Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

[Catherine Legg]

Hi everyone,



I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.



Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up
with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only
recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *
*copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful new
idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.



Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they
are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are
prescinded after the fact.



Cheers, Cathy



*From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
*To:* ***@lists.ut.ee
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter
3.7



Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,



I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as
*denote*, *designate,
indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such as *signify,
comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik here employs such
terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary
development and vast expansion of the proposition as the *dicisign concept *in,
especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*



I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:



*In considering the proposition (dicisign)*:

*[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *



And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these two
as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.



In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the
replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
* co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.



*The*

* co-localization of the elements of the dicisign*:

*[Subject](Predicate)*



(Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive and
pre-linguistic.)



This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt,
66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this
section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of the
co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like
to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?



Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain how
Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
(Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of
Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its
replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a
bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and
the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language
of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus)
where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be
making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply
loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued
for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in
terminology from the Syllabus to KS)



Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!



Best,



Gary




*Gary Richmond*

*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*

*Communication Studies*

*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*C 745*

*718 482-5690*



On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Gary Fuhrman <***@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

Lists,



We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of
Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be
prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to
it, I’m going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for
questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule
(attached), we have another two weeks to ‘cover’ Chapter 3. I’d encourage
those who haven’t yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don’t worry
if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that
anyone, including me, has it ‘down pat’, with the possible exception of
Frederik! As you’ve probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and
difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can
make it a little easier.



gary f.



} {

www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics

[Sungchul Ji]

Catherine, Frederik, Gary R, Gary F, Jerry, lists,

It seems to me that recent discussions on "dicisign" are primarily
concerned with the structure and function of a sentence in English
language. But how about the structure and function of sentences or their
equivalents in other languages, including the cell language (cellese;
please excuse my neologism), molecular language used by living cells, on
which the functioning of the human language (humanese) critically depends
?

One of the linguistic principles found in all humaneses is the principle
of “double articulation”, i.e., the first articulation = formation of
sentences form words, and the second articulation = formation of words
from letters. I am postulating that this principle can be extended
beyond the original linguistic units to the word-sentence-text level as
well as the atom-molecule-complex level as indicated in Table 1. I also
assume that underlying these structural/syntactic trichotomies is the
functional/semantic trichotomy, i.e., denotation-judgement-reasoning.

_____________________________________________________________________

Table 1. Semiotics as the unification of physics and linguistics
______________________________________________________________________

2nd articulation 1st articulation
X ---------------------> Y -----------------------> Z
_______________________________________________________________________

X Y Z
(denotation) (judgment) (reasoning)
________________________________________________________________________

letters words sentences
________________________________________________________________________

words sentences texts
________________________________________________________________________

atoms molecules complexes
________________________________________________________________________

rheme dicisign argument
_________________________________________________________________________


(I am in the middle of making mid-term exam questions, so I don’t have
much time now to elaborate on Table 1. If you have any questions of
comments, please let me know.)

With all the best.

Sung
____________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers
University Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

Post by Catherine Legg
Hi everyone,
I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.
Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up
with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only
recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *
*copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful new
idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.
Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they
are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are
prescinded after the fact.
Cheers, Cathy
*Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter
3.7
Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as
*denote*, *designate,
indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such as *signify,
comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik here employs such
terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary
development and vast expansion of the proposition as the *dicisign concept *in,
especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*
I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
*[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these two
as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.
In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the
replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
* co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
*The*
*[Subject](Predicate)*
(Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive and
pre-linguistic.)
This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond"
(Stjernfelt,
66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this
section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of the
co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like
to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain how
Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
(Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of
Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its
replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a
bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and
the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language
of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus)
where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be
making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply
loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued
for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in
terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
Lists,
We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of
Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be
prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to
it, I’m going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for
questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule
(attached), we have another two weeks to ‘cover’ Chapter 3. I’d encourage
those who haven’t yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don’t worry
if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that
anyone, including me, has it ‘down pat’, with the possible exception of
Frederik! As you’ve probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and
difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can
make it a little easier.
gary f.
} {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

(N.B.: This post includes abstract technical rhetoric which may be incomprehensible to non-technical readers.)

Sung's suggestion (copied below) is far to simple (in my opinion).

The "triadic triad" requires triple and higher order "articulations" of the metaphysical forms of inquiry into matter necessary for the rhetorical conjunction of BOTH the mathematical and chemical disciplines. Physically, this asserts that both the physics of mass and the physics of electricity are necessary components of the logic of relatives.

The logic of the triadic triad, as I currently understand it from both a chemical and mathematical perspective, is to be taken in the sense of a closure specifying a sinsign, an individual object as a proper name. For example, water, methane, or DNA.

If different sinsigns, for example, the three forms of hydrogen (hydrogen, deuterium and tritium)
THEN three different closures spanning all the other 8 terms of the triadic triad are necessary for the argument to be a valid representation of the form as an informative form including both breath and depth.

I choose this explicit example because the chemical concept of hydrogen may include any one of the three forms as they all three have the same valence (legisign) and all three have different qualisigns, indices, icons, and rhemata.

In other words, the three forms of hydrogen (a proper name) represent three similar "things" with three similar "forms", each with a unique mass index.

Many here have conjectured that "predicate logic" somehow or other, explains both CSP writings and the nature of CSP's logic itself.

If you hold this view, then the challenge is to demonstrate how the Peircian dicisign is useful for chemical representatamen.

An hypothesis could be that CSP constructed the triadic triad as a coherent unity. His term "interpentrability" (sp?) (with respect to his theory of chemical particles) may have been expanded to a quasi-matheamtical / logical form.
The triad - icon, index, symbol - can be viewed as a mathematical triad.
The triad - rheme, dicisign amd argument can be viewed as logical triad.

Thus, one can view the two sets of representamen as a separation of mathematical logic from chemical and other perplex logics.

At this point in the development of his writings, he apparently had concluded that the logic of chemistry was NOT to be explained by the issues of weight and valence alone. (This is merely a highly speculative conjecture!)

CSP's logical firmament appears to some sort of perplex representamen such that it included mathematics, chemistry and probably theology, all in some sort of ineffable sets of relatives. (All in my opinion, of course.)

Perplex-fully Yours

Jerry

Post by Sungchul Ji
Catherine, Frederik, Gary R, Gary F, Jerry, lists,
It seems to me that recent discussions on "dicisign" are primarily
concerned with the structure and function of a sentence in English
language. But how about the structure and function of sentences or their
equivalents in other languages, including the cell language (cellese;
please excuse my neologism), molecular language used by living cells, on
which the functioning of the human language (humanese) critically depends
?
One of the linguistic principles found in all humaneses is the principle
of „double articulation‰, i.e., the first articulation = formation of
sentences form words, and the second articulation = formation of words
from letters. I am postulating that this principle can be extended
beyond the original linguistic units to the word-sentence-text level as
well as the atom-molecule-complex level as indicated in Table 1. I also
assume that underlying these structural/syntactic trichotomies is the
functional/semantic trichotomy, i.e., denotation-judgement-reasoning.
_____________________________________________________________________
Table 1. Semiotics as the unification of physics and linguistics
______________________________________________________________________
2nd articulation 1st articulation
X ---------------------> Y -----------------------> Z
_______________________________________________________________________
X Y Z
(denotation) (judgment) (reasoning)
________________________________________________________________________
letters words sentences
________________________________________________________________________
words sentences texts
________________________________________________________________________
atoms molecules complexes
________________________________________________________________________
rheme dicisign argument
_________________________________________________________________________
(I am in the middle of making mid-term exam questions, so I don‚t have
much time now to elaborate on Table 1. If you have any questions of
comments, please let me know.)
With all the best.
Sung
____________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers
University Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net

Post by Catherine Legg
Hi everyone,
Iâ•˙ve made some progress reading chapter 3.
Re. 3.7: Iâ•˙m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
index. (Subject and predicate are joined by ╲an index pointing to the
*real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object.╡) I see how this idea lines up
with the originality in Peirceâ•˙s theory of perception (which Iâ•˙ve only
recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *
*copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful new
idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.
Re. 3.9: Love the ╢top-downâ•˙ functional analysis of arguments whereby
they
are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are
prescinded after the fact.
Cheers, Cathy
*Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter
3.7
Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as
*denote*, *designate,
indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such as *signify,
comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik here employs such
terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary
development and vast expansion of the proposition as the *dicisign concept *in,
especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*
I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
*[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these two
as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.
In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the
replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
* co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
*The*
*[Subject](Predicate)*
(Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive and
pre-linguistic.)
This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt,
66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this
section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of the
co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like
to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain how
Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
(Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of
Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its
replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a
bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and
the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language
of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus)
where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be
making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply
loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued
for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in
terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
Lists,
We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of
Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be
prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to
it, Iâ•˙m going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days
for
questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule
(attached), we have another two weeks to ╢coverâ•˙ Chapter 3. Iâ•˙d
encourage
those who havenâ•˙t yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Donâ•˙t
worry
if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that
anyone, including me, has it ╢down patâ•˙, with the possible exception
of
Frederik! As youâ•˙ve probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and
difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can
make it a little easier.
gary f.
} {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics

<double-articulation_102014.pdf>
-----------------------------

[Gary Richmond]

Cathy, lists,

Cathy wrote: Re. 3.9: Love the 'top-down' functional analysis of arguments
whereby they are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the
latter are prescinded after the fact.

Closely related to this in 3.9 is something which might be of particular
interest to biosemioticians. Immediately following the Peirce quote which
includes the phrase that "an Argument is no more built up of Propositions
than a motion is built up of positions" (78), Frederik comments that, for
Peirce, according to the principle of continuity it is the reasoning
process--the chain of reasoning--which is primitive. Frederik comments in a
footnote:

Taking the chain of reasoning as primitive may give a new idea of
biological sign evolution. Instead of assuming simple organisms use very
simple signs which then compose to more complex sign during evolution, we
can assume that simple organisms use unarticulated implicit arguments so
that semiotic sophistication during evolution rather has the character of
the ongoing articulating and making explicit the semiotic machinery, such
as the two functions of Dicisigns (fn 27, p 79)


Frederik refers the reader of this footnote to Chapter 6, where the
argument he's building up is applied directly to biosemiosis. Still, as
Gary F. noted in his sketch of 3.10 today, there are so many fresh ideas in
Chapter 3 of considerable value in our possibly rethinking aspects of
semiotics and biosemiotics, that I'm beginning to see why Frederik decided
to take a 'minute' semiotic' approach to the question of the Dicisign! So,
I will this week continue to patiently study each section of Chapter 3,
increasingly convinced that Peirce's and Frederik's insights have the
potential to perhaps shake up or even revolutionize our (at least my)
thinking in these fields.

Chapters 4 and 5 promise to be just as intriguing as 3 has been, For
example, in the relatively short Chapter 4 which Tyler Bennet will be
leading commencing next Monday as Gary noted, the first "consequence of the
Dicisign doctrine" is given as the "Naturalization of Propositions."

But I don't want to get ahead of things, so for now I'll turn to Chapter to
see if I can get a handle on some of the interesting points of 4.10 which
Gary F. outlined earlier today.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Catherine Legg
Hi everyone,
I've made some progress reading chapter 3.
Re. 3.7: I'm very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
index. (Subject and predicate are joined by "an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object.") I see how this idea lines up
with the originality in Peirce's theory of perception (which I've only
recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *
*copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful
new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.
Re. 3.9: Love the 'top-down' functional analysis of arguments whereby they
are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are
prescinded after the fact.
Cheers, Cathy
*Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.7
Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as *denote*
, *designate, indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such
as *signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik
here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in
his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the *dicisign
concept *in, especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*
I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
*[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these
two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.
In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the
replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
* co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
*The*
*[Subject](Predicate)*
(Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive
and pre-linguistic.)
This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond"
(Stjernfelt, 66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the
rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of
the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd
like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain
how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
(Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds
of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than
its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is
a bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70
and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the
language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the
Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that
I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes
simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've
argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change
in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
Lists,
We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of
Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be
prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to
it, I'm going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for
questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule
(attached), we have another two weeks to 'cover' Chapter 3. I'd encourage
those who haven't yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don't worry
if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that
anyone, including me, has it 'down pat', with the possible exception of
Frederik! As you've probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and
difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can
make it a little easier.
gary f.
} {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics

[Tom Gollier]

I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading
Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something
we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the
signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:

"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which
the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information."
[Kaina Stoicheia]

Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information
in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is
a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but
regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same
information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or
false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there
is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like
they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why
are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective
existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing
that?

Tom

Post by Catherine Legg
Hi everyone,
I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.
Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up
with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only
recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *
*copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful
new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.
Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they
are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are
prescinded after the fact.
Cheers, Cathy
*Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.7
Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as *denote*
, *designate, indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such
as *signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik
here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in
his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the *dicisign
concept *in, especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*
I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
*[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these
two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.
In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the
replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
* co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
*The*
*[Subject](Predicate)*
(Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive
and pre-linguistic.)
This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond"
(Stjernfelt, 66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the
rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of
the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd
like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain
how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
(Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds
of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than
its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is
a bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70
and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the
language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the
Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that
I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes
simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've
argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change
in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Lists,

Several comments have been made about our contemporary use of the terms 'denotation' and 'connotation'. It might help if we keep in mind that Peirce thought Mill's (mis)use of these terms would likely lead to confusion. As far as I can tell, Peirce was on the mark in his comments about Mill's use of these terms.

Peirce insists on using the term 'reference' from the very beginning of his writings. As several people have pointed out, he makes a distinction between logical breadth and depth and then, using those conceptions, he provides an account of information.

We might try to draw on Peirce's terminology to sort out some of the confusions that might arise when we talk about denotation and connotation, but my hunch is that this will be an uphill battle. For those who would like to persist in this venture--if only because they are comfortable talking about denotation and connotation, it might be good to try to translate the points into the conceptions of logical breadth and depth in the hopes of getting things on a better track. When we consider examples and then try to spell out the logical depth and breadth of some kind of sign relation, it will probably be worth our time to spell out whether we're talking about the depth and breadth of a rheme, a dicisign or an argument.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Tom Gollier [***@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 4:57 PM
To: Peirce List; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:

"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia]

Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that?

Tom


On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:20 PM, Catherine Legg <***@waikato.ac.nz<mailto:***@waikato.ac.nz>> wrote:
Hi everyone,

I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.

Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *copy* of the percept but an *index* of it. This is such a powerful new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.

Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they are not *composed* of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are prescinded after the fact.

Cheers, Cathy

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
To: ***@lists.ut.ee<mailto:***@lists.ut.ee>
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7

Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,

I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote, designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903.

I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:

In considering the proposition (dicisign):
[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign)

And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that true information represents a real fact in some world of experience.

In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their co-localization, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.

The
co-localization of the elements of the dicisign:
[Subject](Predicate)

(Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and pre-linguistic.)

This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to the real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the two objects of the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?

Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while the reality (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)

Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization syntax were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!

Best,

Gary


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

[Gary Fuhrman]

Tom, my response is interleaved:



From: Tom Gollier [mailto:***@gmail.com]
Sent: 14-Oct-14 7:58 PM



I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:

"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia]

Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience,

[GF] An icon cannot point to an object in the sense of singling it out from the world of experience; so, in Peirce’s strict use of “experience” which applies to the Universe of Secondness or “real things”, it does not denote anything. “Red” signifies a “quality” or “character” belonging to the Universe of Firstness, and a sign can attribute that quality to a particular object only by means of an index involving that icon. Redness can only be denoted by means of hypostatic abstraction, i.e. by symbolizing a quality as a quasi-thing. That’s a very different kind of “denoting” from the indexical function of directing attention to an existing thing.

but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false.

[GF] Peirce doesn’t say that that object conveys the same information as “red”. He says that the information is the coupling of the icon/predicate “_____ is red” with the index/subject that fills the blank by pointing to an existing thing (the book) to which it stands in a real (not imaginary) relation.

So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons,

[GF] What other ways do you have in mind? The index Peirce is referring to at this point in Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:310) is the index which connects the replicas of the subject-symbol and the predicate-symbol in an actual utterance. No general sign such as a word can do that; so it has to be an index, which is NOT general.

or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that?

[GF] Because the reality of Truth — its independence of what anybody thinks it to be — is indispensible for a logic of inquiry. This indispensibility is primarily logical, not metaphysical, although (as Peirce remarks) it’s convenient to express it in metaphysical terms.

In short, I think what you’re overlooking here is the existential aspect of indexicality which is involved in Peirce’s usage of the traditional term “denote”.

gary f.

[Tom Gollier]

Gary, you asked:

What other ways to you have in mind?

I would have to say I think any logical relationship can link an index and
icon. Thus, "myself and my fingerprints" might even be a better example
for the point I'm trying to make. Instead of the implicative relationship
associated with "is," and the prescission needed to a "denote" a
quasi-thing like "red," we have the equivalence of what is denoted by
"myself" as an index and what is indicated by the qualities expressed by
"my fingerprints" as an icon. Both "denote," each in their own way, the
same person.

I don't think what I'm "overlooking here is the existential aspect of
indexicality." I'm just insisting on the existential aspect of the icon
via the analogy between it and what it represents. The two kinds of
"denotation" are no doubt different in several ways, but their combination
is enough to establish logical relationships, on the one hand, and claims
of truth or falsity, on the other, with regard to our experience.

Tom

*Sent:* 14-Oct-14 7:58 PM
I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading
Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something
we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the
"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in
which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey
information." [Kaina Stoicheia]
Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information
in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is
a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience,
*[GF] *An icon cannot point to an object in the sense of singling it out
from the world of experience; so, in Peirce’s strict use of “experience”
which applies to the Universe of Secondness or “real *things*”, it does
not denote anything. “Red” signifies a “quality” or “character” belonging
to the Universe of Firstness, and a sign can attribute that quality to a
particular object only by means of an index involving that icon. Redness
can only be *denoted* by means of hypostatic abstraction, i.e. by
symbolizing a quality as a quasi-thing. That’s a very different kind of
“denoting” from the indexical function of directing attention to an
existing thing.
but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the
same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true
or false.
*[GF] *Peirce doesn’t say that that object conveys the same information
as “red”. He says that the information *is* the coupling of the
icon/predicate “_____ is red” with the index/subject that fills the blank
by pointing to an existing thing (the book) to which it stands in a real
(not imaginary) relation.
So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is
no other way of combining indices and icons,
*[GF] *What other ways do you have in mind? The index Peirce is referring
to at this point in Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:310) is the index which connects
the *replicas* of the subject-symbol and the predicate-symbol in an
actual utterance. No general sign such as a word can do that; so it has to
be an index, which is NOT general.
or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds
of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to
metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where
is the support in Peirce for doing that?
*[GF] *Because the reality of Truth — its independence of what anybody
thinks it to be — is indispensible for a logic of inquiry. This
indispensibility is primarily logical, not metaphysical, although (as
Peirce remarks) it’s convenient to express it in metaphysical terms.
In short, I think what you’re overlooking here is the existential aspect
of indexicality which is involved in Peirce’s usage of the traditional term
“denote”.
*gary f.*

[Gary Fuhrman]

Tom, responses interleaved:



From: Tom Gollier [mailto:***@gmail.com]
Sent: 15-Oct-14 8:17 PM



Gary, you asked:

What other ways to you have in mind?

I would have to say I think any logical relationship can link an index and icon.

[GF] OK, but in Peirce’s view, there is only “one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo” (CP 3.440, quoted previously).

Thus, "myself and my fingerprints" might even be a better example for the point I'm trying to make. Instead of the implicative relationship associated with "is," and the prescission needed to a "denote" a quasi-thing like "red," we have the equivalence of what is denoted by "myself" as an index and what is indicated by the qualities expressed by "my fingerprints" as an icon. Both "denote," each in their own way, the same person.

[GF] OK, but except for the terminological point about “denote”, this just explains why Peirce dispensed with the “copula” in his analysis of the proposition, making the word “is” (when it occurs) part of the predicate, as explained in NP 3.4; and why the syntax of the Dicisign replaces the old “copula” with another index, as explained in NP 3.7.

I don't think what I'm "overlooking here is the existential aspect of indexicality." I'm just insisting on the existential aspect of the icon via the analogy between it and what it represents.

[GF] For Peirce, there’s nothing existential about an analogy or resemblance. An icon without an index can only be a Rheme, which cannot represent the existence of anything; that’s why there are no iconic Dicisigns among the ten classes of triadic relations.

The two kinds of "denotation" are no doubt different in several ways, but their combination is enough to establish logical relationships, on the one hand, and claims of truth or falsity, on the other, with regard to our experience.

[GF] Yes, that’s why Peirce says that the Dicisign has to be an index involving an icon. That’s the only way they can be “combined”, because the icon is more “degenerate” than the index, as explained in KS, so you can’t have an icon involving an index. But neither can convey information without the other. In the case of your fingerprints, the index is their uniqueness, and the fact that only your having actually touched something at the crime scene could account for their being there. But if someone made an enlargement of your fingerprints on canvas, framed it and hung it on the wall of an art gallery, with the title “Untitled”, then it would be an icon without an index connecting it to you, and thus it would not denote you at all, for the viewers of the canvas — not even if they happened to know you personally.

Tom

gary f.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Post by Jeffrey Brian Downard
"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia]

This quote from Kaina Stoicheia demands a bit of chemical knowledge to get to the meaning of it. Allow me to attempt a partial argument that justifies this sentence from K.S..

A chemical icon (any chemical structure) is constructed from a series of propositions.
Theses propositions are inferred from the quali-signs in an exact manner - Dalton's ration of small whole numbers for all chemical icons. CSP is seeking to generalize a chemical argument by using general terms in place of chemical terms.

As a natural object, the object is the source of the information (the sin-sign) which in turn is the source of quali-signs and indices. In the sciences, quali-signs and indices may be measured, that is, assigned numbers representing measured facts.

For example, water has a simple icon: H-O-H.
As an object, water can be decomposed by electricity to generate two quali-signs, hydrogen and oxygen, in the relative volumes of 2:1. (Note that quali-signs may also be objects!)
The principle of Dalton's ratio of small whole numbers indicates that the relative volumes of the gases can be pictorialized as the icon for water, H-O-H.
In this case, the indices of water, with respect to the quali-signs measured following electrolysis (disassembly of the whole into parts) were two and one respectively.

Thus, four of the nine logical terms of the triadic triad form a specific tetrad that conveys information from the object to the association of the the object with its icon.

The logical association of these four terms - sin-sign as object, quali-signs as properties, the index as a ratio, and the icon as the chemical structure is a special case of chemical logic for a simple (small) molecule.

Information is convey in a consistent manner among THREE different symbol systems, the alphabet, the mathematical and the chemical. (BTW, this example also illustrates the insufficiency of CSP's notion of information as being merely breadth and depth.)

The example of water is a simple example of chemical logic, which, in general, requires the meaning of terms in at least three different symbol system and constrained by the necessity for coherence among all of them.

This example should be contrasted with the comment by Gary F., whose restricts his interpretation to a single symbol system, namely, the alphabet and rejects your clear argument which is consistent with facts and measurements.

In general, the more symbol systems invoked in a description of a natural object, the richer the set of natural propositions. Indeed, one could say, rather roughly, that the triadic triad is a method for associating information about objects in a coherent manner.

And the richer the set of necessary relations needed to generate a coherent description of nature. The term "dicisign" can be viewed as a "relations collector" to bring together symbols and their relations from different symbol systems. In other words, I could expand the example of water to include all nine terms of triadic triad. The quali-signs would be expanded to include other physical properties, such a freezing point and boiling point and physical spectra relating electricity and magnetism to sub-atomic motions. In the interest in keeping it simple, the tetrad of terms - sin-sign, qualisign, icon and index suffice to illustrate the logic of relatives for non-technical philosophers.

As CSP recognized elsewhere, Mother Nature is richer than our imaginations.

Does this make any sense to you?
If not, could you point to weaknesses that disconnect the rhetoric from the facts?

Gary F., do you have any reason to reject this line of argumentation?
Jeff. D. -we started a thread along this line some months ago. Do you find this argument consistent with your understanding of Kant?


Cheers

Jerry

Post by Jeffrey Brian Downard
Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that?
Tom
Hi everyone,
I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.
Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *copy* of the percept but an *index* of it. This is such a powerful new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.
Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they are not *composed* of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are prescinded after the fact.
Cheers, Cathy
Sent: Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7
Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote, designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903.
[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign)
And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that true information represents a real fact in some world of experience.
In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their co-localization, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
The
[Subject](Predicate)
(Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and pre-linguistic.)
This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to the real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the two objects of the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while the reality (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization syntax were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
-----------------------------

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Lists,

It looks to me like Frederik has provided a fairly comprehensive explanation of Peirce's doctrine of the dicisign in chapter 3. In addition to sorting through many of the individual trees in Peirce's account, he provides a view of the larger forest. As I step back and look at the chapter as a whole, I'm wondering if we might be able to say more about Peirce's arguments for this position. Over the course of the chapter, Frederik considers a number of the arguments Peirce makes, but I wanted to ask a question about how the arguments might hang together.

For instance, in section 3.7, he consider Bellucci's explanation of Peirce's aims in the Syllabus. Bellucci says that Peirce intends to "deduce the propositions structure from its basic conception as 'bearer of truth values'." (NP, 71). On this account, the deduction takes three steps: 1) an initial definition of Dicisigns with the emphasis on Truth; 2) the argument that this definition requires Dicisigns to possess a specific double structure; 3) the detailed description of these two parts.

Consider the arguments in "Sundry Logical Conceptions." I tend to think that Peirce is offering a more developed argumentative strategy than we have seen thus far in NP. What is the larger strategy?

--Jeff



Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [***@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 9:19 PM
To: Peirce List; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

Lists,

Several comments have been made about our contemporary use of the terms 'denotation' and 'connotation'. It might help if we keep in mind that Peirce thought Mill's (mis)use of these terms would likely lead to confusion. As far as I can tell, Peirce was on the mark in his comments about Mill's use of these terms.

Peirce insists on using the term 'reference' from the very beginning of his writings. As several people have pointed out, he makes a distinction between logical breadth and depth and then, using those conceptions, he provides an account of information.

We might try to draw on Peirce's terminology to sort out some of the confusions that might arise when we talk about denotation and connotation, but my hunch is that this will be an uphill battle. For those who would like to persist in this venture--if only because they are comfortable talking about denotation and connotation, it might be good to try to translate the points into the conceptions of logical breadth and depth in the hopes of getting things on a better track. When we consider examples and then try to spell out the logical depth and breadth of some kind of sign relation, it will probably be worth our time to spell out whether we're talking about the depth and breadth of a rheme, a dicisign or an argument.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Tom Gollier [***@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 4:57 PM
To: Peirce List; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:

"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia]

Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that?

Tom


On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:20 PM, Catherine Legg <***@waikato.ac.nz<mailto:***@waikato.ac.nz>> wrote:
Hi everyone,

I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.

Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *copy* of the percept but an *index* of it. This is such a powerful new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.

Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they are not *composed* of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are prescinded after the fact.

Cheers, Cathy

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
To: ***@lists.ut.ee<mailto:***@lists.ut.ee>
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7

Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,

I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote, designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903.

I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:

In considering the proposition (dicisign):
[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign)

And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that true information represents a real fact in some world of experience.

In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their co-localization, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.

The
co-localization of the elements of the dicisign:
[Subject](Predicate)

(Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and pre-linguistic.)

This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to the real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the two objects of the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?

Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while the reality (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)

Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization syntax were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!

Best,

Gary


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Lists,

Let me say a little bit about the argumentative structure of "Sundry Logical Conceptions" in the hopes of getting a bit clearer--at least in my own mind--about how the arguments in the Syllabus for his account of the dicisign are supposed to hang together.

From the surface of the text, this essay appears to follow the same basic approach that was adopted in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties," "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," and "Further Consequences." That is, Peirce starts with some observations drawn from our common experience. He is particularly interested in those phenomena that do not fit with the philosophical theories that have been developed up to his point in time. In order to support an abductive inference to an explanatory hypothesis, Peirce provides a careful analysis of the key phenomena. The aim is to articulate exactly what needs to be explained so that we will be able to avoid the mistakes of postulating more than is needed or less than is needed to account for the phenomena. The analysis is guided by a phenomenological theory of the universal categories.

It is clear that Peirce is working from this starting point in "Sundry Logical Conceptions," because the first section of this essay consists of an explanation of the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness. After reviewing the account of the universal categories, he says that "in order to understand logic, it is necessary to get as clear notions as possible of these three categories and to gain the ability to recognize them in the different conceptions with which logic deals.” (EP, vol. 2, 270) Before moving any further into the argument of this essay, let me see if the view I'm attributing to Peirce fits with what he says about his procedure in his earlier works. For the sake of taking an example, I'll consider his arguments concerning the dicisign in the "Regernated Logic."

He explains the starting point in his analysis of an assertion in the following way:

Namely, it is that speculative grammar, or analysis of the nature of assertion, which rests upon observations, indeed, but upon observations of the rudest kind, open to the eye of every attentive person who is familiar with the use of language, and which, we may be sure, no rational being, able to converse at all with his fellows, and so to express a doubt of anything, will ever have any doubt. Now, proof does not consist in giving superfluous and superpossible certainty to that which nobody ever did or ever will doubt, but in removing doubts which do, or at least might at some time, arise. A man first comes to the study of logic with an immense multitude of opinions upon a vast variety of topics; and they are held with a degree of confidence, upon which, after he has studied logic, he comes to look back with no little amusement. There remains, however, a small minority of opinions that logic never shakes; and among these are certain observations about assertions. The student would never have had a desire to learn logic if he had not paid some little attention to assertion, so as at least to attach a definite signification to assertion. So that, if he has not thought more accurately about assertions, he must at least be conscious, in some out-of-focus fashion, of certain properties of assertion. When he comes to the study, if he has a good teacher, these already dimly recognized facts will be placed before him in accurate formulation, and will be accepted as soon as he can clearly apprehend their statements. (CP, 3.432)

Let us see what some of these observations and dimly recognized facts are. Here are some points made in the following paragraphs. As far as I can see, they are all observations drawn from common experience of what is involved in the making of an assertion:

1. When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it.

2. Some of these signs (or at least one of them) are supposed to excite in the mind of the receiver familiar images, pictures, or, we might almost say, dreams -- that is, reminiscences of sights, sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, or other sensations, now quite detached from the original circumstances of their first occurrence, so that they are free to be attached to new occasions. The deliverer is able to call up these images at will (with more or less effort) in his own mind; and he supposes the receiver can do the same.

3. Not only is the outward significant word or mark a sign, but the image which it is expected to excite in the mind of the receiver will likewise be a sign -- a sign by resemblance, or, as we say, an icon -- of the similar image in the mind of the deliverer, and through that also a sign of the real quality of the thing. This icon is called the predicate of the assertion. But instead of a single icon, or sign by resemblance of a familiar image or "dream," evocable at will, there may be a complexus of such icons, forming a composite image of which the whole is not familiar. But though the whole is not familiar, yet not only are the parts familiar images, but there will also be a familiar image of its mode of composition.

4. In fact, two types of complication will be sufficient. For example, one may be conjunctive and the other disjunctive combination. Conjunctive combination is when two images are both to be used at once; and disjunctive when one or other is to be used. (This is not the most scientific selection of types; but it will answer the present purpose.) The sort of idea which an icon embodies, if it be such that it can convey any positive information, being applicable to some things but not to others, is called a first intention. The idea embodied by an icon which cannot of itself convey any information, being applicable to everything or to nothing, but which may, nevertheless, be useful in modifying other icons, is called a second intention.

5. The assertion which the deliverer seeks to convey to the mind of the receiver relates to some object or objects which have forced themselves upon his attention; and he will miss his mark altogether unless he can succeed in forcing those very same objects upon the attention of the receiver. No icon can accomplish this, because an icon does not relate to any particular thing; nor does its idea strenuously force itself upon the mind, but often requires an effort to call it up. Some such sign as the word this, or that, or hullo, or hi, which awakens and directs attention must be employed. A sign which denotes a thing by forcing it upon the attention is called an index. An index does not describe the qualities of its object. An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, having thisness, and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called a hecceity. A hecceity in its relation to the assertion is a subject thereof. An assertion may have a multitude of subjects; but to that we shall return presently.

6. Neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor both together, can make an assertion. The assertion represents a compulsion which experience, meaning the course of life, brings upon the deliverer to attach the predicate to the subjects as a sign of them taken in a particular way. This compulsion strikes him at a certain instant; and he remains under it forever after. It is, therefore, different from the temporary force which the hecceities exert upon his attention. This new compulsion may pass out of mind for the time being; but it continues just the same, and will act whenever the occasion arises, that is, whenever those particular hecceities and that first intention are called to mind together. It is, therefore, a permanent conditional force, or law. The deliverer thus requires a kind of sign which shall signify a law that to objects of indices an icon appertains as sign of them in a given way. Such a sign has been called a symbol. It is the copula of the assertion.

7. Returning to the subjects, it is to be remarked that the assertion may contain the suggestion, or request, that the receiver do something with them. For instance, it may be that he is first to take any one, no matter what, and apply it in a certain way to the icon, that he is then to take another, perhaps this time a suitably chosen one, and apply that to the icon, etc. … This is forced upon the deliverer by experience; and it is by no idiosyncrasy of his; so that it will be forced equally upon the receiver.

As far as I can tell, these are some of the same key points the Peirce is analyzing in "Sundry Logical Conceptions" and other parts of the Syllabus. So, the starting point of Peirce's arguments concerning the nature of the dicisign seems to be an analysis of the observations, and we can see that he is already correcting for observational errors made by other philosophers. Other philosophers have failed to notice, for instance, that "neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor both together, can make an assertion." In failing to notice this, they have failed to see that there is a kind of compulsion involved in making an assertion--and that the compulsion is of a particular sort.

Supposing that this is on the right track, how does his analysis of the observations fit with the deductions he makes from his key definitions--such as the definition of the sign? These are two parts of his argumentative strategy, but I'm not yet clear on how they fit together.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [***@nau.edu]
Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 12:41 AM
To: Peirce List; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

Lists,

It looks to me like Frederik has provided a fairly comprehensive explanation of Peirce's doctrine of the dicisign in chapter 3. In addition to sorting through many of the individual trees in Peirce's account, he provides a view of the larger forest. As I step back and look at the chapter as a whole, I'm wondering if we might be able to say more about Peirce's arguments for this position. Over the course of the chapter, Frederik considers a number of the arguments Peirce makes, but I wanted to ask a question about how the arguments might hang together.

For instance, in section 3.7, he consider Bellucci's explanation of Peirce's aims in the Syllabus. Bellucci says that Peirce intends to "deduce the propositions structure from its basic conception as 'bearer of truth values'." (NP, 71). On this account, the deduction takes three steps: 1) an initial definition of Dicisigns with the emphasis on Truth; 2) the argument that this definition requires Dicisigns to possess a specific double structure; 3) the detailed description of these two parts.

Consider the arguments in "Sundry Logical Conceptions." I tend to think that Peirce is offering a more developed argumentative strategy than we have seen thus far in NP. What is the larger strategy?

--Jeff



Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [***@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 9:19 PM
To: Peirce List; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

Lists,

Several comments have been made about our contemporary use of the terms 'denotation' and 'connotation'. It might help if we keep in mind that Peirce thought Mill's (mis)use of these terms would likely lead to confusion. As far as I can tell, Peirce was on the mark in his comments about Mill's use of these terms.

Peirce insists on using the term 'reference' from the very beginning of his writings. As several people have pointed out, he makes a distinction between logical breadth and depth and then, using those conceptions, he provides an account of information.

We might try to draw on Peirce's terminology to sort out some of the confusions that might arise when we talk about denotation and connotation, but my hunch is that this will be an uphill battle. For those who would like to persist in this venture--if only because they are comfortable talking about denotation and connotation, it might be good to try to translate the points into the conceptions of logical breadth and depth in the hopes of getting things on a better track. When we consider examples and then try to spell out the logical depth and breadth of some kind of sign relation, it will probably be worth our time to spell out whether we're talking about the depth and breadth of a rheme, a dicisign or an argument.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Tom Gollier [***@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 4:57 PM
To: Peirce List; ***@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 - 3.9

I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:

"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia]

Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that?

Tom


On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:20 PM, Catherine Legg <***@waikato.ac.nz<mailto:***@waikato.ac.nz>> wrote:
Hi everyone,

I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.

Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *copy* of the percept but an *index* of it. This is such a powerful new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.

Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they are not *composed* of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are prescinded after the fact.

Cheers, Cathy

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
To: ***@lists.ut.ee<mailto:***@lists.ut.ee>
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7

Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,

I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote, designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903.

I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:

In considering the proposition (dicisign):
[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign)

And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that true information represents a real fact in some world of experience.

In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their co-localization, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.

The
co-localization of the elements of the dicisign:
[Subject](Predicate)

(Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and pre-linguistic.)

This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to the real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the two objects of the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?

Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while the reality (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)

Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization syntax were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!

Best,

Gary


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690