that physical laws can be
encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies?

HP: Frederik says, "Peirce based himself on the Kantian principle
that any assumptions on metaphysical existence should be based upon
logic. . ."

For example, continuity was a fundamental epistemological or logical
assumption. Peirce: " Now continuity, it is not too much to say, is
the leading conception of science. The complexity of the conception
of continuity is so great as to render it important wherever it
occurs. Now it enters into every fundamental and exact law of physics
or of psychics that is known. The few laws of chemistry which do not
involve continuity seem for the most part to be very roughly true. It
seems not unlikely that if the veritable laws were known continuity
would be found to be involved in them."

In Peirce's time, continuity was popular. However, theory and
experiment demonstrated that this metaphysics was mistaken. Nature
has an irreducible discrete component. QM also showed that classical
analytic logic (the distributive law) did not fit the empirical evidence.

HP: I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that
connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the
relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us
as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical
experiment." I also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with
the meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But
Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the
reality of their results.
GF: Where does Peirce claim that physicists do not doubt the reality
of their results?

HP: Frederik says, "To Peirce, no scientist in his heart doubt the
reality of the general results of his research." (p.107)

Howard

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard, you're beating a dead horse here.



Your objections to "anti-psychologism" in logic, which are based on a
misreading of NP Chapter 2 and of Peirce, have already been answered by
Frederik a month ago, and now that the discussion has moved on, you're still
recycling the same old misunderstandings. I for one don't have the patience
to deal yet again with these non-issues, and I don't think it would be a
good use of Frederik's time either. Your answers to my questions, like your
replies to Ben, demonstrate your ability to take the words of others out of
context and twist them to fit the framework of your monologue. If someone
else wants to take the bait again, they're welcome to do so, but it's not
Frederik's fault that you've missed his point and ignored his explanations,
and there's nothing either empirical or pragmatic about your reasoning here.



When you have something to say about Peirce and physics that is new and
possibly valid, perhaps a useful dialogue will ensue. In the meantime,
though, the discussion of NP is evidently more productive, and is moving on
shortly to the next chapter, where we begin to explore the real scientific
applications of the Dicisign doctrine. I'd rather do that than do another
circle around "nominalism", "psychologism," "epistemologies" and so on.



gary f.



From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 17-Oct-14 3:48 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; peirce-***@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Peirce and physics



At 07:37 AM 10/17/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:



Howard said: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me
explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.

GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can explain
that, I'm changing the subject line of this thread.


HP: Frederik begins NP with some 30 pages on the historical antipsychologism
movement. In Chapter 4, in order to Naturalize propositions he associates
nominalism with psychologism (p. 106) with more arguments against both.
Somewhere, Frederik is afraid that cognitive sciences will introduce
nominalism and psychologism by the back door.

I think fighting or worrying about nominalism or psychologism is not only
unnecessary, but likely to miss out on discoveries about how brains
recognize and associate patterns. I am arguing that these should not be
either-or epistemic or metaphysical choices. As many physicists have
suggested, these are complementary interpretations that are very useful, but
not empirically decidable. Trying to eliminate one or the other is
counterproductive. That is why I suggested thinking about these questions:

"For how many years have the greatest minds been arguing over realism vs.
nominalism? Is there any obvious trend toward a consensus? If not, why not?
Do you know of any mathematical theorem, physical, biological, or brain
theory that would be altered if either the truth or falsity of either view
were revealed?"




HP: First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's
philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude
freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the demands of
empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that have shown that
physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or
epistemologies.

GF: Where does Peirce (or anyone!) argue that physical laws can be
encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies?


HP: Frederik says, "Peirce based himself on the Kantian principle that any
assumptions on metaphysical existence should be based upon logic. . ."

For example, continuity was a fundamental epistemological or logical
assumption. Peirce: " Now continuity, it is not too much to say, is the
leading conception of science. The complexity of the conception of
continuity is so great as to render it important wherever it occurs. Now it
enters into every fundamental and exact law of physics or of psychics that
is known. The few laws of chemistry which do not involve continuity seem for
the most part to be very roughly true. It seems not unlikely that if the
veritable laws were known continuity would be found to be involved in them."

In Peirce's time, continuity was popular. However, theory and experiment
demonstrated that this metaphysics was mistaken. Nature has an irreducible
discrete component. QM also showed that classical analytic logic (the
distributive law) did not fit the empirical evidence.




HP: I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects
the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes
in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that
brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the
Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and
linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists
do not doubt the reality of their results.

GF: Where does Peirce claim that physicists do not doubt the reality of
their results?


HP: Frederik says, "To Peirce, no scientist in his heart doubt the reality
of the general results of his research." (p.107)

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Frederik, Gary F, list:

I apologize if I missed Frederik’s answers to my
Chapter 2 questions. My short term memory is
deteriorating. I do not understand why my answers
to Gary's questions caused such a bad reaction. I
have moved on to NP Chapter 4, where the complete
rejection of nominalism and psychologism still seems to be the starting point.

Frederik says, “Peirce refused nominalism and
psychologism often, if not always together.
Peirce refused both – with the upshot that his
naturalism automatically includes thought, logic,
semiotics, and mind as intrinsic aspects”

HP: Why don't nominalism and psychologism also,
“automatically include thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic?”

I agree with what Frederik is trying to do,
naturalizing human mental activities by
considering their function so they apply to lower
organisms. I have been trying to naturalize the
origin of function so that semiosis is possible.
I think this first occurs in an empirically
testable sense at the origin of life (e.g., see
<https://www.academia.edu/863857/Cell_psychology_an_evolutionary_approach_to_the_symbol-matter_problem>Cell
Psychology). Peirceans disagree with this. I
would like to hear Frederik's view. I see no
basic conflict in our aims, but our approaches
are separated by 4 billion years and two
cultures, which I think is the basic reason that disagreements arise.

Frederik: “Nowhere is this [refusal of
nominalism] more apparent than in his idea that
propositions may be defined purely functionally.”
This implies four things: “(1) Propositions do
not require an explicit linguistic system in which to function.” (p.107)

HP: Here I disagree. The biological evidence is
clear that all life requires a linguistic system
to replicate, engage the environment, and
survive. I am defining a linguistic system and
symbols functionally, just as Frederik defines a
proposition functionally. Isolated symbols do not
exist. To be functional there must be an
interpreting agent with an underlying symbol
system, i.e., the genetic language, which
experiments shows to be far more complex than
anyone imagined. It must have evolved from
simpler origins, but of course that is just the origin problem.

In Chapter 6, Frederik gives good examples of
Dicisign signaling from bacteria, fireflies, and
bees to vervet monkeys. What needs to be
emphasized is that all of his examples are
special-purpose signals that depend on
instructions (and constructions) from the
general-purpose genetic language (vervet signals
may also depend on some learning).

I also infer that Frederik would interpret the
deflated truth value of a primitive proposition
as its survival value. I agree with that
interpretation, but could a realist be satisfied
with that interpretation of truth? Also, how is a
genetic instruction (an imperative or
conditional) interpretable as a proposition?

Howard

[Edwina Taborsky]

Howard, you wrote:

"Frederik says, "Peirce refused nominalism and psychologism often, if not always together. Peirce refused both - with the upshot that his naturalism automatically includes thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic aspects"

HP: Why don't nominalism and psychologism also, "automatically include thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic?""

My response would be that of course nominalism and psychologism include thought, logic, semiotics and mind as instrinsic. We can see this in the many articles and conferences on both topics which revolve around these attributes.

But both nominalism and psychologism are rooted in and indeed confined to the human cognition and consciousness and again, include 'thought, logic, semiotics and mind as intrinsic'. But they deny these attributes to non-human cognition and consciousness; indeed, they even deny that such actions take place in these 'lower levels of life'. Therefore, since Peirce rejected this perspective of their confinement to human processes, he acknowledged their existence within the natural world.

Edwina


----- Original Message -----
From: Howard Pattee
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; peirce-***@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 11:56 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7260] Re: Natural


Frederik, Gary F, list:

I apologize if I missed Frederik's answers to my Chapter 2 questions. My short term memory is deteriorating. I do not understand why my answers to Gary's questions caused such a bad reaction. I have moved on to NP Chapter 4, where the complete rejection of nominalism and psychologism still seems to be the starting point.

Frederik says, "Peirce refused nominalism and psychologism often, if not always together. Peirce refused both - with the upshot that his naturalism automatically includes thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic aspects"

HP: Why don't nominalism and psychologism also, "automatically include thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic?"

I agree with what Frederik is trying to do, naturalizing human mental activities by considering their function so they apply to lower organisms. I have been trying to naturalize the origin of function so that semiosis is possible. I think this first occurs in an empirically testable sense at the origin of life (e.g., see Cell Psychology). Peirceans disagree with this. I would like to hear Frederik's view. I see no basic conflict in our aims, but our approaches are separated by 4 billion years and two cultures, which I think is the basic reason that disagreements arise.

Frederik: "Nowhere is this [refusal of nominalism] more apparent than in his idea that propositions may be defined purely functionally." This implies four things: "(1) Propositions do not require an explicit linguistic system in which to function." (p.107)

HP: Here I disagree. The biological evidence is clear that all life requires a linguistic system to replicate, engage the environment, and survive. I am defining a linguistic system and symbols functionally, just as Frederik defines a proposition functionally. Isolated symbols do not exist. To be functional there must be an interpreting agent with an underlying symbol system, i.e., the genetic language, which experiments shows to be far more complex than anyone imagined. It must have evolved from simpler origins, but of course that is just the origin problem.

In Chapter 6, Frederik gives good examples of Dicisign signaling from bacteria, fireflies, and bees to vervet monkeys. What needs to be emphasized is that all of his examples are special-purpose signals that depend on instructions (and constructions) from the general-purpose genetic language (vervet signals may also depend on some learning).

I also infer that Frederik would interpret the deflated truth value of a primitive proposition as its survival value. I agree with that interpretation, but could a realist be satisfied with that interpretation of truth? Also, how is a genetic instruction (an imperative or conditional) interpretable as a proposition?

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Post by Edwina Taborsky
But both nominalism and psychologism are rooted in and indeed
confined to the human cognition and consciousness
and again, include 'thought, logic, semiotics and mind as
intrinsic'. But they deny these attributes to non-human cognition
and consciousness; indeed, they even deny that such actions take
place in these 'lower levels of life'.

HP: That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I think Peirce's
view of Tychism and Agapism is more radical. He generalizes signs,
interpreters, mind, habits, and love to the entire natural world.
Frederik is elaborating Peirce's generalized propositions (I'm unsure
how far). I think Peirce intended these generalizations to apply
throughout all evolution. That's the whole idea. The generalized
relation of signs to objects (their interpretation) is still an
epistemic relation (by definition of epistemic). Realism and
nominalism are generalized epistemic propositions (signs refer to
individual and universal objects, or signs refer to just individual objects).

Post by Edwina Taborsky
Edwina: Therefore, since Peirce rejected this perspective
of confinement [of all minds and signs] to human processes, he
acknowledged their existence within the natural world.

HP: Agreed. The Biosemiotic Principle generalizes at least to the
origin of life (or for Edwina, with Peirce, to the origin of nature)
but in either case generalized evolution is a package deal. You can't
choose which parts you want to generalize and leave the rest for
humans (they didn't exist until the last minute). If bacteria use
signs, then we must consider if it is meaningful to ask, e.g., if the
bacteria's "sugar Dicisign" (p. 145) interprets signs realistically
or naturalistically. The concept of function is essential here. And
consider, if you don't generalize all the way to origins, then you
have to explain at what stage of evolution each generalization and
interpretation arises. That is biosemiotics' problem.

There are a few clues in my early (1982) thoughts in
<https://www.academia.edu/863857/Cell_psychology_an_evolutionary_approach_to_the_symbol-matter_problem>Cell
Psychology, but I can see arguments on all sides -- whether it is a
meaningful question and whether organisms are realistic or
nominalist, starting with the genetic language (Note: I am not
thinking metaphorically, and I don't think Peirce was either.)

Howard

[Edwina Taborsky]

Howard - I think that some of these debates are due to confusion over terminology.

1) Howard wrote:

"That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I think Peirce's view of Tychism and Agapism is more radical. He generalizes signs, interpreters, mind, habits, and love to the entire natural world."

Edwina: What do tychasm and agapasm have to do with nominalism?

2) And

" Realism and nominalism are generalized epistemic propositions (signs refer to individual and universal objects, or signs refer to just individual objects). "

Edwina: Is this your definition of realism and nominalism? It lacks, in my view, the key reference to the specific nature of 'the universal' and 'the particular existence'. My definition is that Realism claims that there ARE objective universals (not objects; a universal is never a discrete object!). These universals exist 'per se', i.e., they are not creations of the human mind. A universal is a real pattern or mode of organization within which a particular object can form. And my understanding of nominalism is that the human mind 'names' the external world and that this world is made up only of these named discrete particular existences. Any collective generalization, such as 'animals' is merely another human word. That is, universals do not have any objective reality in the nominalist analytic perception.

So, it's not simply whether one view says that signs include both individual and universal objects (again - what is a universal 'object'?) while the other view includes only the individual. It the matter of their actual nature. The realist considers that the universal, in its own nature - has an objective 'existence' unrelated to human or other cogntion. The nominalist considers that no such objective universal exists and one's experience of the person is based on human cognition and the 'names' we give to these experiences.

3)And Howard wrote:
"If bacteria use signs, then we must consider if it is meaningful to ask, e.g., if the bacteria's "sugar Dicisign" (p. 145) interprets signs realistically or naturalistically."

Edwina: I'm not sure what this means - what does 'realistically or naturalistically' mean? Do you mean whether the bacterium reacts within a realistic or nominalist framework? Again, since nominalism is confined to human cognition - then, this can't be the question.


----- Original Message -----
From: Howard Pattee
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; peirce-***@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 8:04 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7261] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4


Edwina, Gary F, Frederik, and list:

At 12:47 PM 10/19/2014, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

But both nominalism and psychologism are rooted in and indeed confined to the human cognition and consciousness
and again, include 'thought, logic, semiotics and mind as intrinsic'. But they deny these attributes to non-human cognition and consciousness; indeed, they even deny that such actions take place in these 'lower levels of life'.

HP: That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I think Peirce's view of Tychism and Agapism is more radical. He generalizes signs, interpreters, mind, habits, and love to the entire natural world. Frederik is elaborating Peirce's generalized propositions (I'm unsure how far). I think Peirce intended these generalizations to apply throughout all evolution. That's the whole idea. The generalized relation of signs to objects (their interpretation) is still an epistemic relation (by definition of epistemic). Realism and nominalism are generalized epistemic propositions (signs refer to individual and universal objects, or signs refer to just individual objects).


Edwina: Therefore, since Peirce rejected this perspective of confinement [of all minds and signs] to human processes, he acknowledged their existence within the natural world.

HP: Agreed. The Biosemiotic Principle generalizes at least to the origin of life (or for Edwina, with Peirce, to the origin of nature) but in either case generalized evolution is a package deal. You can't choose which parts you want to generalize and leave the rest for humans (they didn't exist until the last minute). If bacteria use signs, then we must consider if it is meaningful to ask, e.g., if the bacteria's "sugar Dicisign" (p. 145) interprets signs realistically or naturalistically. The concept of function is essential here. And consider, if you don't generalize all the way to origins, then you have to explain at what stage of evolution each generalization and interpretation arises. That is biosemiotics' problem.

There are a few clues in my early (1982) thoughts in Cell Psychology, but I can see arguments on all sides -- whether it is a meaningful question and whether organisms are realistic or nominalist, starting with the genetic language (Note: I am not thinking metaphorically, and I don't think Peirce was either.)

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Howard wrote: That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I
think Peirce's view of Tychasm and Agapism is more radical. He
generalizes signs, interpreters, mind, habits, and love to the
entire natural world.
Edwina: What do tychasm and agapasm have to do with nominalism?

HP: I'm suggesting that Peirce's all-inclusive view of evolution
(tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism) suggests there are
functional epistemologies (like nominalism) before there were humans.
Call them proto-epistemologies if you wish, like Tyler's proto-propositions.

HP: Realism and nominalism are generalized epistemic propositions
(signs refer to individual and universal objects, or signs refer to
just individual objects).
Edwina: Is this your definition of realism and nominalism?

HP: No. It's a caricature just for brevity. I didn't want my point to
be waylaid by arguments over the many ambiguous meanings of realism
and nominalism (they were anyway). My point was only that some
functional kind of epistemology (a general interpretation of how
signs relate to their objects)) must arise before humans.

If bacteria use signs, then we must consider if it is meaningful to
ask, e.g., if the bacteria's "sugar Dicisign" (p. 145) interprets
signs realistically or naturalistically.
Edwina: I'm not sure what this means - what does 'realistically or
naturalistically' mean? Do you mean whether the bacterium reacts
within a realistic or nominalist framework?

HP: Exactly. More generally, do the symbols of the genes code only
nominalistically for specific amino acids, or do they code
realistically for universal functions like catalysis and
self-replication? The evidence seems clear that gene symbols code for
both, as well as many other conditional and control activites that
can't be called either specific or universal.

Howard

[Edwina Taborsky]

Howard - I think I begin to see your viewpoint but I think you have a very personal definition of some terms.

You don't mean to say that 'nominalism existed before humans' - or do you? Nominalism is, by definition, a perspective that exists only within human cognition. It says that knowledge and information are the result of how humans 'name' the world. In that sense, there is no objective reality (or if there is, it is unattainable) and what we experience is only what we have named. Nominalism can refer to generals/universals but - post hoc- i.e., only as terms set up by humans; the universal does not have any objective reality to the nominalist. So- again, your definition of 'nominalism', to me at least, seems unique.

In addition, you seem to be comparing a perspective that acknowledges that there are only individual things in the world versus one that acknowledges that there are both individuals and generalities. I don't think that this has anything to do with either nominalism or realism.

The first is, in my view, a type of materialist reductionism. The second - I'm not sure - because you do not define your use of 'universal'. Sometimes you refer to it as a 'general interpretation' - which has nothing to do with scholastic realism and its definition of the universal as an objectively real Form. You wrote:

"More generally, do the symbols of the genes code only nominalistically for specific amino acids, or do they code realistically for universal functions like catalysis and self-replication?"

I think the above is a clear indication of how YOU use the terms 'nominal' and 'realist' - and these are very different from the philosophical use. You use 'nominal' to mean 'referring only to individual things'...and 'realist' to refer to both common actions and individual things..Again, your use of these terms is very different from their philosophical meanings. Your use has nothing to say about objective vs subjective experience. And nothing, really, about the existential nature of either the individual thing or the commonality.

If I understand your use of these terms correctly, they refer to individual units and the common causal interactions between these units. Your concern then, seems to be the codal mechanism that determines their nature. Does the code refer only to single units or to the particular units and their common interactions? [That's not nominalism vs realism!] It is certainly specific versus general...

Edwina




----- Original Message -----
From: Howard Pattee
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; peirce-***@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 12:19 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7261] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4


At 09:40 AM 10/20/2014, Edwina Taborsky wrote:


Howard wrote: That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I think Peirce's view of Tychasm and Agapism is more radical. He generalizes signs, interpreters, mind, habits, and love to the entire natural world.

Edwina: What do tychasm and agapasm have to do with nominalism?

HP: I'm suggesting that Peirce's all-inclusive view of evolution (tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism) suggests there are functional epistemologies (like nominalism) before there were humans. Call them proto-epistemologies if you wish, like Tyler's proto-propositions.


HP: Realism and nominalism are generalized epistemic propositions (signs refer to individual and universal objects, or signs refer to just individual objects).

Edwina: Is this your definition of realism and nominalism?

HP: No. It's a caricature just for brevity. I didn't want my point to be waylaid by arguments over the many ambiguous meanings of realism and nominalism (they were anyway). My point was only that some functional kind of epistemology (a general interpretation of how signs relate to their objects)) must arise before humans.


Howard wrote:
If bacteria use signs, then we must consider if it is meaningful to ask, e.g., if the bacteria's "sugar Dicisign" (p. 145) interprets signs realistically or naturalistically.

Edwina: I'm not sure what this means - what does 'realistically or naturalistically' mean? Do you mean whether the bacterium reacts within a realistic or nominalist framework?

HP: Exactly. More generally, do the symbols of the genes code only nominalistically for specific amino acids, or do they code realistically for universal functions like catalysis and self-replication? The evidence seems clear that gene symbols code for both, as well as many other conditional and control activites that can't be called either specific or universal.

Howard

[Sungchul Ji]

Howard, Edwina, Stan, Gary R, Gary F, Frederick, lists,

What I don't understand is why can't we extend "nominalism", whatever it
is, beyond the human mind to living cells, when Peirce himself extended
the concept of Mind to crystals and that of Propositions to non-linguistic
things ? Are we all confused because of the ambiguity of words ?
Shouldn't we use more of figures, diagrams, tables, and mathematical
formulas to help us out of these linguistic mess ?

With all the best.

Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

Stan, Edwina, Howard,
I have to agree with Edwina's definition of nominalism which is
pretty standard.

HP: Of course, I also agree that Edwina uses the standard definition
of nominalism. The standard definition of proposition is also in
terms of human language and human thought. However, we are discussing
Frederik's (and Peirce's) more general definition of proposition that
applies before humans. In the same functional sense, I am defining
epistemology as it can be used before humans. Whether these
evolution-dependent definitions are instructive or useful is what
biosemiotics is all about.
Howard

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Sung was responding in the context of about 10 messages in the biosemiotics
list where, by the way, I think this discussion should remain (that is, not
on peirce-l). I won't copy all those messages, but the last one before
Sung's was sent by me and reads:

*Howard, *

*Semiosis is a process whereas nominalism is a philosophical view or
position. You're comparing apples with oranges. *

*The idea of semiosis happening in nature is there from the get go in
Peirce, and Frederik is but explicating and expanding that idea [I would
now add, with emphasis on the dicisign, of course GR] .*

*On the other hand, the meaning of a metaphysical position such as
nominalism cannot, in my opinion, be extrapolated into the biological world
as you and Stan are apparently attempting to do without twisting its
meaning beyond recognition. *

*Best,*

*Gary*


I've posted this just to add a little context for Sung's recent post. But,
again, I don't think there's much reason for this thread to be pursued on
peirce-l, and that we'd much better spend our time on both lists discussing
Chapter 4 of NP, which Tyler has nicely introduced today.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

Post by Sungchul Ji
Howard, Edwina, Stan, Gary R, Gary F, Frederick, lists,
What I don't understand is why can't we extend "nominalism", whatever it
is, beyond the human mind to living cells, when Peirce himself extended
the concept of Mind to crystals and that of Propositions to non-linguistic
things ? Are we all confused because of the ambiguity of words ?
Shouldn't we use more of figures, diagrams, tables, and mathematical
formulas to help us out of these linguistic mess ?
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net

Stan, Edwina, Howard,
I have to agree with Edwina's definition of nominalism which is
pretty standard.

HP: Of course, I also agree that Edwina uses the standard definition
of nominalism. The standard definition of proposition is also in
terms of human language and human thought. However, we are discussing
Frederik's (and Peirce's) more general definition of proposition that
applies before humans. In the same functional sense, I am defining
epistemology as it can be used before humans. Whether these
evolution-dependent definitions are instructive or useful is what
biosemiotics is all about.
Howard

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R - I can understand, since you are (to my knowledge) one of the moderators of the Peirce-L list, that you can decide that the discussion some of us have been having only on the biosemiotics list should not be extended to the Peirce-L list. But I don't think that you can decide what the biosemiotics list should or should not discuss. If people on that list want to discuss not only NP but also other topics which might refer to issues brought up by NP or even, might not, then I think it's up to that list's moderators to make that decision.

I admit that the definition of terms is almost a ceaseless and at times, maddening debate, because these terms have been and are used in so many different ways by different authors. In a way, that's not the real point because we aren't going to succeed in an agenda of: "There's only one way to use this term" . What matters is the analytic framework of these authors.

Howard's perspective on 'symbols' and codification - which I may not agree with (including his use of the term 'symbol') , is nevertheless a coherent and thorough analytic framework of 'what's going on in the non-human informational processes'. His use of nominalism and realism is, to put it mildly, vastly different from the traditional definition of those terms. But once you get past the 'names', then, one can discuss the analysis and see how far it goes with its explanations. It's up to the biosemiotic list members if they wish to enter into the discussion.

I think we should have retitled the Subject Line; that might have helped.

Edwina


----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 7:00 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7276] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4


List,


Sung was responding in the context of about 10 messages in the biosemiotics list where, by the way, I think this discussion should remain (that is, not on peirce-l). I won't copy all those messages, but the last one before Sung's was sent by me and reads:


Howard,


Semiosis is a process whereas nominalism is a philosophical view or position. You're comparing apples with oranges.


The idea of semiosis happening in nature is there from the get go in Peirce, and Frederik is but explicating and expanding that idea [I would now add, with emphasis on the dicisign, of course GR] .


On the other hand, the meaning of a metaphysical position such as nominalism cannot, in my opinion, be extrapolated into the biological world as you and Stan are apparently attempting to do without twisting its meaning beyond recognition.


Best,


Gary


I've posted this just to add a little context for Sung's recent post. But, again, I don't think there's much reason for this thread to be pursued on peirce-l, and that we'd much better spend our time on both lists discussing Chapter 4 of NP, which Tyler has nicely introduced today.


Best,


Gary




Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690


On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 6:01 PM, Sungchul Ji <***@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:

Howard, Edwina, Stan, Gary R, Gary F, Frederick, lists,

What I don't understand is why can't we extend "nominalism", whatever it
is, beyond the human mind to living cells, when Peirce himself extended
the concept of Mind to crystals and that of Propositions to non-linguistic
things ? Are we all confused because of the ambiguity of words ?
Shouldn't we use more of figures, diagrams, tables, and mathematical
formulas to help us out of these linguistic mess ?

With all the best.

Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

Stan, Edwina, Howard,
I have to agree with Edwina's definition of nominalism which is
pretty standard.

HP: Of course, I also agree that Edwina uses the standard definition
of nominalism. The standard definition of proposition is also in
terms of human language and human thought. However, we are discussing
Frederik's (and Peirce's) more general definition of proposition that
applies before humans. In the same functional sense, I am defining
epistemology as it can be used before humans. Whether these
evolution-dependent definitions are instructive or useful is what
biosemiotics is all about.
Howard

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina,

I agree with you both that (a) it goes without saying that members of the
biosemiotics list should feel free to discuss whatever they wish to and (b)
that it would have been helpful to have changed the Subject line from one
pointing to the NP seminar.

I sent my post to the Peirce forum because Sung had provided no context
(including only one of some 10 posts in his message), and since I didn't
think it would be productive to get into this matter without the fuller
context (all 10 or so messages), I suggested that peirce-l members might
direct their attention not to Sung's and my out of context posts, but more
productively to the seminar.

You are, however, quite correct in writing that I should not have suggested
the same for the biosemiotics list. But as my message was sent only to
peirce-l perhaps I can be forgiven that error of judgment.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Edwina Taborsky
Gary R - I can understand, since you are (to my knowledge) one of the
moderators of the Peirce-L list, that you can decide that the discussion
some of us have been having only on the biosemiotics list should not be
extended to the Peirce-L list. But I don't think that you can decide what
the biosemiotics list should or should not discuss. If people on that list
want to discuss not only NP but also other topics which might refer to
issues brought up by NP or even, might not, then I think it's up to that
list's moderators to make that decision.
I admit that the definition of terms is almost a ceaseless and at times,
maddening debate, because these terms have been and are used in so many
different ways by different authors. In a way, that's not the real point
because we aren't going to succeed in an agenda of: "There's only one way
to use this term" . What matters is the analytic framework of these
authors.
Howard's perspective on 'symbols' and codification - which I may not agree
with (including his use of the term 'symbol') , is nevertheless a coherent
and thorough analytic framework of 'what's going on in the non-human
informational processes'. His use of nominalism and realism is, to put it
mildly, vastly different from the traditional definition of those terms.
But once you get past the 'names', then, one can discuss the analysis and
see how far it goes with its explanations. It's up to the biosemiotic list
members if they wish to enter into the discussion.
I think we should have retitled the Subject Line; that might have helped.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*Sent:* Monday, October 20, 2014 7:00 PM
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7276] Re: Natural Propositions
Chapter 4
List,
Sung was responding in the context of about 10 messages in the
biosemiotics list where, by the way, I think this discussion should remain
(that is, not on peirce-l). I won't copy all those messages, but the last
*Howard, *
*Semiosis is a process whereas nominalism is a philosophical view or
position. You're comparing apples with oranges. *
*The idea of semiosis happening in nature is there from the get go in
Peirce, and Frederik is but explicating and expanding that idea [I would
now add, with emphasis on the dicisign, of course GR] .*
*On the other hand, the meaning of a metaphysical position such as
nominalism cannot, in my opinion, be extrapolated into the biological world
as you and Stan are apparently attempting to do without twisting its
meaning beyond recognition. *
*Best,*
*Gary*
I've posted this just to add a little context for Sung's recent post. But,
again, I don't think there's much reason for this thread to be pursued on
peirce-l, and that we'd much better spend our time on both lists discussing
Chapter 4 of NP, which Tyler has nicely introduced today.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

Post by Sungchul Ji
Howard, Edwina, Stan, Gary R, Gary F, Frederick, lists,
What I don't understand is why can't we extend "nominalism", whatever it
is, beyond the human mind to living cells, when Peirce himself extended
the concept of Mind to crystals and that of Propositions to non-linguistic
things ? Are we all confused because of the ambiguity of words ?
Shouldn't we use more of figures, diagrams, tables, and mathematical
formulas to help us out of these linguistic mess ?
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net

Stan, Edwina, Howard,
I have to agree with Edwina's definition of nominalism which is
pretty standard.

HP: Of course, I also agree that Edwina uses the standard definition
of nominalism. The standard definition of proposition is also in
terms of human language and human thought. However, we are discussing
Frederik's (and Peirce's) more general definition of proposition that
applies before humans. In the same functional sense, I am defining
epistemology as it can be used before humans. Whether these
evolution-dependent definitions are instructive or useful is what
biosemiotics is all about.
Howard

------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
.

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard, I thought you were lagging behind the discussion of NP, but now it
seems you've jumped ahead of it!



However, your quotation from NP p.107 got a bit garbled. What the book says
there is: "Nominalism and psychologism often, if not always, go together.
Peirce refused both - with the upshot that his naturalism automatically
includes thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic aspects." You may
not approve of Frederik's usage of these "-isms", but I think the context
(p. 105-7) explains the reasoning behind his statement clearly enough, and I
don't think I can improve on it as an answer to your question "Why don't
nominalism and psychologism also, "automatically include thought, logic,
semiotics, and mind as intrinsic?""



You say that semiosis "first occurs in an empirically testable sense at the
origin of life." This strikes me as a peculiar use of the term "empirically
testable", so I'm not sure whether I (as a "Peircean" disagree with it or
not; but I am definitely skeptical of your apparent presupposition that "the
origin of life" is or was a singular point in evolutionary history, and I
can give Peircean reasons for that if you wish.



You disagree with Frederik's Peircean thesis that "Propositions do not
require an explicit linguistic system in which to function" (p.107), saying
that "The biological evidence is clear that all life requires a linguistic
system to replicate, engage the environment, and survive. I am defining a
linguistic system and symbols functionally, just as Frederik defines a
proposition functionally."



GF: Yes, but your "functional" definition of "linguistic system" is quite
different from Frederik's. I think the popular concept of a "genetic
language" is metaphorical (though a highly convenient metaphor), while
Frederik's usage in the phrase "explicit linguistic system" is the standard
non-metaphorical one in science. This is obvious from the fact that the
origin of language is a topic no less controversial than the origin of life,
and none of the scientists working on either problem take them to be the
same problem. They all agree that the origin of language occurred much more
recently than the origin of life - which is not compatible with your claim
as quoted above.



As for Chapter 6, I'd prefer to cross that bridge when we come to it.



gary f.



From: Howard Pattee [mailto:***@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 19-Oct-14 11:57 AM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; peirce-***@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions
Chapter 4



Frederik, Gary F, list:

I apologize if I missed Frederik's answers to my Chapter 2 questions. My
short term memory is deteriorating. I do not understand why my answers to
Gary's questions caused such a bad reaction. I have moved on to NP Chapter
4, where the complete rejection of nominalism and psychologism still seems
to be the starting point.

Frederik says, "Peirce refused nominalism and psychologism often, if not
always together. Peirce refused both - with the upshot that his naturalism
automatically includes thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic
aspects"

HP: Why don't nominalism and psychologism also, "automatically include
thought, logic, semiotics, and mind as intrinsic?"

I agree with what Frederik is trying to do, naturalizing human mental
activities by considering their function so they apply to lower organisms. I
have been trying to naturalize the origin of function so that semiosis is
possible. I think this first occurs in an empirically testable sense at the
origin of life (e.g., see Cell Psychology
<https://www.academia.edu/863857/Cell_psychology_an_evolutionary_approach_to
_the_symbol-matter_problem> ). Peirceans disagree with this. I would like to
hear Frederik's view. I see no basic conflict in our aims, but our
approaches are separated by 4 billion years and two cultures, which I think
is the basic reason that disagreements arise.

Frederik: "Nowhere is this [refusal of nominalism] more apparent than in his
idea that propositions may be defined purely functionally." This implies
four things: "(1) Propositions do not require an explicit linguistic system
in which to function." (p.107)

HP: Here I disagree. The biological evidence is clear that all life requires
a linguistic system to replicate, engage the environment, and survive. I am
defining a linguistic system and symbols functionally, just as Frederik
defines a proposition functionally. Isolated symbols do not exist. To be
functional there must be an interpreting agent with an underlying symbol
system, i.e., the genetic language, which experiments shows to be far more
complex than anyone imagined. It must have evolved from simpler origins, but
of course that is just the origin problem.

In Chapter 6, Frederik gives good examples of Dicisign signaling from
bacteria, fireflies, and bees to vervet monkeys. What needs to be emphasized
is that all of his examples are special-purpose signals that depend on
instructions (and constructions) from the general-purpose genetic language
(vervet signals may also depend on some learning).

I also infer that Frederik would interpret the deflated truth value of a
primitive proposition as its survival value. I agree with that
interpretation, but could a realist be satisfied with that interpretation of
truth? Also, how is a genetic instruction (an imperative or conditional)
interpretable as a proposition?

Howard

[Tyler Bennett]

Hello.

It is now time to begin discussion of chapter four of Natural
Propositions, "Some Consequences of the Dicisign Doctrine". I
come to the discussion as a student of applied semiotics in Tartu and my main
interest here is in contemporary debates about the application of Peirce for
empirical sign analysis.

Having covered the anti-psychologism of Peirce in chapter
2, and the definition of the dicisign in chapter 3, chapter 4 outlines some
consequences of the doctrine in the terms of co-localization, the distinction
between conceptual and non-conceptual content, as well as the definition of
inference. Here, "naturalization means the reformulation of knowledge so
it fits into a naturalist evolutionist world-view based on the reality of laws
of nature" (105). Regarding consequences, to my mind the most important is
that "the purely functional definition of propositions liberates Dicisigns
from the confinement to human language, intention, and consciousness."
(105) This chapter sets up the discussion in chapter six regarding dicisigns in
biology as well as later discussion of propositions in non-verbal human
semiosis.


In ethos this work appears as one of the
most technical attempts to defend what is sometimes called the Sebeok thesis,
that semiosis and life are coextensive. A major difference here from other
biosemiotic defenses of the Sebeok thesis is that, where many other
biosemioticians abandon the use of terms from traditional logic altogether
(such as proposition and inference) for describing non-verbal semiosis,
Frederik salvages some of these terms by generalizing or deflating them, and
this seems more consistent with Peirce's own project. Also, where other
biosemioticians have used Peirce in a more taxonomic fashion with semiotic
thresholds describing evolutionary phases (Deacon 1997; e.g. Kull 2009), the
dicisign doctrine seems to reject this approach, favoring what is sometimes
called the mereological approach, where even the simplest semiosis involves the
highest type of sign within the 1903 classification (argument) and any sign
that does not attain to this level is considered in Peircean terms
"degenerate" or fragmentary. The meaningful world obtains as one
sophisticated argument, the details of which work themselves out as the
constituents of that 'fully fledged' sign.

In Natural
Propositions, the difference between the semiosis of single-celled
organisms and verbal language for example consists in the difference between
what are called 'proto-propositions' and fully fledged propositions or
arguments which seem not to be differentiable in the terms of the 1903 classification
of signs. I think one likely target for list dispute pertaining specifically to
this chapter is whether the gains made by deflating the concept of proposition
are worth the price of deposing the conceptual/non-conceptual dichotomy just to
replace it with proto-proposition/fully fledged proposition (4.3). Much the
same for (4.4). We generalize inference so as to give it applicability across
the board in semiosis (all instances of semiosis entail inference), seemingly
in order to salvage a hard definition of intention and consciousness
(inferences can happen without intention or consciousness, which are unique to "higher"
organisms). To my mind both of these arguments depend heavily on the
distinction between proto-propositions and fully fledged propositions, without
which distinction it appears we have no way of really semiotically contrasting the
character of E. coli bacteria moving
toward sugar with that of verbal language



My main question pertains to how/whether we should try to
differentiate proto- from fully fledged propositions in Peircean terms,
specifically in the terms of the mature theory of signs where there are sub-divisions
of arguments (more sophisticated than the abduction-induction-deduction
trichotomy) that would make possible a still taxonomic differentiation between
the semiosis of "lower" organisms and humans. The only other option would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of E. Coli for example to the dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis, in the way that Deacon does. Otherwise the taxonomic-descriptive power of Peirce's theory of signs would seem really limited.


Thanks for letting me participate.


Regards,

Tyler Bennett

[Jon Awbrey]

Re:Tyler Bennet
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14779

Peircers,

The Peirce I have known for nigh unto the last 50 years is not much in evidence
on the Peirce List anymore, so I'll just limit myself to one general observation
that I've made before and then hope find a more productive occupation for the
duration of the bi-haviorist bi-semiotic winter of our discontext.

I do not think that jumping out of the pan of psychologism into the pyre of
biologism is doing logic, pragmatisim, or semiotics much good.

So watch out for that ...

Later,

Jon

Post by Tyler Bennett
Hello.
It is now time to begin discussion of chapter four of Natural Propositions,
"Some Consequences of the Dicisign Doctrine". I come to the discussion as a
student of applied semiotics in Tartu and my main interest here is in
contemporary debates about the application of Peirce for empirical sign
analysis.
Having covered the anti-psychologism of Peirce in chapter 2, and the
definition of the dicisign in chapter 3, chapter 4 outlines some consequences
of the doctrine in the terms of co-localization, the distinction between
conceptual and non-conceptual content, as well as the definition of
inference. Here, "naturalization means the reformulation of knowledge so it
fits into a naturalist evolutionist world-view based on the reality of laws
of nature" (105). Regarding consequences, to my mind the most important is
that "the purely functional definition of propositions liberates Dicisigns
from the confinement to human language, intention, and consciousness." (105)
This chapter sets up the discussion in chapter six regarding dicisigns in
biology as well as later discussion of propositions in non-verbal human
semiosis.
In ethos this work appears as one of the most technical attempts to defend
what is sometimes called the Sebeok thesis, that semiosis and life are
coextensive. A major difference here from other biosemiotic defenses of the
Sebeok thesis is that, where many other biosemioticians abandon the use of
terms from traditional logic altogether (such as proposition and inference)
for describing non-verbal semiosis, Frederik salvages some of these terms by
generalizing or deflating them, and this seems more consistent with Peirce's
own project. Also, where other biosemioticians have used Peirce in a more
taxonomic fashion with semiotic thresholds describing evolutionary phases
(Deacon 1997; e.g. Kull 2009), the dicisign doctrine seems to reject this
approach, favoring what is sometimes called the mereological approach, where
even the simplest semiosis involves the highest type of sign within the 1903
classification (argument) and any sign that does not attain to this level is
considered in Peircean terms "degenerate" or fragmentary. The meaningful
world obtains as one sophisticated argument, the details of which work
themselves out as the constituents of that 'fully fledged' sign.
In Natural Propositions, the difference between the semiosis of single-celled
organisms and verbal language for example consists in the difference between
what are called 'proto-propositions' and fully fledged propositions or
arguments which seem not to be differentiable in the terms of the 1903
classification of signs. I think one likely target for list dispute
pertaining specifically to this chapter is whether the gains made by
deflating the concept of proposition are worth the price of deposing the
conceptual/non-conceptual dichotomy just to replace it with
proto-proposition/fully fledged proposition (4.3). Much the same for (4.4).
We generalize inference so as to give it applicability across the board in
semiosis (all instances of semiosis entail inference), seemingly in order to
salvage a hard definition of intention and consciousness (inferences can
happen without intention or consciousness, which are unique to "higher"
organisms). To my mind both of these arguments depend heavily on the
distinction between proto-propositions and fully fledged propositions,
without which distinction it appears we have no way of really semiotically
contrasting the character of E. coli bacteria moving toward sugar with that
of verbal language
My main question pertains to how/whether we should try to differentiate
proto- from fully fledged propositions in Peircean terms, specifically in the
terms of the mature theory of signs where there are sub-divisions of
arguments (more sophisticated than the abduction-induction-deduction
trichotomy) that would make possible a still taxonomic differentiation
between the semiosis of "lower" organisms and humans. The only other option
would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of E. Coli for example to the
dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol
dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis, in the way
that Deacon does. Otherwise the taxonomic-descriptive power of Peirce's
theory of signs would seem really limited.
Thanks for letting me participate.
Regards,
Tyler Bennett

[Edwina Taborsky]

Thanks for your very succinct and clear outline of this chapter and its issues.

I agree that "the purely functional definition of propositions liberates Dicisigns from the confinement to human language, intention, and consciousness." (105). That's vital - semiosis proceeds without language or consciousness. This means that information and knowledge function without language or consciousness.

Again, as noted (p 105), this doesn't mean a reductionism to singular particulars - which has been the key focus of so much of Western science, because as noted also, 'scholastic realism' prevents this because it acknowledges the reality of objective universals. And, 'anti-psychologism' rejects nominalism or the view that language/consciousness is necessary for knowledge based interactions.

You also wrote: "The only other option would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of E. Coli for example to the dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis"

Here, I would tend to agree. My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'. This of course, has not merely its benefits enabling technological innovation and societal improvement but it also has its disastrous and catastrophic downside of utopianism and totalitarianism. But only man can imagine the difference between 'is' and 'ought'.

This leaves the non-human realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive. It remains, however, firmly 'connected' to the local actual existentiality.

But I'd also say that the natural world also uses that Rhematic Indexical Legisign - which similar to the Dicent Indexical Legisign gives it 'an individual interpretation of local stimuli as referenced to a general rule'. BUT, the interpretant as Rhematic is more open than the Interpretant in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and thus, far more open to novel interpretation by other organisms picking up and relation to this Sign. That is the 'Rhematic' aspect of the Interpretant enables novel adaptation to the information carried within this Rhem-Ind. Legisign.

Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Tyler Bennett
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-***@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 9:45 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7267] Natural Propositions Chapter 4


Hello.

It is now time to begin discussion of chapter four of Natural Propositions, "Some Consequences of the Dicisign Doctrine". I come to the discussion as a student of applied semiotics in Tartu and my main interest here is in contemporary debates about the application of Peirce for empirical sign analysis.

Having covered the anti-psychologism of Peirce in chapter 2, and the definition of the dicisign in chapter 3, chapter 4 outlines some consequences of the doctrine in the terms of co-localization, the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content, as well as the definition of inference. Here, "naturalization means the reformulation of knowledge so it fits into a naturalist evolutionist world-view based on the reality of laws of nature" (105). Regarding consequences, to my mind the most important is that "the purely functional definition of propositions liberates Dicisigns from the confinement to human language, intention, and consciousness." (105) This chapter sets up the discussion in chapter six regarding dicisigns in biology as well as later discussion of propositions in non-verbal human semiosis.




In ethos this work appears as one of the most technical attempts to defend what is sometimes called the Sebeok thesis, that semiosis and life are coextensive. A major difference here from other biosemiotic defenses of the Sebeok thesis is that, where many other biosemioticians abandon the use of terms from traditional logic altogether (such as proposition and inference) for describing non-verbal semiosis, Frederik salvages some of these terms by generalizing or deflating them, and this seems more consistent with Peirce's own project. Also, where other biosemioticians have used Peirce in a more taxonomic fashion with semiotic thresholds describing evolutionary phases (Deacon 1997; e.g. Kull 2009), the dicisign doctrine seems to reject this approach, favoring what is sometimes called the mereological approach, where even the simplest semiosis involves the highest type of sign within the 1903 classification (argument) and any sign that does not attain to this level is considered in Peircean terms "degenerate" or fragmentary. The meaningful world obtains as one sophisticated argument, the details of which work themselves out as the constituents of that 'fully fledged' sign.

In Natural Propositions, the difference between the semiosis of single-celled organisms and verbal language for example consists in the difference between what are called 'proto-propositions' and fully fledged propositions or arguments which seem not to be differentiable in the terms of the 1903 classification of signs. I think one likely target for list dispute pertaining specifically to this chapter is whether the gains made by deflating the concept of proposition are worth the price of deposing the conceptual/non-conceptual dichotomy just to replace it with proto-proposition/fully fledged proposition (4.3). Much the same for (4.4). We generalize inference so as to give it applicability across the board in semiosis (all instances of semiosis entail inference), seemingly in order to salvage a hard definition of intention and consciousness (inferences can happen without intention or consciousness, which are unique to "higher" organisms). To my mind both of these arguments depend heavily on the distinction between proto-propositions and fully fledged propositions, without which distinction it appears we have no way of really semiotically contrasting the character of E. coli bacteria moving toward sugar with that of verbal language



My main question pertains to how/whether we should try to differentiate proto- from fully fledged propositions in Peircean terms, specifically in the terms of the mature theory of signs where there are sub-divisions of arguments (more sophisticated than the abduction-induction-deduction trichotomy) that would make possible a still taxonomic differentiation between the semiosis of "lower" organisms and humans. The only other option would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of E. Coli for example to the dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis, in the way that Deacon does. Otherwise the taxonomic-descriptive power of Peirce's theory of signs would seem really limited.




Thanks for letting me participate.




Regards,

Tyler Bennett

[Gary Richmond]

Tyler, Edwina, lists,

Thanks for your good introduction to Chapter 4 of NP. I think your question
concerning differentiating proto-propositions from propositions *per se* is
an important one and key to the application of the dicisign theory to
biosemiotics and elsewhere. I am myself still struggling with that
differentiation so that I won't comment on it just now, but rather turn to
another important point taken up in Chapter 4, viz., the relation of
propositions (and presumably proto-propositions) to inference.

Frederik quotes Peirce as writing that ". . the production of propositions
is of the general nature of inference" (118) and then refers to the famous
Peirce dictum that sound reasoning resembles a cable, "many connected
inferences pointing in the same direction" (119).

At this point Frederik remarks: "As to inference being basically action
habits rather than (only) mental representations, this leads Peirce to the
important step of conceptually separating inferences from consciousness"
(119) and quotes a longish passage of Peirce which includes such remarks as
"habit is by no means exclusively mental. Some plants take habits, and so
do some things purely inorganic" (at CP 5.492 he gives the example of a
"stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a habit." Edwina
occasionally points to a passage which goes even beyond this notion in
claiming that "Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops
there."

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can
no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes,
etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs (CP 4.551)


Peirce continues in the passage quoted by Frederik:

The observed laws of habit follow necessarily from a definition of habit
which takes no notice of consciousness. Thus the facts that great numbers
of individuals which die and are replaced by reproduction is favourable to
a marked prominence of habit, and that highly complex organisms of which
multitudes of parts exercise interchangeable functions are so, follow from
such a definition. (119)


He immediately comments that he does not, however, see consciousness as an
"epiphenomenon" but rather that "the function of consciousness is to
render self-control possible and efficient." (119)

The passage quoted concludes with the "living definition" (versus the
"inferior" "verbal definition") of the concept, "the living definition that
grows up in the habit." (119-120)

Consequently, the most perfect account we can give of a concept will
consist in a description of the habit that it will reproduce; and how
otherwise can a habit be described than by a general statement of the kind
of action it will give rise to under described circumstances? ("Pragmatism"
1907, Ms. 318, NEM III/I, 493-494


This understanding of habit--along with the "spatialization-of-logic
hypothesis" discussed somewhat earlier--will, as Frederik concludes the
chapter, clear the road "for considering Dicisigns in cases where
consciousness can not necessarily be presumed," (122)

Still, your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of
proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be
addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of
thinking just discussed above. I am still pondering Edwina's comments on
that problem as well as her including the hypothesis that "the natural
world also uses that Rhematic Indexical Legisign," that idea advanced also
by C.W.Spinks as I recall. On the non-symbolic Dicisign Edwina wrote;


ET: This leaves the non-human realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a
local mechanical reaction, and the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by
virtue of its Legisign, connected to the truths of the Universal and thus,
not merely reactive. It remains, however, firmly 'connected' to the local
actual existentiality.


So there seems to me much of value to ponder in this chapter.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Tyler Bennett
Hello.
It is now time to begin discussion of chapter four of Natural
Propositions, "Some Consequences of the Dicisign Doctrine". I come to the
discussion as a student of applied semiotics in Tartu and my main interest
here is in contemporary debates about the application of Peirce for
empirical sign analysis.
Having covered the anti-psychologism of Peirce in chapter 2, and the
definition of the dicisign in chapter 3, chapter 4 outlines some
consequences of the doctrine in the terms of co-localization, the
distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content, as well as the
definition of inference. Here, "naturalization means the reformulation of
knowledge so it fits into a naturalist evolutionist world-view based on the
reality of laws of nature" (105). Regarding consequences, to my mind the
most important is that "the purely functional definition of propositions
liberates Dicisigns from the confinement to human language, intention, and
consciousness." (105) This chapter sets up the discussion in chapter six
regarding dicisigns in biology as well as later discussion of propositions
in non-verbal human semiosis.
In ethos this work appears as one of the most technical attempts to defend
what is sometimes called the Sebeok thesis, that semiosis and life are
coextensive. A major difference here from other biosemiotic defenses of the
Sebeok thesis is that, where many other biosemioticians abandon the use of
terms from traditional logic altogether (such as proposition and inference)
for describing non-verbal semiosis, Frederik salvages some of these terms
by generalizing or deflating them, and this seems more consistent with
Peirce's own project. Also, where other biosemioticians have used Peirce in
a more taxonomic fashion with semiotic thresholds describing evolutionary
phases (Deacon 1997; e.g. Kull 2009), the dicisign doctrine seems to reject
this approach, favoring what is sometimes called the mereological approach,
where even the simplest semiosis involves the highest type of sign within
the 1903 classification (argument) and any sign that does not attain to
this level is considered in Peircean terms "degenerate" or fragmentary. The
meaningful world obtains as one sophisticated argument, the details of
which work themselves out as the constituents of that 'fully fledged' sign.
In *Natural Propositions*, the difference between the semiosis of
single-celled organisms and verbal language for example consists in the
difference between what are called 'proto-propositions' and fully fledged
propositions or arguments which seem not to be differentiable in the terms
of the 1903 classification of signs. I think one likely target for list
dispute pertaining specifically to this chapter is whether the gains made
by deflating the concept of proposition are worth the price of deposing the
conceptual/non-conceptual dichotomy just to replace it with
proto-proposition/fully fledged proposition (4.3). Much the same for (4.4).
We generalize inference so as to give it applicability across the board in
semiosis (all instances of semiosis entail inference), seemingly in order
to salvage a hard definition of intention and consciousness (inferences can
happen without intention or consciousness, which are unique to "higher"
organisms). To my mind both of these arguments depend heavily on the
distinction between proto-propositions and fully fledged propositions,
without which distinction it appears we have no way of really semiotically
contrasting the character of *E. coli* bacteria moving toward sugar with
that of verbal language
My main question pertains to how/whether we should try to differentiate
proto- from fully fledged propositions in Peircean terms, specifically in
the terms of the mature theory of signs where there are sub-divisions of
arguments (more sophisticated than the abduction-induction-deduction
trichotomy) that would make possible a still taxonomic differentiation
between the semiosis of "lower" organisms and humans. The only other option
would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of *E. Coli* for example to the
dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol
dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis, in the way
that Deacon does. Otherwise the taxonomic-descriptive power of Peirce's
theory of signs would seem really limited.
Thanks for letting me participate.
Regards,
Tyler Bennett