Gary R - I don't see why, because there is a discussion of a book (and one which I very much admire) that both blogs should be silenced and not allowed to discuss other areas. Stan and I, for one, were confining our interaction only to the Biosemiotic Blog.
And, the thread - Semiotic Theory of Information - is entirely different in title from the titles of the chapters of Frederik's book being discussed and makes no attempt to interfere with that discussion. After all, there is no 'law' that says that we may not discuss the dicisign outside of the discussion focused around the NP book! Nor that we require the 'preparatory work' found only in that NP book in order to discuss the work that is being done within the non-linguistic semiotic realms.
Some of us have an interest strictly and only in the philosophical; some in the linguistic; some have an interest in the non-linguistic physical and biological and other pragmatics of semiosis; it is, after all, being researched widely in various fields. Why can't we discuss that on these blogs - now - and instead must either be silent or wait until we are deemed 'sufficiently prepared' to enter into our discussion?
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: ***@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 4:34 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7152] Re: Semiotic Theory Of
Stan, Edwina, lists,
Stan wrote: In the sprit of : ET: attempt to move the discussion from the isolation of the philosophy seminar room into pragmatic reality.
I would think that it would behoove those interested in applying the idea of the dicisign, as Peirce analyzed it and Stjernfelt both explicates and further develops it, to first understand it. In a word, I'd advocate a bit of patience in consideration of the present seminar on Natural Propositions, perhaps especially in the biosemiotics list, since the direct application of the dicisign concept to biosemiotics isn't taken up as such until Chapter 6.
Still, the preparatory work seems to me to be very important, and while, for example, I wasn't particularly interested in participating in the anti-psychologism of semiotics discussions of Chapter 2, especially as I understand and agree with the argument which Peirce and Stjernfelt make regarding the need to de-psychologize semiotics (so I read, but didn't participate in that discussion), I find the subject matter of Chapter 3 of considerable interest.
Stan wrote, and, if I correctly understand him, I tend to agree (although I'm not a materialist):
SS: The abstractness of [Edwina's formulation that the semiosic process is best seen as a single triadic process that is a function. f(x)=y] does not sit well in my materialist mind. In particular, the representamen is the product of a process of interpretation by a system of interpretance. This also converts the dynamic object to the immediate object. I think that, without spelling out what particular system of interpretance might be involved, it needs to be represented in the BASIC formulation if we are to have a formulation that might appeal to scientists like biologists.
So, again, I would recommend some patience as we approach (as somewhat diverse communities of what I hope is mutual interest) Chapter 6, "The Evolution of Semiotic Self-Control." I think that there's quite a bit of "pragmatic reality" to be found there (and elsewhere) in Natural Propositions (as well as in the key late Peirce texts, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia). After all, Peirce himself was a practicing scientist, and a good one at that.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Stanley N Salthe <***@binghamton.edu> wrote:
Edwina -- In the sprit of : ET: attempt to move the discussion from the isolation of the philosophy seminar room into pragmatic reality.
Thus, responding to:
ET: I've advocated, for many years, that the semiosic process, in its single triadic process, is a function. f(x)=y. X is the input data from the Dynamic Object and Y is the output Interpretant. F, of course, is the Representamen. This acknowledges the dynamic mediative nature of 'f', or the Representamen, where input data is transformed/interpreted into one basic conclusion.
The abstractness of this formulation does not sit well in my materialist mind. In particular, the representamen is the product of a process of interpretation by a system of interpretance. This also converts the dynamic object to the immediate object. I think that, without spelling out what particular system of interpretance might be involved, it needs to be represented in the BASIC formulation if we are to have a formulation that might appeal to scientists like biologists.
STAN
On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 11:58 AM, Edwina Taborsky <***@primus.ca> wrote:
Sung - I've still no idea what you mean by semiotics as a mathematical category - despite your frequent descriptions of it. I've advocated, for many years, that the semiosic process, in its single triadic process, is a function. f(x)=y. X is the input data from the Dynamic Object and Y is the output Interpretant. F, of course, is the Representamen. This acknowledges the dynamic mediative nature of 'f', or the Representamen, where input data is transformed/interpreted into one basic conclusion.
Your other concepts (besides your 'mathematical category')...such as the wave-particle duality and your complementarism and your formal/material dualism etc - I don't agree with because they have little to do with semiosis...and my views of 'what is matter' and 'what is Mind' are quite different, as I follow the 'matter is effete Mind' view of Peirce.
My point in bringing these issues into these discussions is a perhaps sideline attempt to move the discussion from the isolation of the philosophy seminar room into pragmatic reality. That is, biology and evolution, and economics, and artificial intelligence and yes, societal organization, have a great deal to learn from semiotics. I think that Frederik's outline of the dicisign moves semiosis from the heady fields of literature, film, language etc...into the actual material world - and to me, that's where it is innovative and exciting.
Edwina
----- Original Message ----- From: "Sungchul Ji" <***@rci.rutgers.edu>
To: "Edwina Taborsky" <***@primus.ca>
Cc: "Peirce List" <peirce-***@list.iupui.edu>; <***@lists.ut.ee>
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 11:30 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion
Edwina, Jon, lists,
If the idea expressed in [biosemiotics:7096] is, in principle, correct
that the "new" semiotics can be viewed as a mathematical category
comprising physics, biology and linguistics, among others, it may be
necessary for natural scientists to become semioticians and semioticians
natural scientists.
For example the model of morphogenesis (see attached) proposed in one of
the articles collected in the link Edwina provides below states thus:
"This image is a representation of a regenerating planarian (100714-1)
flatworm. The tail portion, which has been amputated, will
regrow perfectly. This illustrates the concept of morphostasis-the
ability of some living systems to dynamically restore their pattern.
The image shows neoblast stem cells (light red dots), blastema
(orange tissue at the wound site), and the bioelectrical gradients
that are crucial for maintaining long-range anatomical polarity
(yellow "field" lines). The morphogenetic field of patterning
information (the target morphology) which will guide the rebuilding
of the tail is schematized as a wire framework (white)-a scaffold
of force and information underlying the subsequent gene expression
and anatomy."
One possible explanation for the amputated tail regrowing to its original
shape would be the action of the wave-particle duality in morphogenesis,
since the standing waves determined by the topology of the whole embryo
can guide the regeneration of the appropriate cells (i.e., particles) to
form the missing tail. I have not yet read the original paper but I am
almost sure that the authors non-local explanation for this phenomenon
would be consistent witht he wave-particle dual model here described.
From the wave-particle model to Peircean theory of categories may not be
too far, since semiosis would implicate the irreducible triad of physics
(a First), biology (a Second) and linguistics/informatics/genetics (a
Third).
With all the best.
Sung
____________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
Jon - these people have attempted to move semiotic analysis out of the
comfort of the pipe-smoke-filled seminar rooms into the pragmatic realm.
So,
they've been exploring the semiotic informational and knowledge processes
that actually take place within artificial intelligence, within economic
processes within societies, within humans both as the individual and as a
collective, within societies as cohesive organisms and of course, within
the
biological realm - where a lot of work is being done within biosemiotics.
Therefore these are not trivial but necessarily very specific outlines of
the informational processes that take place in these systems.
http://www.dca.fee.unicamp.br/~gudwin/compsemio/
http://link.springer.com/journal/12304
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/biosystems/
In many cases they refer to Peirce. In many cases they do not but the
actual
analytic framework they are developing and using is a triadic semiosic
unit
with all the complexities of the three categories.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03032647/109/3
In other areas, they are focusing on semiotics as a dynamic complex
process
not confined to the individual but as operating within the collective..and
not as a single interaction but as a network of interactions.. as in, eg,
the economic processes (and of course within the biological realm)
http://www.frankfurt-school.de/clicnetclm/fileDownload.do?goid=000000396632AB4
And entropy and complexity research further explores the basic nature of
semiosis, again, often referring to semiosis (and Peirce) and often not.
I'm
sure you are aware of the
COMPLEXITY DIGEST and of Entropy online
http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/16/9?utm_source=issue_link&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=releaseIssue_entropy
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jon Awbrey" <***@att.net>
To: "Peirce List" <peirce-***@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 8:24 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14561
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14570
Edwina, List,
I don't recall running across Perlovsky before but I have at least
skimmed
a few
papers coming out of the Computational Semiotics group (or maybe it was
another
such group out of Waterloo?) At any rate, aside from my own humble
efforts it
has only been the computer science semioticians who actually tackle
anything
approaching non-trivial examples of sign relations. By tackling a
non-trivial
example I don't mean simply waving ones hands in the direction of a
complex case
and remarking how complex it is, but actually articulating a concrete
example as
a sign relation proper.
Regards,
Jon
Jon Awbrey wrote:
Edwina, List,
I decided the other title was too long, and I like the acronym STOI
much
better.
It's not so much that we touch on learning and reasoning just now as
the
fact that we've been immersed in them all along.
In every realm of inquiry we encounter complementaries, dualities, or
trade-offs between two aspects of the phenomena we are trying to
understand. Viewed in the setting of a triadic sign relation that
encompasses all the relevant objects and all the signs and ideas we
have
of them, we can often recognize these aspects as corresponding to the
denotative and connotative planes of that sign relation.
In computer science, especially in AI, one runs smack dab into the
problem of integrating data-driven and concept-driven aspects of
intelligent functioning. You find yourself recapitulating in the
ontogeny of your software development something like the phylogeny of
classical oppositions between empiricists and rationalists.
Well, it's late ...
Jon
If we are to touch on learning and reasoning, it might be fruitful to
expand the research domain of this blog to include the research areas
of
such people as Leonid Perlovsky and Ricardo Gudwin. Both of them are
involved in cognition, semiotics, learning, evolution. That is, most
of
this list (Peirce list) and its discussions seems devoted to the
purely
theoretical area of the philosophical domains of Peirce. These two (and
others) are focused on the applied, pragmatic domains of cognition,
semiotics, artificial intelligence, bioengineering, and etc. And
yes,
both of them have explored Peirce.
http://www.leonid-perlovsky.com/
http://faculty.dca.fee.unicamp.br/gudwin/node/2
--
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