Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

[Gary Fuhrman]

On to the third section of NP Chapter 3:



Here we come to the intension (depth), i.e. the definition, of the dicisign — first in the definition of “proposition” (from “Kaina Stoicheia”) as “a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.” Separately from what? From the rest of the sign. In a verbal replica of a proposition, the part which indicates the object is called the subject. Like all words, it is symbolic — but this is not definitive of its function in the proposition. What is definitive is not the symbolic but the indexical function. Thus the definition applies equally well to a sign which is not verbal or symbolic.



An index alone, though, would indicate the object without giving us any information about it. The part of a verbal proposition which does tell us something about its object is called the predicate. But here too, the symbolicity of the predicate part is not definitive of its function; what’s definitive of that function is the iconicity of the sign. Thus “the vital spark of every proposition, the peculiar propositional element of the proposition, is an indexical proposition; an index involving an icon” (EP2:310). Hence the name dicisign or dicent sign for a sign that combines these indexical and iconic functions (whether it does so by symbolic means or not). This is the core of Peirce’s doctrine of the Dicisign.



This still leaves open the question I posed earlier about “Kaina Stoicheia”, which may be reworded thus: if a genuine dicisign or “indexical proposition” does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign? To clarify this question, we should note Peirce’s definition of “symbol”, in KS and in the Syllabus, as “a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted” (EP2:307). Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign’s relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.



This will probably be my last post for a few days, as I’ll be away from home and fully occupied all weekend. I trust that the seminar will carry on in my absence.



gary f.

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F., lists,

This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with the
next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even at
the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've
written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly
vexing question:

GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to be
symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why
does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?"


You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
because it will be so interpreted" (EP2:307) then commenting:

GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this
definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the
sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder the
relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.


Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with
its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as
I proceed down the ensuing group of quotes):

. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices,
and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such
until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a
Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its
Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually
determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an Object
(emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a
Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a
Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of "substitute"
involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.) [emphasis
added CP 2.275-276]


So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea
of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."

But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
the science of Thridness in general":

Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).


But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.

Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent
to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly
contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of
the passage).

Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot
be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law,
or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is
separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this
is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter
of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added).

So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now
near
proverbial
"
sunflower"
)
has the *potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump
,


in
certain cases, the idea of

*the genuine sign*
, which is to say *the sign *
*completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*.
So, as the following quote concludes, "
take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this
genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign
,
"
and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.


Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all
three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another
they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as
mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague
idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event.
That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The
third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the
information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign *(CP1.537).


So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).

Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
definite notion of any object in any way":

. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign
I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way,
as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with
this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to
a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis
applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know
no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540, emphasis added).


And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition (which,
note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
representamen and *not* of a sign):

My definition of a representamen is as follows:
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the
same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).


I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

Post by Gary Fuhrman
Here we come to the intension (depth), i.e. the definition, of the
dicisign -- first in the definition of "proposition" (from "Kaina
Stoicheia") as "a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its
object." Separately from what? From the rest of the sign. In a verbal
replica of a proposition, the part which indicates the object is called the
*subject*. Like all words, it is symbolic -- but this is not definitive of
its function in the proposition. What is definitive is not the symbolic but
the *indexical* function. Thus the definition applies equally well to a
sign which is *not* verbal or symbolic.
An index alone, though, would indicate the object without giving us any
information about it. The part of a verbal proposition which does tell us
something *about* its object is called the *predicate*. But here too, the
symbolicity of the predicate part is not definitive of its function; what's
definitive of that function is the *iconicity* of the sign. Thus "the
vital spark of every proposition, the peculiar propositional element of the
proposition, is an indexical proposition; an index involving an icon"
(EP2:310). Hence the name *dicisign* or *dicent* sign for a sign that
combines these indexical and iconic functions (whether it does so by
symbolic means or not). This is the core of Peirce's doctrine of the
Dicisign.
This still leaves open the question I posed earlier about "Kaina
Stoicheia", which may be reworded thus: if a *genuine dicisign* or
"indexical proposition" does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill
its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the
*symbol* with the *genuine sign*? To clarify this question, we should
note Peirce's definition of "symbol", in KS and in the *Syllabus*, as "a
sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so
interpreted" (EP2:307). Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed
to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and
*object*. Yet this definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be
more about the sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its
object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
This will probably be my last post for a few days, as I'll be away from
home and fully occupied all weekend. I trust that the seminar will carry on
in my absence.
gary f.

[Gary Fuhrman]

Gary R, lists,



This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of
following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer)
mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to
dicisigns.



First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative
Grammar" section of the Syllabus (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding Peirce's
introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of
representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell
Lectures which the Syllabus was intended to accompany. But your third, CP
1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper
c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a fact, or his usage of the
word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.



In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that
representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object
and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living" (CP
1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of fact" lacks
the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is "supposed to
be an element" is only the universe of existence, i.e. of Secondness. By
shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that Secondness to
its structure - which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore
partakes of Thirdness - I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the
mode of being of "fact".



But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet . I think it's related to a
some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this
neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign,
relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the linguistic symbol
at least, if related to its object mainly by reference, involves a
degenerate index: the Index is a "Representamen whose Representative
character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is
an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a
reference, the Index is degenerate" (EP2:274). This shows at least that
genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to
a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging
name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when
combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of
except by involving them.



The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely mathematical
roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could describe a
circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is simpler than an
ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be
described as "degenerate" relative to the argument, which is the most
complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its
interpretant - and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is
that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first
(icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?



It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough to
see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of your
post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort should be
helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's doctrine of
the Dicisign.



gary f.

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com]
Sent: 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.3



Gary F., lists,



This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with the
next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even at
the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've written,
and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly vexing
question:



GF: "if a genuine dicisign or "indexical proposition" does not have to be
symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does
Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign?"



You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
because it will be so interpreted" (EP2:307) then commenting:



GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this
definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign's
relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation
between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.



Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with its
interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as I
proceed down the ensuing group of quotes):



. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices, and
Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such until it
actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon
as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not
necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant,
nor even upon its actually having an Object (emphasis added).

An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness
of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to
be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything
that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose,
and thus of genuine thirdness.) [emphasis added CP 2.275-276]



So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully capable of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely may substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea of
substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."



But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
the science of Thridness in general":



Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).



But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.



Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent
to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly
contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of
the passage).



Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot
be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is
separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is
neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of
law, since thought is living (CP 1.480, emphasis added).



So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o

f

some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower")
has the potential to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, the genuine triad, may trump , in certain cases,
the idea of the genuine sign, which is to say the sign completed in its
being interpreted, that is, the symbol.

So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation
of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.





Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all
three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another
they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as
mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague
idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That
is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is
thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into
the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought,
or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element,
and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (CP1.537).



So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).



Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
definite notion of any object in any way":



. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign
I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way,
as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with
this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to
a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies
to. [. . . ] All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason
why every representamen should do so (CP1.540, emphasis added).



And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition (which,
note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
representamen and not of a sign):



My definition of a representamen is as follows:

A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).



I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.



Best,



Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary, lists,

GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that
Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or dicisign,
and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding another
dimension to the mode of being of "fact".


I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension
to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his
late 19th century emphasis on its *existential* *2ns* to examining its
*structure* *as a dicisign *at the beginning of the 20th.

Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this
regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274):

GF: [That t]his shows at least that* genuineness and degeneracy are not
absolute qualities* but *always relative to a function.* So even though
Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in
KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out
semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of *except by involving
them*.


Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us overcome
a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of degeneracy in
semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. But this is
still a vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote:

GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be
described as "degenerate" *relative to the argument*, which is the most
complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its
interpretant -- and which, for that very reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is
that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member *of the
first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of signs?


But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came
across this.

A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical
criticism. CP 2.26


Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof'
and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought
that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the
argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty
good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.

At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of
Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't
make too much of the phrase '*relatively* genuine', but I'm not exactly
certain now *how much* to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've
always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?

As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you
(or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of
the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make
of it.

. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that
if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be
indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would
then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire
whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the
former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer,
however, comes forthwith.* Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a
tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .]
to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a
genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it.*
It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the
analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and
arguments. But it is easy to see that *the proposition purports to intend
to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents
itself as an Index*, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion
but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its
character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).


I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of
"the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to
be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign.
I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of
this quotation.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Gary Fuhrman
Gary R, lists,
This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of
following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer)
mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to
dicisigns.
First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative
Grammar" section of the *Syllabus* (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding
Peirce's introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of
representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell
Lectures which the *Syllabus* was intended to accompany. But your third,
CP 1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper
c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a *fact,* or his usage
of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.
In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that
representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object
and an interpreting thought. Now this is *neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general*, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living"
(CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of fact"
lacks the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is
"supposed to be an element" is only the universe of *existence*, i.e. of
Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from
that Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or
dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding
another dimension to the mode of being of "fact".
But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet ... I think it's related to
a some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this
neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign,
relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the *linguistic*
symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by *reference*, involves
a *degenerate index*: the Index is a "Representamen whose Representative
character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is
an existential relation, the Index is *genuine.* If the Secondness is a
reference, the Index is *degenerate*" (EP2:274)*.* This shows at least
that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always
relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the
"disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out that they
(especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the
symbol is incapable of *except by involving them*.
The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely
mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could
describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is
*simpler* than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the
proposition itself can be described as "degenerate" *relative to the
argument*, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types
because it separately indicates its interpretant -- and which, for that very
reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is that the main reason why the symbol is
the most genuine member *of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of
signs?
It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough
to see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of
your post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort
should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's
doctrine of the Dicisign.
gary f.
*Sent:* 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.3
Gary F., lists,
This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with
the next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even
at the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've
written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly
GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to
be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why
does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?"
You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this
definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the
sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder
the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with
its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as
. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices,
and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such
until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a
Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its
Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually
determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an Object
(emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a
Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a
Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of "substitute"
involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.) [emphasis
added CP 2.275-276]
So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the
idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine
thirdness."
But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).
But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.
Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent
to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly
contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of
the passage).
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere
law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad
is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this
is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter
of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added).
So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower") has
the *potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump , in certain
cases, the idea of *the genuine sign*, which is to say *the sign
completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*.
So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.
Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are
all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one
another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its
capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a
mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or
event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information.
The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the
information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign *(CP1.537).
So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).
Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a
sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any
way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start
with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is
essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that
analysis applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds;
but I know no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540,
emphasis added).
And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition
(which, note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the
same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).
I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.
Best,
Gary

[Gary Fuhrman]

Gary R,



Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is worth
reflecting on in this context; but then that's true of the whole Speculative
Grammar section of the Syllabus. Every time I read part of it, it seems that
another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in, because of clues I've
picked up since the previous reading. This time around, what comes to the
fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the
sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index - which,
strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol
and thus more genuine. I'm not making it any more clear than Peirce did,
just rewording it, but that seems to help make the words more transparent,
so that we can see through them to what we're talking about. Maybe that's
why Peirce did so much rewording of his own thought - to get through to the
real, general, genuine Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his
momentary brain activity, but a piece of the Truth .



But then I must be missing something too, because I don't see why Peirce's
remark that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open
to logical criticism" is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. Can
you maybe reword that part of your message?



gary f.



From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com]
Sent: 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3



Gary, lists,



GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that
Secondness to its structure - which is that of a proposition or dicisign,
and therefore partakes of Thirdness - I think Peirce was adding another
dimension to the mode of being of "fact".



I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension
to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his
late 19th century emphasis on its existential 2ns to examining its structure
as a dicisign at the beginning of the 20th.



Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this
regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274):



GF: [That t]his shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not
absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce
gave the icon and index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he
also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out
semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.



Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us overcome
a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of degeneracy in
semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. But this is
still a vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote:



GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be
described as "degenerate" relative to the argument, which is the most
complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its
interpretant - and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is
that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first
(icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?



But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came
across this.



A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical
criticism. CP 2.26



Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof'
and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought
that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the
argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty
good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.



At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of
Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make
too much of the phrase 'relatively genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now
how much to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to
mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?



As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you
(or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of
the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of
it.



. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that
if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be
indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would
then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire
whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the
former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer,
however, comes forthwith. Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a
tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .] to
a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a
genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it.
It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the
analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and
arguments. But it is easy to see that the proposition purports to intend to
compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents
itself as an Index, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion but
action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its
character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).



I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of
"the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to be
of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign.
I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of
this quotation.



Best,



Gary








Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690



On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Gary Fuhrman <***@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

Gary R, lists,



This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of
following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer)
mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to
dicisigns.



First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative
Grammar" section of the Syllabus (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding Peirce's
introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of
representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell
Lectures which the Syllabus was intended to accompany. But your third, CP
1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper
c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a fact, or his usage of the
word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.



In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that
representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object
and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living" (CP
1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of fact" lacks
the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is "supposed to
be an element" is only the universe of existence, i.e. of Secondness. By
shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that Secondness to
its structure - which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore
partakes of Thirdness - I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the
mode of being of "fact".



But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet . I think it's related to a
some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this
neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign,
relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the linguistic symbol
at least, if related to its object mainly by reference, involves a
degenerate index: the Index is a "Representamen whose Representative
character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is
an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a
reference, the Index is degenerate" (EP2:274). This shows at least that
genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to
a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging
name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when
combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of
except by involving them.



The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely mathematical
roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could describe a
circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is simpler than an
ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be
described as "degenerate" relative to the argument, which is the most
complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its
interpretant - and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is
that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first
(icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?



It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough to
see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of your
post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort should be
helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's doctrine of
the Dicisign.



gary f.

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com]
Sent: 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.3



Gary F., lists,



This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with the
next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even at
the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've written,
and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly vexing
question:



GF: "if a genuine dicisign or "indexical proposition" does not have to be
symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does
Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign?"



You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
because it will be so interpreted" (EP2:307) then commenting:



GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this
definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign's
relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation
between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.



Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with its
interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as I
proceed down the ensuing group of quotes):



. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices, and
Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such until it
actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon
as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not
necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant,
nor even upon its actually having an Object (emphasis added).

An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness
of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to
be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything
that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose,
and thus of genuine thirdness.) [emphasis added CP 2.275-276]



So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully capable of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely may substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea of
substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."



But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
the science of Thridness in general":



Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).



But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.



Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent
to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly
contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of
the passage).



Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot
be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is
separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is
neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of
law, since thought is living (CP 1.480, emphasis added).



So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o

f

some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower")
has the potential to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, the genuine triad, may trump , in certain cases,
the idea of the genuine sign, which is to say the sign completed in its
being interpreted, that is, the symbol.

So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation
of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.





Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all
three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another
they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as
mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague
idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That
is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is
thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into
the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought,
or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element,
and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (CP1.537).



So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).



Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
definite notion of any object in any way":



. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign
I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way,
as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with
this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to
a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies
to. [. . . ] All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason
why every representamen should do so (CP1.540, emphasis added).



And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition (which,
note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
representamen and not of a sign):



My definition of a representamen is as follows:

A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).



I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.



Best,



Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, lists,

Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus
that this struck him:

GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign
itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* -- which,
strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument a symbol
and thus more genuine.


I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further,
that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was
"to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a
piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes
good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking
more transparent, but often enough they did.

You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine
argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"

GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign
might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.


First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument?
While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate
relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's
terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of
degenerate symbols *per se*. For example:

. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning,
is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a
character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There
are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that
individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293


I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of genuine
symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to apply to
symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of degenerate
symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the Abstract
(its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate
interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say:


Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since
its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index
may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol
may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate
Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine
Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294


I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as
opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to
grasp Peirce's meaning here.


Best,


Gary R


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Gary Fuhrman
Gary R,
Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is worth
reflecting on in this context; but then that's true of the whole
Speculative Grammar section of the *Syllabus*. Every time I read part of
it, it seems that another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in,
because of clues I've picked up since the previous reading. This time
around, what comes to the fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or
proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and
represents it as an *index* -- which, strictly speaking, lacks the
*generality* which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine. I'm
not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording it, but that
seems to help make the words more transparent, so that we can see through
them to what we're talking about. Maybe that's why Peirce did so much
rewording of his own thought -- to get through to the real, general, genuine
Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his momentary brain
activity, but a piece of the Truth ...
But then I must be missing something too, because I don't see why Peirce's
remark that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open
to logical criticism" is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. Can
you maybe reword that part of your message?
gary f.
*Sent:* 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3
Gary, lists,
GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that
Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or
dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding
another dimension to the mode of being of "fact".
I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new
dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving
from his late 19th century emphasis on its *existential* *2ns* to
examining its *structure* *as a dicisign *at the beginning of the 20th.
Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this
GF: [That t]his shows at least that* genuineness and degeneracy are not
absolute qualities* but *always relative to a function.* So even though
Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in
KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out
semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of *except by involving
them*.
Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us
overcome a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of
degeneracy in semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent.
GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be
described as "degenerate" *relative to the argument*, which is the most
complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its
interpretant -- and which, for that very reason, can only be a *symbol*.
Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member *of the
first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of signs?
But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came
across this.
A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical
criticism. CP 2.26
Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof'
and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought
that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the
argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty
good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.
At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of
Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't
make too much of the phrase '*relatively* genuine', but I'm not exactly
certain now *how much* to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've
always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?
As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you
(or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of
the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make
of it.
. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought
that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be
indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would
then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire
whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the
former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer,
however, comes forthwith.* Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol
"a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. .
.] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as
a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to
it.* It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether
the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and
arguments. But it is easy to see that *the proposition purports to intend
to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents
itself as an Index*, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion
but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its
character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).
I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of
"the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to
be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign.
I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of
this quotation.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
Gary R, lists,
This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of
following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer)
mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to
dicisigns.
First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative
Grammar" section of the *Syllabus* (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding
Peirce's introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of
representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell
Lectures which the *Syllabus* was intended to accompany. But your third,
CP 1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper
c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a *fact,* or his usage
of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.
In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that
representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object
and an interpreting thought. Now this is *neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general*, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living"
(CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of fact"
lacks the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is
"supposed to be an element" is only the universe of *existence*, i.e. of
Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from
that Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or
dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding
another dimension to the mode of being of "fact".
But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet ... I think it's related to
a some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this
neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign,
relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the *linguistic*
symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by *reference*, involves
a *degenerate index*: the Index is a "Representamen whose Representative
character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is
an existential relation, the Index is *genuine.* If the Secondness is a
reference, the Index is *degenerate*" (EP2:274)*.* This shows at least
that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always
relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the
"disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out that they
(especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the
symbol is incapable of *except by involving them*.
The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely
mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could
describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is
*simpler* than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the
proposition itself can be described as "degenerate" *relative to the
argument*, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types
because it separately indicates its interpretant -- and which, for that very
reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is that the main reason why the symbol is
the most genuine member *of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of
signs?
It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough
to see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of
your post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort
should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's
doctrine of the Dicisign.
gary f.
*Sent:* 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.3
Gary F., lists,
This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with
the next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even
at the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've
written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly
GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to
be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why
does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?"
You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this
definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the
sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder
the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with
its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as
. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices,
and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such
until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a
Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its
Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually
determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an Object
(emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a
Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a
Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of "substitute"
involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.) [emphasis
added CP 2.275-276]
So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the
idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine
thirdness."
But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).
But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.
Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent
to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly
contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of
the passage).
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere
law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad
is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this
is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter
of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added).
So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower") has
the *potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump , in certain
cases, the idea of *the genuine sign*, which is to say *the sign
completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*.
So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.
Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are
all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one
another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its
capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a
mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or
event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information.
The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the
information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign *(CP1.537).
So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).
Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a
sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any
way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start
with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is
essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that
analysis applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds;
but I know no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540,
emphasis added).
And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition
(which, note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the
same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).
I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.
Best,
Gary

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary R., Gary F., lists,

I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had not
embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.

[Quote]
_/Subindices/_ or _/hyposemes/_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the
letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real
connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it
is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]

I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus"
but it's been years and years.

Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents
the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an
/index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks the /generality/ which
makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and,
further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much
self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine
Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere)
personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his
re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent, but often
enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual,
and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that
has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols,
the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and
which signifies only such characters as that individual may
realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to
apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds
of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual)
and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of"
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index,
yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular]
Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect
Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect
Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index
or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect'
(as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try
to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary R, Gary F., lists,

There seemed some inconsistency here, especially because of the date
"November 1903" appearing with the subindex quote, but date is for the
start of the lecture series and isn't date of the MS itself. EP
Headnotes indicate that CP 2.292-4 (including the hyposemes) is from:

MS 478 [The third and longest section of the 1903 Syllabus, this
text was not printed in the pamphlet for the audience. The
subsection entitled "Speculative Grammar" was published in large
part in CP 2.274-77, 283-84, 292-94, and 309-31.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 20, "Sundry Logical Conceptions",
267 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20> ]

The tenfold classification, including the indexical legisign is from

MS 540. [This is the fifth section of 1903 Syllabus, first published
in CP 2.233-72.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 21, "Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", 289
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21>

The "dimly remembered passage" that I mentioned was, I now realize, the
very one quoted about Singular Symbols in this thread. I remember years
ago putting the passages together in my mind. Peirce said that
subindexes are not indices, so what are they? I doubted that they could
be icons, so I figured that they must be symbols. And then I found the
passage on Singular Symbols, and put two and two together, so to speak.

Best, Ben

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had
not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_/Subindices/_ or _/hyposemes/_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or
the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a
real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus"
but it's been years and years.
Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents
the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an
/index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks the /generality/ which
makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and,
further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much
self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine
Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere)
personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his
re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent, but often
enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual,
and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that
has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols,
the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and
which signifies only such characters as that individual may
realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem
to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two
kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an
individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in
speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index,
yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual
[Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its
indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect
Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine
Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect'
(as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try
to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

[Benjamin Udell]

Correction, sorry, the subindex quote was from CP 2.274, but that also
was from MS 478 (the third section of "Syllabus") just like the passage
with the Singular Symbol in CP 2.293. - Best Ben

Gary R, Gary F., lists,

There seemed some inconsistency here, especially because of the date
"November 1903" appearing with the subindex quote, but date is for the
start of the lecture series and isn't date of the MS itself. EP
Headnotes indicate that CP 2.292-4 (including the hyposemes) is from:

MS 478 [The third and longest section of the 1903 Syllabus, this
text was not printed in the pamphlet for the audience. The
subsection entitled "Speculative Grammar" was published in large
part in CP 2.274-77, 283-84, 292-94, and 309-31.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 20, "Sundry Logical Conceptions",
267 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20> ]

The tenfold classification, including the indexical legisign is from

MS 540. [This is the fifth section of 1903 Syllabus, first published
in CP 2.233-72.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 21, "Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", 289
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21>

The "dimly remembered passage" that I mentioned was, I now realize, the
very one quoted about Singular Symbols in this thread. I remember years
ago putting the passages together in my mind. Peirce said that
subindexes are not indices, so what are they? I doubted that they could
be icons, so I figured that they must be symbols. And then I found the
passage on Singular Symbols, and put two and two together, so to speak.

Best, Ben

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had
not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_/Subindices/ _ or _/hyposemes/ _ are signs which are rendered
such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus
a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or
the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a
real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus"
but it's been years and years.
Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents
the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an
/index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks the /generality/ which
makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and,
further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much
self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine
Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere)
personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his
re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent, but often
enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols /per se/ . For
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual,
and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that
has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols,
the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and
which signifies only such characters as that individual may
realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem
to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two
kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an
individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in
speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index,
yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual
[Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its
indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect
Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine
Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect'
(as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try
to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

[Gary Fuhrman]

Just a bibliographic note here: I think that all references to or quotations from the Syllabus should just give the EP2 page number, unless it’s a reference to the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Dyadic Relations” (CP 3.571ff.). Except for that part, the Syllabus is complete and together in EP2, while in CP it’s scattered around, parts are missing, and parts are mistakenly dated as “c. 1902”. Since the chronological order is important here, I think that would clarify many of the terminological issues to use EP2 for citations.



gary f.



From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:***@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: 1-Oct-14 5:13 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:7048] Re: Natural Propositions,



Correction, sorry, the subindex quote was from CP 2.274, but that also was from MS 478 (the third section of "Syllabus") just like the passage with the Singular Symbol in CP 2.293. - Best Ben

Gary R, Gary F., lists,

There seemed some inconsistency here, especially because of the date "November 1903" appearing with the subindex quote, but date is for the start of the lecture series and isn't date of the MS itself. EP Headnotes indicate that CP 2.292-4 (including the hyposemes) is from:

MS 478 [The third and longest section of the 1903 Syllabus, this text was not printed in the pamphlet for the audience. The subsection entitled "Speculative Grammar" was published in large part in CP 2.274-77, 283-84, 292-94, and 309-31.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 20, "Sundry Logical Conceptions", 267 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20 <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20> ]

The tenfold classification, including the indexical legisign is from

MS 540. [This is the fifth section of 1903 Syllabus, first published in CP 2.233-72.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 21, "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", 289 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21 <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21>

The "dimly remembered passage" that I mentioned was, I now realize, the very one quoted about Singular Symbols in this thread. I remember years ago putting the passages together in my mind. Peirce said that subindexes are not indices, so what are they? I doubted that they could be icons, so I figured that they must be symbols. And then I found the passage on Singular Symbols, and put two and two together, so to speak.

Best, Ben

On 10/1/2014 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

Gary R., Gary F., lists,

I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP 2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a. hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.

[Quote]
_Subindices _ or _hyposemes _ are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]

I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus" but it's been years and years.

Best, Ben

On 10/1/2014 1:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Gary F, lists,

Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus that this struck him:

GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.

I think that your rewording is helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings always made his thinking more transparent, but often enough they did.

You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"

GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.

First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols per se . For example:

. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293

I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say:

Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294

I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, Gary F, lists,

So, putting your posts together, Ben, I think that you're saying that the
*Singular Symbol* is better understood as the "Subindex" (you earlier
remarked that Peirce didn't stick with the Singular Symbol notion)? Or are
they equivalent terms?

And what do you make of the "Abstract Symbol" in the same sentence in which
the "Singular Symbol" occurs?

Here are the Subindices quote followed by the Singular/Abstract Symbol
quote again for ready reference for whomever may be interested in this
analysis.

Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by an
actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, personal
demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram,
denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of
these is an Index, since it is not an individual. CP 2.284

There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object
is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that
individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293


Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP editors).
In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a. hyposemes, dated
1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had not embraced the idea
of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_*Subindices*_ or _*hyposemes*_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name,
[a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a
diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object
but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute
beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus" but
it's been years and years.
Best, Ben
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign
itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* -- which,
strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument a
symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further,
that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was
"to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a
piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes
good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking
more transparent, but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign
might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument?
While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate
relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's
terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning,
is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a
character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There
are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that
individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to
apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of
degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the
Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet
since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the
Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine
Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a
degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and
a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as
opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to
grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
<718%20482-5690>*

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary R., Gary F., lists,

Yes, I think that the subindex is the singular symbol. Well, I can't
say, for example, that Peirce didn't have in mind more than one kind of
singular symbol, but I found no textual evidence for that. Anyway the
singular symbol is a sign for an individual thing, and is singular in
the same sense as a name like 'Socrates' is said in standard logic to be
a singular term - not because the symbol or term itself is a singular
object, but instead because it refers to a singular object. It really
seems like the subindex, which, Peirce said, is not an individual. The
simplest explanation is that the subindex is the singular symbol. I
remember years ago looking very hard for a passage where comes out and
says so, but I didn't find one.

Personal names, demonstratives, designations, etc., things that Peirce
had customarily classified as indices but then classified instead as
subindices in MS 478 (third section of "syllabus" - "Sundry Logical
Conceptions"), are once again classified as indices in his writings
after MS 478. So he quite seems to have dropped the non-index subindex.

I said that I wasn't sure that he stuck with the idea of the singular
symbol. If he flatly identified it as the subindex, then I'd say that he
dropped it. I don't know what he did with the abstract symbol, which I
take to include abstract terms like 'redness'. Peirce was very likely
aware of a traditional division of terms in logic into singular and
general and into concrete and abstract, and he gets into the
concrete/abstract thing in his ten sign-trichotomies.

Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Ben, Gary F, lists,
So, putting your posts together, Ben, I think that you're saying that
the *Singular Symbol* is better understood as the "Subindex" (you
earlier remarked that Peirce didn't stick with the Singular Symbol
notion)? Or are they equivalent terms?
And what do you make of the "Abstract Symbol" in the same sentence in
which the "Singular Symbol" occurs?
Here are the Subindices quote followed by the Singular/Abstract Symbol
quote again for ready reference for whomever may be interested in this
analysis.
Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the
letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real
connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it
is not an individual. CP 2.284
There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol
whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only
such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract
Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had
not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_/Subindices/_ or _/hyposemes/_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or
the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a
real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus"
but it's been years and years.
Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition
represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents
it as an /index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks the
/generality/ which makes the argument a symbol and thus more
genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP
2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me);
and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so
much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general,
genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more
(mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure
that his re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent,
but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an
individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a
symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of
degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as
that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only
Object is a character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem
to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two
kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an
individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in
speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an
Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual
[Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its
indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect
Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or
an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine
Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect'
(as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try
to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary R., Gary F., lists,

A little more on what happened to the abstract and singular symbols.

The singular symbol / the subindex designates, names, or says 'this' or
'that', etc. Earlier Peirce had accounted those functions as indexical.
In 1885 he said that demonstrative and relative pronouns and some other
things that he later called subindexes are nearly pure indices:

The index asserts nothing; it only says "There!" It takes hold of
our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a particular
object, and there it stops. Demonstrative and relative pronouns are
nearly pure indices, because they denote things without describing
them; so are the letters on a geometrical diagram, and the subscript
numbers which in algebra distinguish one value from another without
saying what those values are.
('On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of
Notation', W 5:162-3, 1885
https://web.archive.org/web/20130301083318/http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
(Commens's new site is temporarily down for maintenance)

In "Sundry Logical Conceptions" (1903) in EP 2, he introduces ideas of
the singular symbol and the subindex, which seem to be the same thing.
According to that text, the symbol is always a general, the index is
always an individual. In "Nomenclature" (1903) in EP 2, he introduces
the idea of the indexical legisign, which will let us use the type-token
(legisign-sinsign) division with indices like 'this'.

In the Dec. 24 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby on the ten trichotomies,
Peirce has a trichotomy consisting of (1) the descriptive sign, (2) the
designative/denominative sign, and (3) the copulant/distributive sign.
To keep a long story short, that alone tells you that the classification
will result either in iconic and indexical designatives, or in indexical
and symbolic designatives. According to Peirce's tentative
co-classifications in that letter, the result is iconic and indexical
designatives, and no symbolic designatives. Of course, Peirce did not
complete the ten trichotomies to his own satisfaction, so far as we now.
Here's an image Loading Image...
of some of Peirce's co-classifications in the Dec. 24, 1908 letter,
consisting of, first, an illustration of his famous co-classifications
of the members of the three sign-trichotomies in "Nomenclature" (1903);
second, an illustration of his expanded co-classification including the
old three now numbered 1st, 4th, and 9th, by Peirce, along two new
trichotomies numbered 2nd & 3rd by Peirce, in which I stick to the
numbering of the trichotomies; and, finally, an illustration of those
same co-classifications by Peirce but with the trichotomies re-ordered
(3, 2, 1, 4, ...9) so that the lines indicating Peirce's
co-classifications follow the pattern of the standard three trichotomies.

As to what happened to the abstract symbol: In a previous post, I
mentioned that Peirce got into the abstract/concrete issue in the ten
trichotomies. The sign trichotomy abstractive-concretive-collective
consists in signs classified by the mode of being (phenomenological
category) of their object. (The abstractive sign is a sign of a quality
or possibility, the concretive sign is the sign of an individual, a
fact, etc., and so on.). According to Peirce's tentative
co-classifications in the Dec. 24, 1908 letter, an abstractive sign is
always a descriptive qualisign icon. So, there's no getting an abstract
symbol by that route. Yet obviously a word like 'redness' is a symbol
and refers to an abstraction of a quality. I guess the real question in
terms of "Sundry Logical Conceptions" (in "Syllabus", 1903), is, if the
singular and abstract symbols were both degenerate symbols, what about
afterward, when the idea of the singular symbol seems to have absorbed
back into the idea of the index via the idea of the indexical legisign?
Well, I don't know.

Best, Ben

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
Yes, I think that the subindex is the singular symbol. Well, I can't
say, for example, that Peirce didn't have in mind more than one kind
of singular symbol, but I found no textual evidence for that. Anyway
the singular symbol is a sign for an individual thing, and is singular
in the same sense as a name like 'Socrates' is said in standard logic
to be a singular term - not because the symbol or term itself is a
singular object, but instead because it refers to a singular object.
It really seems like the subindex, which, Peirce said, is not an
individual. The simplest explanation is that the subindex is the
singular symbol. I remember years ago looking very hard for a passage
where comes out and says so, but I didn't find one.
Personal names, demonstratives, designations, etc., things that Peirce
had customarily classified as indices but then classified instead as
subindices in MS 478 (third section of "syllabus" - "Sundry Logical
Conceptions"), are once again classified as indices in his writings
after MS 478. So he quite seems to have dropped the non-index subindex.
I said that I wasn't sure that he stuck with the idea of the singular
symbol. If he flatly identified it as the subindex, then I'd say that
he dropped it. I don't know what he did with the abstract symbol,
which I take to include abstract terms like 'redness'. Peirce was very
likely aware of a traditional division of terms in logic into singular
and general and into concrete and abstract, and he gets into the
concrete/abstract thing in his ten sign-trichotomies.
Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Ben, Gary F, lists,
So, putting your posts together, Ben, I think that you're saying that
the *Singular Symbol* is better understood as the "Subindex" (you
earlier remarked that Peirce didn't stick with the Singular Symbol
notion)? Or are they equivalent terms?
And what do you make of the "Abstract Symbol" in the same sentence in
which the "Singular Symbol" occurs?
Here are the Subindices quote followed by the Singular/Abstract
Symbol quote again for ready reference for whomever may be interested
in this analysis.
Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the
letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a
real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual. CP 2.284
There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol
whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only
such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract
Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol.
CP 2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had
not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_/Subindices/_ or _/hyposemes/_ are signs which are rendered
such principally by an actual connection with their objects.
Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative
pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it
does owing to a real connection with its object but none of
these is an Index, since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in
"Syllabus" but it's been years and years.
Best, Ben

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition
represents the sign itself as well as its object, and
represents it as an /index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks
the /generality/ which makes the argument a symbol and thus
more genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP
2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me);
and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so
much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general,
genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more
(mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure
that his re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent,
but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say,
its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an
individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a
symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of
degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters
as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose
only Object is a character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem
to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two
kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an
individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in
speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an
Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual
[Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its
indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an
imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate
Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and
a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and
'indirect' (as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it
might be important--especially in getting at the concept of
"genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, lists,

Thanks for this excellent work, even if I'm left with the same question you
had concerning the fate of the singular symbol.

I'm about to be traveling again--btw, I understand Frederik is as well from
an off-list email message today saying he's traveling to Paris to give an
address--but this time I'm taking NS with me and hoping I have good
internet connections during my travels. I'll be back in NYC by Monday and
hope to rejoin the conversation then if, perhaps, I can't connect on the
road.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Benjamin Udell
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
A little more on what happened to the abstract and singular symbols.
The singular symbol / the subindex designates, names, or says 'this' or
'that', etc. Earlier Peirce had accounted those functions as indexical. In
1885 he said that demonstrative and relative pronouns and some other things
The index asserts nothing; it only says "There!" It takes hold of our
eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and
there it stops. Demonstrative and relative pronouns are nearly pure
indices, because they denote things without describing them; so are the
letters on a geometrical diagram, and the subscript numbers which in
algebra distinguish one value from another without saying what those values
are.
('On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation',
W 5:162-3, 1885
https://web.archive.org/web/20130301083318/http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
(Commens's new site is temporarily down for maintenance)
In "Sundry Logical Conceptions" (1903) in EP 2, he introduces ideas of the
singular symbol and the subindex, which seem to be the same thing.
According to that text, the symbol is always a general, the index is always
an individual. In "Nomenclature" (1903) in EP 2, he introduces the idea of
the indexical legisign, which will let us use the type-token
(legisign-sinsign) division with indices like 'this'.
In the Dec. 24 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby on the ten trichotomies,
Peirce has a trichotomy consisting of (1) the descriptive sign, (2) the
designative/denominative sign, and (3) the copulant/distributive sign. To
keep a long story short, that alone tells you that the classification will
result either in iconic and indexical designatives, or in indexical and
symbolic designatives. According to Peirce's tentative co-classifications
in that letter, the result is iconic and indexical designatives, and no
symbolic designatives. Of course, Peirce did not complete the ten
trichotomies to his own satisfaction, so far as we now. Here's an image
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/2204107/2/10ad5.GIF of some of
Peirce's co-classifications in the Dec. 24, 1908 letter, consisting of,
first, an illustration of his famous co-classifications of the members of
the three sign-trichotomies in "Nomenclature" (1903); second, an
illustration of his expanded co-classification including the old three now
numbered 1st, 4th, and 9th, by Peirce, along two new trichotomies numbered
2nd & 3rd by Peirce, in which I stick to the numbering of the trichotomies;
and, finally, an illustration of those same co-classifications by Peirce
but with the trichotomies re-ordered (3, 2, 1, 4, ...9) so that the lines
indicating Peirce's co-classifications follow the pattern of the standard
three trichotomies.
As to what happened to the abstract symbol: In a previous post, I
mentioned that Peirce got into the abstract/concrete issue in the ten
trichotomies. The sign trichotomy abstractive-concretive-collective
consists in signs classified by the mode of being (phenomenological
category) of their object. (The abstractive sign is a sign of a quality or
possibility, the concretive sign is the sign of an individual, a fact,
etc., and so on.). According to Peirce's tentative co-classifications in
the Dec. 24, 1908 letter, an abstractive sign is always a descriptive
qualisign icon. So, there's no getting an abstract symbol by that route.
Yet obviously a word like 'redness' is a symbol and refers to an
abstraction of a quality. I guess the real question in terms of "Sundry
Logical Conceptions" (in "Syllabus", 1903), is, if the singular and
abstract symbols were both degenerate symbols, what about afterward, when
the idea of the singular symbol seems to have absorbed back into the idea
of the index via the idea of the indexical legisign? Well, I don't know.
Best, Ben
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
Yes, I think that the subindex is the singular symbol. Well, I can't say,
for example, that Peirce didn't have in mind more than one kind of singular
symbol, but I found no textual evidence for that. Anyway the singular
symbol is a sign for an individual thing, and is singular in the same sense
as a name like 'Socrates' is said in standard logic to be a singular term -
not because the symbol or term itself is a singular object, but instead
because it refers to a singular object. It really seems like the subindex,
which, Peirce said, is not an individual. The simplest explanation is that
the subindex is the singular symbol. I remember years ago looking very hard
for a passage where comes out and says so, but I didn't find one.
Personal names, demonstratives, designations, etc., things that Peirce had
customarily classified as indices but then classified instead as subindices
in MS 478 (third section of "syllabus" - "Sundry Logical Conceptions"), are
once again classified as indices in his writings after MS 478. So he quite
seems to have dropped the non-index subindex.
I said that I wasn't sure that he stuck with the idea of the singular
symbol. If he flatly identified it as the subindex, then I'd say that he
dropped it. I don't know what he did with the abstract symbol, which I take
to include abstract terms like 'redness'. Peirce was very likely aware of a
traditional division of terms in logic into singular and general and into
concrete and abstract, and he gets into the concrete/abstract thing in his
ten sign-trichotomies.
Best, Ben
Ben, Gary F, lists,
So, putting your posts together, Ben, I think that you're saying that the
*Singular Symbol* is better understood as the "Subindex" (you earlier
remarked that Peirce didn't stick with the Singular Symbol notion)? Or are
they equivalent terms?
And what do you make of the "Abstract Symbol" in the same sentence in
which the "Singular Symbol" occurs?
Here are the Subindices quote followed by the Singular/Abstract Symbol
quote again for ready reference for whomever may be interested in this
analysis.
Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by
an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, personal
demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram,
denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of
these is an Index, since it is not an individual. CP 2.284
There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose
Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters
as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object
is a character. CP 2.293
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
<718%20482-5690>*
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP editors).
In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a. hyposemes, dated
1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had not embraced the idea
of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_*Subindices*_ or _*hyposemes*_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name,
[a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a
diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object
but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute
beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus" but
it's been years and years.
Best, Ben
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign
itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* -- which,
strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument a
symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further,
that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was
"to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a
piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes
good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking
more transparent, but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign
might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument?
While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate
relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's
terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning,
is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a
character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There
are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that
individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to
apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of
degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the
Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet
since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the
Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine
Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a
degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and
a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as
opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to
grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
<718%20482-5690>*
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[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

(N.B. 1: This message contains technical arguments that may be incomprehensible to non-technical readers.)
(N.B. 2: This message also contains Peircian coinages that may be incomprehensible to non-Peircian readers.)

The scientific origins of the meaning of the unique CSP-created logic terms "decisign" and "legisign" has puzzled me for over a decade. I have a sought to identify the mathematical and scientific concepts which motivated CSP to coin these terms.

A recent post searching to find the meaning of the critical CSP coinage, decisign, in a mere crossword puzzle struck me as being unsound as pragmatism is scientifically and mathematically grounded and crossword puzzles are not.

Crossword puzzles are linguistically grounded. Knowledge of mathematics is NOT essential to solving a crossword puzzle.

So, how do the terms "decisign and legisigns" relate to science and mathematics? Surely, if we understand the deep philosophical tensions underlying the genesis of these two terms, we could apply that understanding to other aspects of CSP's metaphysics, philosophies and their relations to other Peircian coinages.

The reasoning (necessary to show that the concept of a crossword puzzle is unsound) motivated a comparison of the three similarities of the associative logics of the indices, rhemata and icons of three sorts of puzzles- the crossword puzzles, the Sudoku puzzles and the chemical puzzles. The arguments used here are constructed about a triadically triadic triad of terms, which could be identified as a sinsign. A Peician 9-fold way? :-) :-) :-)

The metaphor of a "cross-word puzzle" for a triadic triad is grossly inadequate because a cross word puzzle only allows one letter in each rhematic blank box. The combinatorial solution of a crossword puzzle, given a clue for the number of letters and the length of each word, is constrained to the choice of any one of 26 letter (symbols) for each open box. The solution of a crossword puzzle depends on a correspondence relations among a large set of correspondence relations among the individual rhematic blanks AND a global coherence for all the choices for rhematic blanks SUCH THAT the entire puzzle is a perfect match between rhematic blanks such that a medad is created. Thus, the crossword puzzle is, from a mathematical perspective (e.g., iconic) a combinatorial puzzle with constraints among the symbol system being restricted to alphabetic symbol system.

The count of the combinatorial possibilities for a correct solution of a cross word puzzle is mathematically simple because the number of rhematic blanks is countable and the number of possible symbols for each rhematic blank is countable, that is, 26 in English.

A stronger metaphor (at least stronger than the crossword puzzle) for the triadic triad is the Sudoku puzzle. The Sudoku is a stronger metaphor because it is formed (created, generates) by indexes and entails containment of boxes within boxes, such that the puzzle solver must attempt to identify potentially emergent mathematical propositions about number sequences. In summary, a Sudoku puzzle is a problem in combinatorial sequences.

The largest box is one object.
The 9-subboxes are clearly separate and distinct objects, meeting the Descartian constraint on concept formation. The arrangement of the intermediate size boxes constitute a Peircian triadic triad with three rows and three columns. The solution of Sudoku puzzle requires both coherence among the three rows and three columns.
The smallest objects are triadic triads of the intermediate boxes, that is, each of the smallest boxes contains three rows and three columns. The Sudoku puzzle is hierarchical in structure.

Thus, in Peircian logical terms, the Sudoku puzzle is a triadically triadic triad which corresponds with the single box of the object as a whole, an intermediate size set of boxes that correspond with the number three squared and the smallest boxes corresponding with the number three cubed. (Thus, the structure of a Sudoku puzzle consists of starting with a single box and partitioning it into smaller boxes and a second partitioning of it into even smaller boxes such that the total number of boxes is extended from 1 to 9 and then to 81.)

The puzzle requires coherence and correspondence for each of the 9 smallest boxes such that the coherence and correspondence for the intermediate size boxes and the global box are consistent with the sequences (and sums) of the numbers 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and 9. The solution of a Sudoku puzzle must necessary emerge from the bottom up; each entry in to a box must satisfy mathematical propositions related to fundamental constraints of arranging partitions of number sequences of 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and 9.

Several similarities exist between these two forms of combinatorial puzzles.

Analogously, the puzzle solver is given a number of clues that provide the logical propositions for solving either puzzle.

Like the cross-word, the puzzle solver, the number of clues varies from puzzle to puzzle, thereby creating the potential for an almost unbound number of possible puzzles and possible solutions. But the clues are expressed in different symbol systems.

Like the cross word puzzle, the Sudoku puzzle is solved by identifying the propositional clues with a symbol for one or more of the rhematic boxes. But the clues are expressed in different symbol systems, alphabet symbols or numerical symbols.

The logical operations for the intrinsic propositions of a crossword puzzle require an interpretation of words as both meaning and letters. In other words, the correct choice of terms are always based on substitution of one meaning for another meaning, in the sense of mathematical substitution of terms.

The logical operations for solving the propositions of the Sudoku puzzle are deductive. The medad of every row and every column is the same. The clues are arranged such that each medad of deductive propositions is possible. The number of clues for a Sudoku puzzle is usually from 40 to 15. Given that 81 boxes exist, the solution requires that the puzzle solver need to find a range of mathematical proposition to solve the puzzle, usually from 41 (since 40 +41 = 81) to 66 (since 15 + 66 =81).

The Peircian triadic triad can be used as a metaphor for solving the puzzle of the relationships between physical atoms and physical molecules and the vastly more difficult puzzle of the relations between chemical molecules and living cells.

The clues for solving the chemical problems are the physical facts related to one-another by physical laws and chemical indices. The mathematical clues are crucial triad, indices, medads as rhemata, and icons and the associated logic of the mathematical symbols. (The concept of an icon associates the visual images of mathematical graphs and chemical graphs.)

The crucial clue for the scientific grounding of the chemical puzzle is the physical existence of electrical patterns among chemical indices - a source of both qualisigns and relatonomics.

As I noted several months ago on this list, the logic/metaphysical/scientific origins of the triadic triad was successfully resolved. I discussed portions of resolution in my papers (on the logics of the perplex number system) given in Baden-Baden last August. The foundational logic for solving chemical puzzles was previously published in a well-respected mathematics journal (as Ben noted) and was given the name synductive logic to associate with the puzzles of chemical synthesis.

Open questions:

Are the following hypotheses true or false?

"CSP used his knowledge of chemical phenomena to seed the logic of the triadic triad as the foundation for his philosophy of pragmatism."

and:

"The inquiry into the signs, signals and representations emerging from living systems is grounded in the physics of electricity."


Cheers

Jerry

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording is helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings always made his thinking more transparent, but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
Gary R,
Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is worth reflecting on in this context; but then that’s true of the whole Speculative Grammar section of the Syllabus. Every time I read part of it, it seems that another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in, because of clues I’ve picked up since the previous reading. This time around, what comes to the fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine. I’m not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording it, but that seems to help make the words more transparent, so that we can see through them to what we’re talking about. Maybe that’s why Peirce did so much rewording of his own thought — to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his momentary brain activity, but a piece of the Truth …
But then I must be missing something too, because I don’t see why Peirce’s remark that “A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism” is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. Can you maybe reword that part of your message?
gary f.
Sent: 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3
Gary, lists,
GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.
I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his late 19th century emphasis on its existential 2ns to examining its structure as a dicisign at the beginning of the 20th.
GF: [That t]his shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.
GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?
But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came across this.
A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism. CP 2.26
Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.
At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make too much of the phrase 'relatively genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now how much to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?
As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you (or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of it.
. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer, however, comes forthwith. Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it. It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. But it is easy to see that the proposition purports to intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents itself as an Index, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).
I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of "the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign. I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of this quotation.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
Gary R, lists,
This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I’m still in the process of following up on it, but thought I’d better (rather than wait any longer) mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to dicisigns.
First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the “Speculative Grammar” section of the Syllabus (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding Peirce’s introduction of the Dicisign as part of the “second trichotomy of representamens” (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell Lectures which the Syllabus was intended to accompany. But your third, CP 1.480 (about “genuine triads”), is from the “Logic of Mathematics” paper c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce’s concept of a fact, or his usage of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.
In “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904?), Peirce wrote that “What we call a “fact” is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself.” Earlier on, he wrote that representation is necessarily triadic because “it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living” (CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a “matter of fact” lacks the generality of “thought”, as if the universe of which it is “supposed to be an element” is only the universe of existence, i.e. of Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.
But I’m not sure how much sense this makes, yet … I think it’s related to a some other pieces of the puzzle of the “genuine” which turn up in this neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign, relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the linguistic symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by reference, involves a degenerate index: the Index is a “Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a reference, the Index is degenerate” (EP2:274). This shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.
The more we take the concept of “degeneracy” back to its purely mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is simpler than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?
It’s difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough to see how it all fits together, and there’s much in the latter part of your post that I haven’t dealt with here. But I think the joint effort should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce’s doctrine of the Dicisign.
gary f.
Sent: 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3
Gary F., lists,
GF: "if a genuine dicisign or “indexical proposition” does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign?"
GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign’s relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices, and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an Object (emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness.) [emphasis added CP 2.275-276]
So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully capable of [determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen when it merely may substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).
But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of "purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.
Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of the passage).
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living (CP 1.480, emphasis added).
So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial “sunflower") has the potential to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the idea of genuine thirdness, the genuine triad, may trump , in certain cases, the idea of the genuine sign, which is to say the sign completed in its being interpreted, that is, the symbol.
So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign,” and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.
Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (CP1.537).
So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).
. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. [. . . ] All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so (CP1.540, emphasis added).
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).
I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the wrong direction.
Best,
Gary
-----------------------------

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Jerry, lists -

I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in the periodic table of the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot predicates only) - I quote this in Natural Propositions.
As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages. "Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for the naming of generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes. "Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.

Best
F

Den 01/10/2014 kl. 19.04 skrev Gary Richmond <***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>>
:

Gary F, lists,

Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus that this struck him:

GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.

I think that your rewording is helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings always made his thinking more transparent, but often enough they did.

You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"

GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.

First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols per se. For example:

. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293

I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say:

Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294

I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here.

Best,

Gary R


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman <***@gnusystems.ca<mailto:***@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Gary R,

Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is worth reflecting on in this context; but then that’s true of the whole Speculative Grammar section of the Syllabus. Every time I read part of it, it seems that another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in, because of clues I’ve picked up since the previous reading. This time around, what comes to the fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine. I’m not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording it, but that seems to help make the words more transparent, so that we can see through them to what we’re talking about. Maybe that’s why Peirce did so much rewording of his own thought — to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his momentary brain activity, but a piece of the Truth …

But then I must be missing something too, because I don’t see why Peirce’s remark that “A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism” is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. Can you maybe reword that part of your message?

gary f.

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>]
Sent: 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee<mailto:***@lists.ut.ee>
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

Gary, lists,

GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.

I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his late 19th century emphasis on its existential 2ns to examining its structure as a dicisign at the beginning of the 20th.

Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274):

GF: [That t]his shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.

Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us overcome a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of degeneracy in semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. But this is still a vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote:

GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?

But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came across this.

A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism. CP 2.26

Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.

At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make too much of the phrase 'relatively genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now how much to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?

As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you (or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of it.

. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer, however, comes forthwith. Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it. It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. But it is easy to see that the proposition purports to intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents itself as an Index, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).

I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of "the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign. I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of this quotation.

Best,

Gary



Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>

On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Gary Fuhrman <***@gnusystems.ca<mailto:***@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Gary R, lists,

This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I’m still in the process of following up on it, but thought I’d better (rather than wait any longer) mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to dicisigns.

First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the “Speculative Grammar” section of the Syllabus (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding Peirce’s introduction of the Dicisign as part of the “second trichotomy of representamens” (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell Lectures which the Syllabus was intended to accompany. But your third, CP 1.480 (about “genuine triads”), is from the “Logic of Mathematics” paper c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce’s concept of a fact, or his usage of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.

In “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904?), Peirce wrote that “What we call a “fact” is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself.” Earlier on, he wrote that representation is necessarily triadic because “it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living” (CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a “matter of fact” lacks the generality of “thought”, as if the universe of which it is “supposed to be an element” is only the universe of existence, i.e. of Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.

But I’m not sure how much sense this makes, yet … I think it’s related to a some other pieces of the puzzle of the “genuine” which turn up in this neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign, relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the linguistic symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by reference, involves a degenerate index: the Index is a “Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a reference, the Index is degenerate” (EP2:274). This shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.

The more we take the concept of “degeneracy” back to its purely mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is simpler than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?

It’s difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough to see how it all fits together, and there’s much in the latter part of your post that I haven’t dealt with here. But I think the joint effort should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce’s doctrine of the Dicisign.

gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>]
Sent: 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
To: ***@lists.ut.ee<mailto:***@lists.ut.ee>
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

Gary F., lists,

This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with the next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even at the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly vexing question:

GF: "if a genuine dicisign or “indexical proposition” does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign?"

You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late definition of a symbol as “a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted” (EP2:307) then commenting:

GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign’s relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.

Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as I proceed down the ensuing group of quotes):

. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices, and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an Object (emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness.) [emphasis added CP 2.275-276]

So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully capable of [determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen when it merely may substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."

But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be the science of Thridness in general":

Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).

But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of "purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.

Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of the passage).

Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living (CP 1.480, emphasis added).

So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial “sunflower") has the potential to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the idea of genuine thirdness, the genuine triad, may trump , in certain cases, the idea of the genuine sign, which is to say the sign completed in its being interpreted, that is, the symbol.
So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign,” and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.


Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (CP1.537).

So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).

Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any definite notion of any object in any way":

. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. [. . . ] All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so (CP1.540, emphasis added).

And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition (which, note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a representamen and not of a sign):

My definition of a representamen is as follows:
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).

I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the wrong direction.

Best,

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Frederik, lists,

So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific
having you active again in the seminar.

Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce
experimented with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which
I gleaned from NP 3.9.

(1903) Rheme

Dicisign

Argument

(1903) Sumisign

Dicisign

Suadisign

(1903) Single sign (substitutive sign)

Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition")

Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument")

(1903) Rhema

Proposition

Argument

(1906) Seme

Pheme

Delome

I found the third column of particular interest, especially his referring
to the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a
'propositional function').

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear Jerry, lists -
I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's
dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts
as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of
the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in
the periodic table of the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot
predicates only) - I quote this in Natural Propositions.
As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling
but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages.
"Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for the naming of
generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes.
"Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to
underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.
Best
F
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the
sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* --
which, strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument
a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further,
that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was
"to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a
piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes
good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking
more transparent, but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign
might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is
degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining
Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must
signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general
meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol
whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such
characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose
only Object is a character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to
apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of
degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the
Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet
since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the
Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine
Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a
degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and
a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as
opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to
grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

Post by Gary Fuhrman
Gary R,
Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is
worth reflecting on in this context; but then that's true of the whole
Speculative Grammar section of the *Syllabus*. Every time I read part of
it, it seems that another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in,
because of clues I've picked up since the previous reading. This time
around, what comes to the fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or
proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and
represents it as an *index* -- which, strictly speaking, lacks the
*generality* which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I'm not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording it, but
that seems to help make the words more transparent, so that we can see
through them to what we're talking about. Maybe that's why Peirce did so
much rewording of his own thought -- to get through to the real, general,
genuine Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his momentary brain
activity, but a piece of the Truth ...
But then I must be missing something too, because I don't see why
Peirce's remark that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which
is open to logical criticism" is in any way incompatible with the notion
that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the
argument. Can you maybe reword that part of your message?
gary f.
*Sent:* 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3
Gary, lists,
GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that
Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or
dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding
another dimension to the mode of being of "fact".
I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new
dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving
from his late 19th century emphasis on its *existential* *2ns* to
examining its *structure* * as a dicisign *at the beginning of the 20th.
Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in
GF: [That t]his shows at least that* genuineness and degeneracy are not
absolute qualities* but *always relative to a function.* So even though
Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in
KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out
semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of *except by involving
them*.
Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us
overcome a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of
degeneracy in semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent.
GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be
described as "degenerate" *relative to the argument*, which is the most
complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its
interpretant -- and which, for that very reason, can only be a *symbol*.
Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member *of
the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of signs?
But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came across this.
A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical
criticism. CP 2.26
Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof'
and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought
that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the
argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty
good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.
At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of
Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't
make too much of the phrase '*relatively* genuine', but I'm not exactly
certain now *how much* to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've
always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?
As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you
(or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of
the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make
of it.
. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought
that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be
indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would
then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire
whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the
former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer,
however, comes forthwith.* Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol
"a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. .
.] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as
a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to
it.* It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether
the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and
arguments. But it is easy to see that *the proposition purports to
intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is
represents itself as an Index*, while the argument purports to intend
not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is,
represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis
added).
I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of
"the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to
be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign.
I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of
this quotation.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
Gary R, lists,
This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of
following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer)
mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to
dicisigns.
First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative
Grammar" section of the *Syllabus* (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding
Peirce's introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of
representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell
Lectures which the *Syllabus* was intended to accompany. But your third,
CP 1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper
c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a *fact,* or his usage
of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.
In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that
representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object
and an interpreting thought. Now this is *neither a matter of fact,
since thought is general*, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is
living" (CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of
fact" lacks the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is
"supposed to be an element" is only the universe of *existence*, i.e. of
Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from
that Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or
dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding
another dimension to the mode of being of "fact".
But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet ... I think it's related to
a some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this
neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign,
relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the *linguistic*
symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by *reference*,
involves a *degenerate index*: the Index is a "Representamen whose
Representative character consists in its being an individual second. If the
Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is *genuine.* If the
Secondness is a reference, the Index is *degenerate*" (EP2:274)*.* This
shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities
but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and
index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out
that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that
the symbol is incapable of *except by involving them*.
The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely
mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could
describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is
*simpler* than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the
proposition itself can be described as "degenerate" *relative to the
argument*, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types
because it separately indicates its interpretant -- and which, for that very
reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is that the main reason why the symbol
is the most genuine member * of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy*
of signs?
It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough
to see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of
your post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort
should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's
doctrine of the Dicisign.
gary f.
*Sent:* 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
*Cc:* Peirce List
*Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.3
Gary F., lists,
This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with
the next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even
at the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've
written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly
GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to
be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why
does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?"
You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this
definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the
sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder
the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with
its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as
. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons,
Indices, and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as
such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a
Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its
Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually
determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an
Object (emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a
Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a
Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of
"substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.)
[emphasis added CP 2.275-276]
So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the
idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine
thirdness."
But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).
But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.
Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be
pertinent to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language
seemingly contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the
conclusion of the passage).
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere
law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad
is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this
is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter
of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added).
So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower") has
the * potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump , in certain
cases, the idea of *the genuine sign*, which is to say *the sign
completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*.
So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.
Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are
all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one
another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its
capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a
mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or
event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information.
The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the
information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign *(CP1.537).
So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).
Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a
sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any
way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start
with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is
essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that
analysis applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds;
but I know no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540,
emphasis added).
And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition
(which, note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called
its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation
being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in
the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant
(CP1.541).
I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.
Best,
Gary

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

thanks, that is a helpful overview!
F

Den 11/10/2014 kl. 21.46 skrev Gary Richmond <***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>>
:

Frederik, lists,

So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific having you active again in the seminar.

Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce experimented with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which I gleaned from NP 3.9.


(1903) Rheme


Dicisign


Argument


(1903) Sumisign


Dicisign


Suadisign


(1903) Single sign (substitutive sign)


Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition")


Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument")


(1903) Rhema


Proposition


Argument


(1906) Seme


Pheme


Delome


I found the third column of particular interest, especially his referring to the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a 'propositional function').

Gary

[Gary Richmond]

Lists,

It was pointed out to me off-list that in my final sentence positioned
below the chart I posted today that where I wrote "I found the third column
of particular interest, especially his referring to the Rheme as a
'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a 'propositional function') I
meant 'row', not 'column', of course.

This affords me the opportunity to note as well that the terms in the third
row of the chart occur in the same passage as the second row and, indeed,
the expressions are juxtaposed.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
thanks, that is a helpful overview!
F
Frederik, lists,
So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific
having you active again in the seminar.
Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce
experimented with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which
I gleaned from NP 3.9.
(1903) Rheme
Dicisign
Argument
(1903) Sumisign
Dicisign
Suadisign
(1903) Single sign (substitutive sign)
Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition")
Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument")
(1903) Rhema
Proposition
Argument
(1906) Seme
Pheme
Delome
I found the third column of particular interest, especially his
referring to the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a
'propositional function').
Gary
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[Jerry LR Chandler]

Frederik:

The origen of the root of the term "decisign" is of substantial interest to me.

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
"Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.

My limited search yielded nothing.

Could you expand on your beliefs about this interpretation?

Does anayone else use a different root term for this "ill-defined" concept?

(It is of critical importance from a chemical perspective of the logic of the triadic triad in relation to the S.O.P. of chemical methodology for "proof of structure" and logical closure.)

Cheers

Jerry

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear Jerry, lists -
I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in the periodic table of the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot predicates only) - I quote this in Natural Propositions.
As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages. "Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for the naming of generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes. "Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.
Best
F

Post by Gary Richmond
Gary F, lists,
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording is helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings always made his thinking more transparent, but often enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
Gary R,
Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is worth reflecting on in this context; but then that’s true of the whole Speculative Grammar section of the Syllabus. Every time I read part of it, it seems that another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in, because of clues I’ve picked up since the previous reading. This time around, what comes to the fore is that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine. I’m not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording it, but that seems to help make the words more transparent, so that we can see through them to what we’re talking about. Maybe that’s why Peirce did so much rewording of his own thought — to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was not merely his, and not merely his momentary brain activity, but a piece of the Truth …
But then I must be missing something too, because I don’t see why Peirce’s remark that “A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism” is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. Can you maybe reword that part of your message?
gary f.
Sent: 30-Sep-14 7:11 PM
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3
Gary, lists,
GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.
I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his late 19th century emphasis on its existential 2ns to examining its structure as a dicisign at the beginning of the 20th.
GF: [That t]his shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.
GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?
But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came across this.
A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism. CP 2.26
Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.
At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make too much of the phrase 'relatively genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now how much to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?
As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you (or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of it.
. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer, however, comes forthwith. Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it. It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. But it is easy to see that the proposition purports to intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents itself as an Index, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).
I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of "the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign. I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of this quotation.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
Gary R, lists,
This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I’m still in the process of following up on it, but thought I’d better (rather than wait any longer) mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to dicisigns.
First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the “Speculative Grammar” section of the Syllabus (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding Peirce’s introduction of the Dicisign as part of the “second trichotomy of representamens” (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell Lectures which the Syllabus was intended to accompany. But your third, CP 1.480 (about “genuine triads”), is from the “Logic of Mathematics” paper c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce’s concept of a fact, or his usage of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years.
In “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904?), Peirce wrote that “What we call a “fact” is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself.” Earlier on, he wrote that representation is necessarily triadic because “it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living” (CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a “matter of fact” lacks the generality of “thought”, as if the universe of which it is “supposed to be an element” is only the universe of existence, i.e. of Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.
But I’m not sure how much sense this makes, yet … I think it’s related to a some other pieces of the puzzle of the “genuine” which turn up in this neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign, relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the linguistic symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by reference, involves a degenerate index: the Index is a “Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a reference, the Index is degenerate” (EP2:274). This shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.
The more we take the concept of “degeneracy” back to its purely mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is simpler than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?
It’s difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough to see how it all fits together, and there’s much in the latter part of your post that I haven’t dealt with here. But I think the joint effort should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce’s doctrine of the Dicisign.
gary f.
Sent: 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3
Gary F., lists,
GF: "if a genuine dicisign or “indexical proposition” does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign?"
GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign’s relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices, and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an Object (emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of "substitute" involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness.) [emphasis added CP 2.275-276]
So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully capable of [determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen when it merely may substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).
But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of "purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.
Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of the passage).
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living (CP 1.480, emphasis added).
So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial “sunflower") has the potential to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the idea of genuine thirdness, the genuine triad, may trump , in certain cases, the idea of the genuine sign, which is to say the sign completed in its being interpreted, that is, the symbol.
So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign,” and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.
Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (CP1.537).
So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).
. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. [. . . ] All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so (CP1.540, emphasis added).
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).
I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the wrong direction.
Best,
Gary

-----------------------------

[Benjamin Udell]

Jerry, list,

Peirce does not use "decisign" with an 'e' in any of the texts in
Collected Papers, Writings, or Contributions to _The Nation_.

He uses 'dicisign' and 'dicent sign', and does so with the same meaning.
The origin in the Latin verb _/dicere/_ ('to say', 'to tell') is pretty
evident to any Latinist. _/Dico, dicere, dixi, dictus/_ are the
principle parts of the verb. From it come French and Italian _/dire/_,
Spanish _/decir/_, Portuguese _/dizer/_, English 'diction', etc.

1. The word 'dicent' is pretty plainly from the Latin _/dicere/_'s
present participle _/dicens, dicentis/_.

2. 'Sign' is a word from Latin _/signum/_, and Peirce is not the kind
readily to combine a Latin root with a root from some other language. So
the 'dici' in 'dicisign' is almost certainly from _/dicere/_.

3. The first and second points converge to the same conclusion.

Best, Ben

Post by Jerry LR Chandler
The origen of the root of the term "decisign" is of substantial interest to me.

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
"Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I
think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about
something.

My limited search yielded nothing.
Could you expand on your beliefs about this interpretation?
Does anayone else use a different root term for this "ill-defined" concept?
(It is of critical importance from a chemical perspective of the logic
of the triadic triad in relation to the S.O.P. of chemical methodology
for "proof of structure" and logical closure.)
Cheers
Jerry

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear Jerry, lists -
I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's
dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject
parts as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the
molecule of the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and
alkali metals in the periodic table of the elements (corresponding,
of course, to one-slot predicates only) - I quote this in Natural
Propositions.
As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that
spelling but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished
pages. "Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for
the naming of generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs
and Phemes. "Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say -
chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say
something about something.
Best
F

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Ben, List:

Thanks for your views on the Latin roots CSP used to generate this term.

Subconsciously, I was associating "dicisign" with the concept of decision.

From the perspective of the roots, then, the decisign is a term describing a human artifact, that is, a judgment about the interpretations of the sinsigns. At least, that is how I now understand the term.

Cheers

jerry

Jerry, list,
Peirce does not use "decisign" with an 'e' in any of the texts in Collected Papers, Writings, or Contributions to _The Nation_.
He uses 'dicisign' and 'dicent sign', and does so with the same meaning. The origin in the Latin verb _dicere_ ('to say', 'to tell') is pretty evident to any Latinist. _Dico, dicere, dixi, dictus_ are the principle parts of the verb. From it come French and Italian _dire_, Spanish _decir_, Portuguese _dizer_, English 'diction', etc.
1. The word 'dicent' is pretty plainly from the Latin _dicere_'s present participle _dicens, dicentis_.
2. 'Sign' is a word from Latin _signum_, and Peirce is not the kind readily to combine a Latin root with a root from some other language. So the 'dici' in 'dicisign' is almost certainly from _dicere_.
3. The first and second points converge to the same conclusion.
Best, Ben

Post by Jerry LR Chandler
The origen of the root of the term "decisign" is of substantial interest to me.

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
"Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.

My limited search yielded nothing.
Could you expand on your beliefs about this interpretation?
Does anayone else use a different root term for this "ill-defined" concept?
(It is of critical importance from a chemical perspective of the logic of the triadic triad in relation to the S.O.P. of chemical methodology for "proof of structure" and logical closure.)
Cheers
Jerry

Post by Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear Jerry, lists -
I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in the periodic table of the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot predicates only) - I quote this in Natural Propositions.
As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages. "Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for the naming of generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes. "Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.
Best
F

-----------------------------

[Benjamin Udell]

Jerry, list,

Peirce's idea includes the idea that nature tells us things, and that's
something that Frederik is getting at in discussing natural
propositions. For example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that
the air is windy. The idea is that facts and representational relations
are real, out there in the world, not just in our heads and textbooks.
That realist perspective is the same one that people bring much less
controversially to informative dependencies and information; also to
statistical distributions, averages, and probabilities; and to
constraints, variational principles, optima, and feasibles.

Best, Ben

Post by Jerry LR Chandler
Thanks for your views on the Latin roots CSP used to generate this term.
Subconsciously, I was associating "dicisign" with the concept of decision.
From the perspective of the roots, then, the decisign is a term
describing a human artifact, that is, a judgment about the
interpretations of the sinsigns. At least, that is how I now
understand the term.
Cheers
jerry

Post by Benjamin Udell
Jerry, list,
Peirce does not use "decisign" with an 'e' in any of the texts in
Collected Papers, Writings, or Contributions to _The Nation_.
He uses 'dicisign' and 'dicent sign', and does so with the same
meaning. The origin in the Latin verb _/dicere/_ ('to say', 'to
tell') is pretty evident to any Latinist. _/Dico, dicere, dixi,
dictus/_ are the principle parts of the verb. From it come French and
Italian _/dire/_, Spanish _/decir/_, Portuguese _/dizer/_, English
'diction', etc.
1. The word 'dicent' is pretty plainly from the Latin _/dicere/_'s
present participle _/dicens, dicentis/_.
2. 'Sign' is a word from Latin _/signum/_, and Peirce is not the kind
readily to combine a Latin root with a root from some other language.
So the 'dici' in 'dicisign' is almost certainly from _/dicere/_.
3. The first and second points converge to the same conclusion.
Best, Ben

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Post by Benjamin Udell
Jerry, list,
Peirce's idea includes the idea that nature tells us things, and that's something that Frederik is getting at in discussing natural propositions. For example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that the air is windy. The idea is that facts and representational relations are real, out there in the world, not just in our heads and textbooks. That realist perspective is the same one that people bring much less controversially to informative dependencies and information; also to statistical distributions, averages, and probabilities; and to constraints, variational principles, optima, and feasibles.
Best, Ben

(If I may, I will wax a bit philosophical, just for a change of pace.)

Well, Ben, we are nature and nature is us. From a metaphysical perspective, we exist within nature and separate ourselves as an "I", as an identity within nature. In so far as I can interpret your worldview from your last sentence above, we differ on the meaning of quantities and natural realism.

My view is that we are in communion with nature, in continuous communication with nature and we share common experiences with nature, such as the forces of wind and the emergence of two dances :-) :-) :-) - one of the air sock and the other of a mind! Why?

At least, that is what I interpret from Schelling's famous comment on the relatonomy* between the facts of the world and the fact of the "I" (and the facts of the "us" as the plural of "I".)

As for natural propositions, well, I expect a natural proposition to deliver what it says it is, a proposition that can be confirmed or denied by inquiry.

And, as I continue to read it, I continue to be hopeful that this book is, indeed, a pragmatic book.
More directly to the point of the current discussion, in what sense can the term "dicisign" be conjoined with the "I" of natural identities? Such that the natural proposition can be either an antecedent or a consequence of a fact of nature?

Yes, I am a very skeptical individual, a chemist to the core. Nevertheless, I have found several of Frederik's narratives to be innovative and, more importantly, useful.

Cheers

Jerry



*[I coined the term "relatonomy" to express the concept of the study of relations among relatives, such as the relations among symbol systems as units of thought.

For example, one must study the concepts of relations as used in mathematics (legi-signs?) in contrast with the study of the concepts used in genetics (sin-signs?) to study the relations among the (quali-) signs of life.

In this early part of the 21st Century, CSP's late 19th Century views of a triadic triad can be viewed as a study of rhetorical relations. Incredible narratives.]

[Sungchul Ji]

(For undistorted Table 1, see the attached.)

Ben wrote:

"The idea is that facts and representational relations (101414-1)
are real, out there in the world, not just in our heads
and textbooks."

We can express this statement diagrammatically thus:

Relations in our head ===> Facts in the world (101414-2)

where the arrow symbol reads “determine”, “correspond to “ or “correlate
with”.

I have evidence that Scheme (101414-2) is reversible, i.e. the following
scheme may also hold:

Facts in the world ===> Relations in our head (101412-3)

What I mean by this statement is that, our social (external) experiences
with humanese will help us unravel the mystery of the cellese (going on
internally in our head all the time while we are alive), establishing the
theory of which is a formidable challenge for the human mind.
This line of thought was motivated by our recent finding that same sets of
mathematical equations, and linguistic and thermodynamics-theoretical
concepts apply to both humanese and cellese, as briefly summarized in
Table below and Figure 1 attached.

_________________________________________________________________________

Table 1. Our knowledge derived from social experiences with our language
may help us understand how the language of living cells work within us.
Gaussian distribution: y = A exp (-(x - mu)^2/(2 signam^2)).
Planckian distribution: y = (a/(Ax + B)^5)/(Exp(b/(Ax + B)) -1).
________________________________________________________________________

Commuication Human Language Cell Language
via (Humanese) (Cellese)
________________________________________________________________________

Sign processor Human Brain Living Cell
________________________________________________________________________

Sign Words Molecules
________________________________________________________________________

Field Glottometrics Genomics
________________________________________________________________________

First Word-length frequency Gene-length frequency
organization distribution in a distribution in a genome
(Equilibrium dictionary is Gaussian is Gaussian
Structures;
Second
articulation;
Gaussian
information)
_________________________________________________________________________

Second World-length frequency Protein-length frequency
organization distribution in Kerry’s distribution in living cells
(Dissipative speech (words in action) (genes in action) is
structures; is Planckian Planckian
First
articulation;
Planckian
information)
_________________________________________________________________________

Selection Kerry’s brain selects Living cells select genes
mechanism words to express his to be expressed to meet
Ideas and feelings their immediate needs
_________________________________________________________________________

*The actual graphs are provided in the attachment.

With all the best.

Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

Post by Benjamin Udell
Jerry, list,
Peirce's idea includes the idea that nature tells us things, and that's
something that Frederik is getting at in discussing natural
propositions. For example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that
the air is windy. The idea is that facts and representational relations
are real, out there in the world, not just in our heads and textbooks.
That realist perspective is the same one that people bring much less
controversially to informative dependencies and information; also to
statistical distributions, averages, and probabilities; and to
constraints, variational principles, optima, and feasibles.
Best, Ben

Post by Jerry LR Chandler
Thanks for your views on the Latin roots CSP used to generate this term.
Subconsciously, I was associating "dicisign" with the concept of decision.
From the perspective of the roots, then, the decisign is a term
describing a human artifact, that is, a judgment about the
interpretations of the sinsigns. At least, that is how I now
understand the term.
Cheers
jerry

Post by Benjamin Udell
Jerry, list,
Peirce does not use "decisign" with an 'e' in any of the texts in
Collected Papers, Writings, or Contributions to _The Nation_.
He uses 'dicisign' and 'dicent sign', and does so with the same
meaning. The origin in the Latin verb _/dicere/_ ('to say', 'to
tell') is pretty evident to any Latinist. _/Dico, dicere, dixi,
dictus/_ are the principle parts of the verb. From it come French and
Italian _/dire/_, Spanish _/decir/_, Portuguese _/dizer/_, English
'diction', etc.
1. The word 'dicent' is pretty plainly from the Latin _/dicere/_'s
present participle _/dicens, dicentis/_.
2. 'Sign' is a word from Latin _/signum/_, and Peirce is not the kind
readily to combine a Latin root with a root from some other language.
So the 'dici' in 'dicisign' is almost certainly from _/dicere/_.
3. The first and second points converge to the same conclusion.
Best, Ben

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Garys, lists,

There is certainly no disparaging in Peirce's claim that icons and indices are "degenerate" as compared to symbols. The concept comes from mathematics, conic sections in particular, where figures like hyperbolas and ellipses are considered non-degenerate while figures like parabolas, circles, crossing lines, points etc. are degenerate because of the fact that the latter result only from certain singular values of the function, typically where one variable assumes the value 0 and vanishes. So the idea is that circles, e.g., are but ellipses where the two foci becomes one and the figure simplifies correspondingly. This implies that such figures are rare limit phenomena as compared to ellipses. In P's sign theory, the analogy will be that icons and indices without symbolic aspects are rare limit phenomena - while symbols typically involve indexical and iconical aspects.
In the third trichotomy, I have not seen P use the term "degenerate" in the same way - but he does say that all rhemes are but "fragmentary" signs while dicisigns are but "states" in the moving process of arguments. In that sense, I think it would not be strange to assume that rhemes and dicisigns are degenerate arguments. Given the way P constructs his semiotics, it would not be strange to say that all of the 9 simpler signs in the Syllabus 10-sign combinary are degenerate as compared to arguments. I think I discussed this a bit in Diagrammatology under the headline of the physiology of Arguments - the metaphor indicating that lower sign types like icons or dicisigns etc. form a sort of organs in the body of arguments …

Best
F


Den 01/10/2014 kl. 01.10 skrev Gary Richmond <***@gmail.com<mailto:***@gmail.com>>
:

Gary, lists,

GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of “fact”.

I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his late 19th century emphasis on itsexistential 2ns to examining its structure as a dicisign at the beginning of the 20th.

Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274):

GF: [That t]his shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.

Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us overcome a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of degeneracy in semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. But this is still a vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote:

GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy of signs?

But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came across this.

A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism. CP 2.26

Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced.

At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make too much of the phrase 'relatively genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now how much to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?

As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you (or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of it.

. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer, however, comes forthwith. Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it. It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. But it is easy to see that the proposition purports to intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents itself as an Index, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added).

I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of "the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign. I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of this quotation.

Best,

Gary

[Howard Pattee]

Post by Benjamin Udell
For example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that the air is
windy. The idea is that facts and representational relations are
real, out there in the world, not just in our heads and textbooks.

HP: I don't think the existence or reality of the windsock is the
issue. I think everyone agrees that the windsock will exist after
everyone leaves or ceases to observe it. Insofar as your brain has a
good memory and forms good models, you can at any time imagine the
sock blowing in the wind without seeing it. If you have a good memory
and model of the windsock you will find that when you see it again it
will still fit your model. That is, the model in your head can
predict how real windsocks behave in the wind.

This amounts to Hertz's necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
a good model. However, his point is that all models are in your head,
and "you do not know, nor have you any means of knowing, whether your
conception of things [your models] are in conformity with them in any
other than this one fundamental respect," namely, that the
consequents of the model of the windsock in your head behaves
"closely enough" to the directly observed consequents of the real windsock.

The condition "closely enough" is a subjective or cultural decision,
and one where physicists and philosophers often differ, largely
because their subject (what they are modeling) is so different. I
don't think calling people realists or nominalists or psychologists
or antipsychologists add any light to how we create our images.

Howard

[Benjamin Udell]

Howard, list,

I didn't reply to your previous post to me on this general subject,
because we're going in circles. What's more, it's become hard to see
what you do think.

On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds nothing;
and on the other hand you argue against realism and call nominalism the
"best bet".

On one hand you grant that numbers can be objectively investigated, and
on the other hand you deny being realist about numbers in a Peircean sense.

On one hand you argue that physical laws are real; and now you turn
around and argue that the match of a theory's predictions vis-a-vis
reality is a "cultural" judgment.

It's not just a cultural judgment that physical theories and engineering
had anything to do with it, when a rocket brings a rover to Mars, lands
successfully, etc., based on physical theories' predictions and
engineering. It's not just a cultural judgment whether a theory's
predictions match reality when lives and wealth have been saved or lost
by those predictions. Whether our theories work or or mislead us to
destruction is not a social construct.

Best, Ben

Post by Howard Pattee

Post by Benjamin Udell
For example, an air sock dances, and that tells us that the air is
windy. The idea is that facts and representational relations are
real, out there in the world, not just in our heads and textbooks.

HP: I don't think the existence or reality of the windsock is the
issue. I think everyone agrees that the windsock will exist after
everyone leaves or ceases to observe it. Insofar as your brain has a
good memory and forms good models, you can at any time imagine the
sock blowing in the wind without seeing it. If you have a good memory
and model of the windsock you will find that when you see it again it
will still fit your model. That is, the model in your head can
/predict/ how real windsocks behave in the wind.
This amounts to Hertz's necessary,/but not sufficient/, condition for
a good model. However, his point is that /all models are in your
head,/ and /"you do not know, nor have you any means of knowing,
whether your conception of things /[your models] /are in conformity
with them in any other than this one fundamental respect,"/**namely,
that the consequents of the model of the windsock in your head behaves
"closely enough" to the directly observed consequents of the real windsock.
The condition "closely enough" is a subjective or cultural decision,
and one where physicists and philosophers often differ, largely
because their subject (what they are modeling) is so different. I
don't think calling people /realists/ or /nominalists or psychologists
or antipsychologists /add any light to how we create our images.
Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Post by Benjamin Udell
On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds
nothing; and on the other hand you argue against realism and call
nominalism the "best bet".

HP: I said no such thing. I said the windsock exists no matter how we
model it. I believe that is what you call realism. Nor did I say
nominalism is the best bet. Some models do exist nominally only in
the head. You philosophers appear to enjoy shackling ideas in
pigeon-holes designed by logicians.

Post by Benjamin Udell
BU: On one hand you grant that numbers can be objectively
investigated, and on the other hand you deny being realist about
numbers in a Peircean sense.

HP: I did not say that either. Some numbers correspond to objects
that are real, like counting your marbles. Other numbers are
creations of the imagination, like n-dimensional spaces. Some model
concepts we cannot know empirically if they correspond with reality,
like discrete and continuous, or deterministic and probabilistic models.

Post by Benjamin Udell
BU: On one hand you argue that physical laws are real; and now you
turn around and argue that the match of a theory's predictions
vis-a-vis reality is a "cultural" judgment.

HP: That is half correct, and it is not a "turn around." As a
physicist I certainly believe that Nature and Natures laws are as
real as we can imagine reality to be. At the same time, our models of
Natures laws, like quantum theory, while they are exceeding accurate
and fit predictions, we do not say they are true or false. In fact,
we know our models are just our best approximations to reality. Like
Peirce, we find them converging toward something we call truth.

Post by Benjamin Udell
BU: It's not just a cultural judgment that physical theories and
engineering had anything to do with it, when a rocket brings a rover
to Mars, lands successfully, etc., based on physical theories'
predictions and engineering.

HP: Of course it is not "just a cultural judgement." But beyond the
necessary explicit physics principles of invariance and symmetry that
define objectivity, the models are ultimately collectively judged not
only by experiments but by a community of experts who rely on their
total experience that includes many tacit beliefs, ethics, and
aesthetics. That does not make physics models just social constructs.
The necessary requirement is that they pragmatically fit Nature's
inexorable behavior. But that is not sufficient.

Polanyi: "We must now recognize belief once more as the source of all
knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the sharing of an
idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like-minded
community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature
of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No
intelligence, however critical or original, can operate outside such
a fiduciary framework."

Howard

[Benjamin Udell]

Howard, list,

Responses interleaved.

Post by Howard Pattee

BU: On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism

and nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds
nothing; and on the other hand you argue against realism and call
nominalism the "best bet".
HP: I said no such thing.

BU: Sorry, my memory reworded it but you said something to the same

Post by Howard Pattee

HP: Epistemologies are not empirically decidable, e.g., not

falsifiable. True belief in any epistemology requires a leap of
faith. There are degrees of faith, skepticism being at the low end.
In my own view as a physicist, nominalism requires a much safer leap
of faith than realism. However, I often think realistically. I see
no harm in it as long as I don't see it as the one true belief.
[End quote
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14168 ]

Post by Howard Pattee

HP: I said the windsock exists no matter how we model it. I believe

that is what you call realism.

BU: The objectively real existence of individuals is where nominalism
and realism traditionally agree but Peirce parts company from realists
who think that future individual things are already determinate and
individualized and objectively real _/individuals/ _ in that sense.
Anyway the nominalist-realist debate is usually in regard to generals
and there realism is usually the idea that there are _/real generals/_
as well as _/figmentitious generals/ _ and that the hope of theory is to
represent real generals. Such realism is compatible with an
indeterminism about probable and feasible individual things/happenings
and even with a indeterminism of past things/happenings that managed not
to interact with, and communicate themselves to, their environment.

Post by Howard Pattee

HG: Nor did I say nominalism is the best bet.

BU: You said "In my own view as a physicist, nominalism requires a much
safer leap of faith than realism ".

Post by Howard Pattee

HG: /*Some* / models do exist nominally only in the head. You

philosophers appear to enjoy shackling ideas in pigeon-holes designed
by logicians.

BU: To hold that _/some/ _ models or theories fail to represent real
generals does not require or constitute nominalism or anti-realism about
generals in general. The problem with the 'pigeon holes' is in your
representation of them, and that representation is among the models that
"do exist only nominally in the head." I've never heard of a philosophy
that claims that all theories are true, all theorized generals are real,
and so on, except the relativist philosophy that surreally calls 'true'
or 'real' whatever somebody, anybody, says is true or real.

Post by Howard Pattee

BU: On one hand you grant that numbers can be objectively

investigated, and on the other hand you deny being realist about
numbers in a Peircean sense.
HP: I did not say that either.

HP: As I have said, numbers can be interpreted by all of the

well-known epistemologies. I agree that various intelligences,
various trained animals, and various computers, proceeding from the
same axioms, strings rewriting rules, and programs will reach the
same conclusion. This has nothing to do with how I view numbers or
epistemologies.
[End quote
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14190 ]

Post by Howard Pattee

BU: You seem like you may be limiting it to the 'automatic' or

corollarial kind of inference, but supposing that you're not, then
what you say is very nearly A: You agree with Peirce about the
reality of generals, and very nearly B: that Peirce's realist view
of generals and modalities has nothing to do with how you view
numbers or epistemologies - not in the sense that you disagree with
Peirce's realism, but in the sense that you and he are not
discussing the same question in the first place. In that sense, his
and your conclusions about epistemology etc. are not necessarily
incompatible at all.
[End quote]

Post by Howard Pattee

HP: /*Some*/ numbers correspond to objects that are real, like

counting your marbles. Other numbers are creations of the imagination,
like n-dimensional spaces

BU: N-dimensional mathematical spaces are instantiated in physical
n-coordinate systems. They don't need to be n-dimensional _/physical
spaces/_ with actual hypercubes and so on. This requires a leap of
metamorphic imagination, not a leap of faith.

But in any case 'X is real' in Peirce's sense means 'X is objectively
investigable as X', not 'X is something studied by physicists'. You have
something like the view from 9th Avenue
https://www.google.com/images?q=view+from+9th+avenue .

You might have had an argument that, even if math is deductive, its
choices of postulates and posited entities is not deductive. But you
grant that there are real correspondences like that of whole numbers to
countable marbles, and you know that intelligences sufficiently
inquiring will get from there and spatial measurement to ideas of
indefinitely divisible space and to continuity as an ideal limit.

Post by Howard Pattee

HP: */Some/* model concepts we cannot know empirically if they

correspond with reality, like discrete and continuous, or
deterministic and probabilistic models.

BU: We can't have absolute theoretical certainty about anything, even
about whether there are four or instead five marbles on some floor.
Nature behaves as if it were fundamentally probabilistic, and continuity
seems at least a good approximation of physical space down to an
increasingly tiny scale of measurement.

Still, again, 'X is real' in Peirce's sense means 'X is objectively
investigable as X', not 'X is something studied by physicists'.

Post by Howard Pattee

BU: On one hand you argue that physical laws are real; and now you

turn around and argue that the match of a theory's predictions
vis-a-vis reality is a "cultural" judgment.
HP: That is half correct, and it is not a "turn around." As a

physicist I certainly believe that Nature and Natures laws are as real
as we can imagine reality to be. At the same time, our */models/* of
Natures laws, like quantum theory, while they are exceeding accurate
and fit predictions, we do not say they are true or false. In fact, we
know our models are just our best approximations to reality. Like
Peirce, we find them converging toward something we call truth.

BU: You've abandoned the "cultural judgment" claim.

Post by Howard Pattee

BU: It's not just a cultural judgment that physical theories and

engineering had anything to do with it, when a rocket brings a rover
to Mars, lands successfully, etc., based on physical theories'
predictions and engineering.
HP: Of course it is not "just a cultural judgement."

BU: In your previous post, you agreed with Hertz that "the consequents
of the model of the windsock in your head behaves 'closely enough' to
the directly observed consequents of the real windsock" and you added
that "The condition "closely enough" is a subjective or cultural
decision...."
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14725

Post by Howard Pattee

HP: But beyond the /necessary/ explicit physics principles of

invariance and symmetry that define objectivity, the models are
ultimately collectively judged not only by experiments but by a
community of experts who rely on their /total experience/ that
includes many tacit beliefs, ethics, and aesthetics. That does not
make physics models/just social constructs./ The /necessary/
requirement is that they pragmatically fit Nature's inexorable
behavior. But that is not /sufficient./

You're just saying that in order for agreement to be reached, agreement
must be reached and that that's a sufficient condition. If the community
is expert enough, then it's necessary for the predictions to match
reality in order for agreement actually to be reached. But that judgment
of closeness of match is just subjective and cultural, according to you.
So what is the part that you say is "of course" not just a cultural
judgment? The part about actually reaching agreement? But that's the
most cultural or social part. Moreover, the agreement of an actual set
of experts is not what makes a theory true or accurate or a close
approximation.

Your not wanting to be 'pigeon-holed' suggests that you want to retain
flexibility, which is fine, but when it leads to continual
inconsistencies, there's no reason not to point them out.

We're going in circles. What's more, it's stlll hard to see what you do
think.

On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds nothing;
and on the other hand you argue against realism and call nominalism -
not the "best bet" - but, in your opinion "as a physicist", "a much
safer leap of faith than realism".

On one hand you grant that numbers can be objectively investigated, and
on the other hand you deny being realist about numbers in a Peircean sense.

On the one hand you say that symbols 'hide' their meanings, and on the
other hand you say that the interpreter 'creates' their meanings.

On one hand you argue that physical laws are real; and on the other hand
you argue that the closeness of a theory's prediction vis-a-vis reality
is a just a subjective cultural judgment.

Then in some cases you say that you didn't say those things and I show
where you said them. If those are not inconsistencies but instead
reflect your changes of mind or your corrections of your misphrasings,
then please say so.

Best, Ben

Post by Howard Pattee
// > HP: Polanyi: "We must now recognize belief once more as the
source of all knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the
sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a
like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of
the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No
intelligence, however critical or original, can operate outside such a
fiduciary framework."

Howard

[Benjamin Udell]

Stan, lists,

BU: The main idea is not that of a long run. Instead the

idea is that of sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently
long' or 'sufficiently far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or
'sufficiently good' or 'sufficiently good for long enough', or
the like, it's stlll the same basic idea.

S: Then two different traditions might come up with differently

sufficient understandings about one object. I accept that, and it
implies nominalism. Sufficiency might be quite different for
different traditions.

Also

S: My position is that 'the real' either is not one thing, or

that there might be several different traditions about it based on
different approaches and knowledges.

B: You're simply not distinguishing between truth and

opinion. If two traditions arrive at contrary conclusions about
the same kind of phenomenon, the normal logical conclusion about
the contrarity is that at most one of the conclusions is true
and true for sound reasons, at most one is the result of
sufficient investigation even though both traditions claim
sufficiency. Peirce's semiotics is logic studied in terms of
signs. You don't distinguish between sufficiency and claims of
sufficiency, truth and claims of truth, and reality and claims
of reality. Both traditions' conclusions might be false, results
of insufficient investigation. They might both be mixes of truth
and falsehood, various inaccuracies, and so on.

S: I do not believe in an external non-mediated TRUTH as such. I

think different traditions might reach different concepts of truth,
and, indeed, more importantly, some might not construct an idea of
truth at all. As I see it, you are simply defending the European
conceptual tradition that has now become global. It was globalized
because of its usefulness (sufficiency), and because no objection
was permitted.

Best, Ben

B: I've never heard of a philosophy that claims that all theories

are true, all theorized generals are real, and so on, except the
relativist philosophy that surreally calls 'true' or 'real' whatever
somebody, anybody, says is true or real.
S: This is an over-the-top misrepresentation (?nurtured by fear or
hate). In matters of belief, policy or theories a relativist simply
acknowledges that there are many perspectives on various issues, none
of which can be proven to be 'true' or 'best', even if the relativist
happens to believe some of the versions and may be ready to try to
overcome others.

HP: Polanyi: "We must now recognize belief once more as the source

of all knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the sharing
of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like-minded
community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature
of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence,
however critical or original, can operate outside such a fiduciary
framework."
STAN
Howard, list,
Responses interleaved.

BU: On one hand you argue that such questions as those of

realism and nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning
them adds nothing; and on the other hand you argue against
realism and call nominalism the "best bet".
HP: I said no such thing.

BU: Sorry, my memory reworded it but you said something to the

HP: Epistemologies are not empirically decidable, e.g.,

not falsifiable. True belief in any epistemology requires a
leap of faith. There are degrees of faith, skepticism being at
the low end. In my own view as a physicist, nominalism
requires a much safer leap of faith than realism. However, I
often think realistically. I see no harm in it as long as I
don't see it as the one true belief.
[End quote
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14168 ]

HP: I said the windsock exists no matter how we model it. I

believe that is what you call realism.

BU: The objectively real existence of individuals is where
nominalism and realism traditionally agree but Peirce parts
company from realists who think that future individual things are
already determinate and individualized and objectively real
_/individuals/ _ in that sense. Anyway the nominalist-realist
debate is usually in regard to generals and there realism is
usually the idea that there are _/real generals/_ as well as
_/figmentitious generals/ _ and that the hope of theory is to
represent real generals. Such realism is compatible with an
indeterminism about probable and feasible individual
things/happenings and even with a indeterminism of past
things/happenings that managed not to interact with, and
communicate themselves to, their environment.

HG: Nor did I say nominalism is the best bet.

BU: You said "In my own view as a physicist, nominalism requires a
much safer leap of faith than realism ".

HG: /*Some* / models do exist nominally only in the head. You

philosophers appear to enjoy shackling ideas in pigeon-holes
designed by logicians.

BU: To hold that _/some/ _ models or theories fail to represent
real generals does not require or constitute nominalism or
anti-realism about generals in general. The problem with the
'pigeon holes' is in your representation of them, and that
representation is among the models that "do exist only nominally
in the head." I've never heard of a philosophy that claims that
all theories are true, all theorized generals are real, and so on,
except the relativist philosophy that surreally calls 'true' or
'real' whatever somebody, anybody, says is true or real.

BU: On one hand you grant that numbers can be objectively

investigated, and on the other hand you deny being realist about
numbers in a Peircean sense.
HP: I did not say that either.

HP: As I have said, numbers can be interpreted by all of

the well-known epistemologies. I agree that various
intelligences, various trained animals, and various computers,
proceeding from the same axioms, strings rewriting rules, and
programs will reach the same conclusion. This has nothing to
do with how I view numbers or epistemologies.
[End quote
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14190 ]

BU: You seem like you may be limiting it to the

'automatic' or corollarial kind of inference, but supposing
that you're not, then what you say is very nearly A: You agree
that Peirce's realist view of generals and modalities has
nothing to do with how you view numbers or epistemologies -
not in the sense that you disagree with Peirce's realism, but
in the sense that you and he are not discussing the same
question in the first place. In that sense, his and your
conclusions about epistemology etc. are not necessarily
incompatible at all.
[End quote]

HP: /*Some*/ numbers correspond to objects that are real, like

counting your marbles. Other numbers are creations of the
imagination, like n-dimensional spaces

BU: N-dimensional mathematical spaces are instantiated in physical
n-coordinate systems. They don't need to be n-dimensional
_/physical spaces/_ with actual hypercubes and so on. This
requires a leap of metamorphic imagination, not a leap of faith.
But in any case 'X is real' in Peirce's sense means 'X is
objectively investigable as X', not 'X is something studied by
physicists'. You have something like the view from 9th Avenue
https://www.google.com/images?q=view+from+9th+avenue .
You might have had an argument that, even if math is deductive,
its choices of postulates and posited entities is not deductive.
But you grant that there are real correspondences like that of
whole numbers to countable marbles, and you know that
intelligences sufficiently inquiring will get from there and
spatial measurement to ideas of indefinitely divisible space and
to continuity as an ideal limit.

HP: */Some/* model concepts we cannot know empirically if they

correspond with reality, like discrete and continuous, or
deterministic and probabilistic models.

BU: We can't have absolute theoretical certainty about anything,
even about whether there are four or instead five marbles on some
floor. Nature behaves as if it were fundamentally probabilistic,
and continuity seems at least a good approximation of physical
space down to an increasingly tiny scale of measurement.
Still, again, 'X is real' in Peirce's sense means 'X is
objectively investigable as X', not 'X is something studied by
physicists'.

BU: On one hand you argue that physical laws are real; and

now you turn around and argue that the match of a theory's
predictions vis-a-vis reality is a "cultural" judgment.
HP: That is half correct, and it is not a "turn around." As a

physicist I certainly believe that Nature and Natures laws are as
real as we can imagine reality to be. At the same time, our
*/models/* of Natures laws, like quantum theory, while they are
exceeding accurate and fit predictions, we do not say they are
true or false. In fact, we know our models are just our best
approximations to reality. Like Peirce, we find them converging
toward something we call truth.

BU: You've abandoned the "cultural judgment" claim.

BU: It's not just a cultural judgment that physical theories

and engineering had anything to do with it, when a rocket brings
a rover to Mars, lands successfully, etc., based on physical
theories' predictions and engineering.
HP: Of course it is not "just a cultural judgement."

BU: In your previous post, you agreed with Hertz that "the
consequents of the model of the windsock in your head behaves
'closely enough' to the directly observed consequents of the real
windsock" and you added that "The condition "closely enough" is a
subjective or cultural decision...."
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14725

HP: But beyond the /necessary/ explicit physics principles of

invariance and symmetry that define objectivity, the models are
ultimately collectively judged not only by experiments but by a
community of experts who rely on their /total experience/ that
includes many tacit beliefs, ethics, and aesthetics. That does
not make physics models/just social constructs./ The /necessary/
requirement is that they pragmatically fit Nature's inexorable
behavior. But that is not /sufficient./

You're just saying that in order for agreement to be reached,
agreement must be reached and that that's a sufficient condition.
If the community is expert enough, then it's necessary for the
predictions to match reality in order for agreement actually to be
reached. But that judgment of closeness of match is just
subjective and cultural, according to you. So what is the part
that you say is "of course" not just a cultural judgment? The part
about actually reaching agreement? But that's the most cultural or
social part. Moreover, the agreement of an actual set of experts
is not what makes a theory true or accurate or a close approximation.
Your not wanting to be 'pigeon-holed' suggests that you want to
retain flexibility, which is fine, but when it leads to continual
inconsistencies, there's no reason not to point them out.
We're going in circles. What's more, it's stlll hard to see what
you do think.
On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds
nothing; and on the other hand you argue against realism and call
nominalism - not the "best bet" - but, in your opinion "as a
physicist", "a much safer leap of faith than realism".
On one hand you grant that numbers can be objectively
investigated, and on the other hand you deny being realist about
numbers in a Peircean sense.
On the one hand you say that symbols 'hide' their meanings, and on
the other hand you say that the interpreter 'creates' their meanings.
On one hand you argue that physical laws are real; and on the
other hand you argue that the closeness of a theory's prediction
vis-a-vis reality is a just a subjective cultural judgment.
Then in some cases you say that you didn't say those things and I
show where you said them. If those are not inconsistencies but
instead reflect your changes of mind or your corrections of your
misphrasings, then please say so.
Best, Ben

// > HP: Polanyi: "We must now recognize belief once more as the
source of all knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passions,
the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation
to a like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our
vision of the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery
of things. No intelligence, however critical or original, can
operate outside such a fiduciary framework."

Howard

[Howard Pattee]

Then in some cases you [Howard] say that you didn't say those things
and I show where you said them. If those are not inconsistencies but
instead reflect your changes of mind or your corrections of your
misphrasings, then please say so.

HP: I stand by what I said; no corrections or mind changes, but I
will try to make my beliefs clearer. Your rephrasings altered my
meanings. I think the reason I appear to you as inconsistent is
because you do not recognize the empirical necessity of
complementarity and hierarchic levels of models. Also, we have a
different view of scientific models. Your response also illustrates
my original point that such disputes over undecidable epistemological
ideologies can not only be a waste of time, but are often misleading;
or worse, they can become name-calling contests over the -isms,
distracting otherwise productive discussions over substantive
scientific theories.

That does not mean that epistemologies are unimportant. In physics,
epistemologies of many forms are entertained (not believed) as
important explorations of conceptual and formal theories. That is,
they are a form of thought experiment, not unlike the non-existent
Maxwell demon. For example, Wigner entertained solipsism as a
logically consistent interpretation of quantum theory, but he does
not believe in solipsism. QM has also engendered novel
epistemologies, like Many Worlds, that are often entertained but
seldom believed. That is what I was getting at when I said: "I often
think realistically. I see no harm in it as long as I don't see it as
the one true belief."

As evidence, ask yourself: For how many years have the greatest minds
been arguing over realism vs. nominalism? Is there any obvious trend
toward a consensus? If not, why not? Do you know of any mathematical
theorem, physical, biological, or brain theory that would be altered
if either the truth or falsity of either view were revealed?

To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me
explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's
philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an
attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the
demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that
have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by
either analytic logics or epistemologies.

I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects
the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he
observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of
Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I
also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the
meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But Peirce
is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the reality
of their results.

This is long enough for one post. I will give examples of the
necessity of complementarity and hierchic levels later. In logic and
mathematics, Peirce's (and Aristotle's, Descartes', Cantor's,
Dedekind's, et al's) problem with defining discreteness and
continuity is one example. Reversible and irreversible models, and
deterministic and probabilistic models are others.

Howard